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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
* * * * * * * * 
MARION MARSH, 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
vs. 
SCOTT ALLAN MARSH, 
Defendant-Appellant 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Appeal No. 970696-CA 
Civil No. 894891070 DA 
Oral Argument Priority 
No. 15 
* * * * * * * * 
Appeal from a Final Judgment 
of the Third Judicial District Court 
of Salt Lake County, Utah 
The Honorable Leslie A. Lewis 
I. JURISDICTION 
The authority which confers jurisdiction on this Court to 
hear this appeal from the Third Judicial District Court of Salt 
Lake County is Section 78-2a-3(2)(h), Utah Code Annotated 1953, 
as amended, and the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure No. 3(a). 
II. STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1 
This is an appeal from a April 17, 1997 decision of the 
Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County which requires 
Appellant Scott Allan Marsh, ("Mr. Marsh") to pay Marion Marsh, 
("Mrs. Marsh") a percentage of the separation pay he received as 
a result of his involuntary separation from the U.S. Navy. In 
addition, Mr. Marsh appeals from a decision of the Trial Court 
which allowed Mrs. Marsh to default on her payments of a loan in 
which she agreed to hold Mr. Marsh harmless thus violating the 
Decree of Divorce dated August 16, 1989. 
III. QUESTIONS OF LAW AND FACT 
A. SHOULD A MILITARY SEPARATION PAYMENT MADE UNDER 10 
U.S.C. §1174 AND RELATED STATUTES BE TREATED AS A PENSION OR 
RETIREMENT PAYMENT WHEN STATUTORILY IT WAS NOT MADE SUCH A 
BENEFIT AND WAS INTENDED TO ASSIST THE DISCHARGED INDIVIDUAL IN 
HIS RE-ENTRY INTO CIVILIAN LIFE? This is a question of law 
reviewed for correctness. Doelle v. Bradley, 784 P.2d 1176 (Utah 
1989); Lake Philgas Service v. Valley Bank, 845 P.2d 955, (Utah 
App. 1993); Marchant v. Park City, 111 P.2d 677 (Utah App. 1989). 
B. SINCE THE SEPARATION BENEFIT APPELLANT RECEIVED MUST BE 
REPAID IN THE EVENT THE DISCHARGED INDIVIDUAL BECOMES ELIGIBLE 
FOR RETIREMENT BENEFITS, MUST THE APPELLEE BE REQUIRED TO 
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CONTRIBUTE TO THE REPAYMENT IF SHE RECEIVES ANY OF THE SEPARATION 
PAY? This is a question of law which the Trial Court failed to 
properly decide and is reviewed for correctness. Doelle v. 
Bradley, 784 P.2d 1176 (Utah 1989); Lake Philgas Service v. 
Valley Bank, 845 P.2d 955, (Ut. App. 1993); Marchant v. Park 
City, 111 P.2d 677 (Utah App. 1989). 
C. IS MRS. MARSH'S FAILURE TO HOLD MR. MARSH HARMLESS FROM 
DEBTS AGAINST THE MARITAL RESIDENCE IN VIOLATION OF HER 
OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE DEGREE OF DIVORCE JUSTIFYING AN AWARD OF 
SANCTIONS AGAINST HER? This is a mixed question of law and fact 
to be reviewed factually and for correctness. Marchant v. Park 
City, 111 P.2d 677 (Utah App. 1989); Lake Philgas Service v. 
Valley Bank, 845 P.2d 955, (Ut. App. 1993); Gillmor v. Wright, 
850 P.2d 422 (Utah 1993); Matter of Estate of Bartell, 116 P.2d 
885 (Utah 1989). 
IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW AND SUPPORTING AUTHORITIES 
All of the foregoing issues for review on this Appeal 
present questions of law for determination by this Appeals Court. 
For the purposes of this appeal there are very limited factual 
disputes. This appeal is based on the Trial Court's order 
requiring Mr. Marsh to pay a percentage of his separation pay to 
Mrs. Marsh as though such pay were part of a Pension or 
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Retirement Benefit when according to the applicable statutes, 
Separation pay is not the same as a retirement benefit since the 
requirements for receiving Separation pay and the formula for 
calculating the payments are different. This appeal is also 
based on the Trial Court's order allowing Mrs. Marsh to avoid her 
obligations of the divorce decree by refusing to hold Mr. Marsh 
harmless in regard to the debt on the marital residence. 
The standard for review (where the appeal as here presented 
is essentially on issues of law and interpretation of statutes) 
is that upon review, no deference is given to the trial court 
statements, conclusions, rulings, or interpretations and the 
Appellate Court is free to render its independent interpretation 
and review for Correctness. Doelle v. Bradley, 784 P.2d 1176 
(Utah 1989); Mountain Fuel Supply Co. v. Salt Lake City Corp., 
752 P.2d 884 (Utah 1988); Faulkner v. Faulkner, 714 P.2d 1149 
(Utah 1986); Arnold Machinery Co. v. Balls, 624 P.2d 678 (Utah 
1981). 
In this case, the facts on both issues are not in dispute. 
Mr. Marsh received a separation payment upon his involuntary 
termination from the military. The Trial Court erred in 
considering this as a Retirement or Pension benefit. In such an 
instance the appellate court need not grant any deference to the 
trial court when "even if viewed in the light most favorable to 
the trial court, the evidence is legally insufficient to support 
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the findings." Doelle v. Bradley, 784 P.2d 1176, 1178 (Utah 
1989). 
In addition, the Trial Court erred in determining that the 
obligations of the divorce decree were contingent upon one 
another and that failure of one justified failure of another. 
Under U.C.A. §30-3-5(1) (c) the divorce decree must specify which 
party is responsible for the payment of joint debts and 
provisions for the enforcement of these orders. The Marsh's 
Divorce Decree provides that in the event Mr. Marsh fell 30 days 
or more in arrears on his support payments, Mrs. Marsh was 
entitled to mandatory income withholding relief. This is the 
only remedy permitted by the decree and the Trial Court erred in 
determining that Mr. Marsh's arrearage was justification for Mrs. 
Marsh's failure to maintain her obligation of holding him 
harmless from the mortgage. 
V. DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
Statutes determinative of Mr. Marsh's first issue are 10 
U.S.C. §§627-1174 and §1408 (Exhibit A) which govern Separation 
Pay and Pension and Retirement Benefits from the U.S. Military. 
While no Utah Cases have been found on point, the California case 
of Kuzmiak v. Kuzmiak, 222 Cal. Rptr. 644 (CA 2nd, Calif 1986) is 
directly on point. (Exhibit B) 
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The statute determinative of Mr. Marsh's second issue is 
U.C.A. §30-3-5 which proscribes that upon divorce debts are to be 
divided, and the Decree of Divorce must contain provisions for 
failure to meet financial obligations. The Divorce Decree 
provides that if Mr. Marsh fails to pay child support, Mrs. Marsh 
is entitled to mandatory withholding to satisfy the payments. 
VI. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On August 16, 1989, Marion Marsh and Scott Allan Marsh were 
divorced. (R. at 38, Exhibit C at 6). The relevant portions of 
the Divorce Decree awarded Marion Marsh "ll/40ths of all pension 
and retirement benefits that the [Mr. Marsh] may receive upon his 
retirement from military service." (Divorce Decree, R. at 43, 
Exhibit C at 6; R. at 462, Exhibit D at 2). This included only 
retirement and pensions and was silent as to separation pay. In 
addition Mrs. Marsh was awarded the marital residence. (R. at 
43, Exhibit C at 6). With the home, she assumed the debt of 
$75,000 with Fleet Mortgage and the Veterans Administration and 
was ordered to hold Mr. Marsh harmless on the financial 
obligation. (R. at 44, Exhibit C at 7). In addition, Mr. Marsh 
was ordered to pay alimony and child support. (R. at 41-42, 
Exhibit C at 4-5). 
In November, 1991, Mr. Marsh was involuntarily discharged 
from his employment with the United States Navy. (Tr. at 52, 
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Exhibit E at 52). Pursuant to 10 U.S.C. §1174, Mr. Marsh was 
given separation pay in the amount of $30,000. Mr. Marsh treated 
the separation pay as such and not a pension or retirement 
payment and did not pay Mrs. Marsh ll/40ths of the payment. 
While the military referred to the payment as a pension plan on 
his W-2 form, Mr. Neil Crist, ("Mr. Crist''), a retired Air Force 
Colonel and the expert at the hearing on this matter, 
acknowledged that the W-2 form did not contain an appropriate 
place on the form to enter military separation pay. He indicated 
that under the circumstances, the Retirement/Pension line is 
where an individual would likely be instructed to enter the 
payment. (Tr. at 66, Exhibit E at 66). 
Mrs. Marsh contends that she was entitled to ll/40ths of the 
separation pay as part of a pension or retirement plan. (R. at 
283, Exhibit F at 3). Commissioner Michael Evans recommended a 
ruling in favor of Mrs. Marsh. At the trial, Mr. Crist, a 
retired colonel with the Air Force, testified as an expert 
witness. (Tr. at 25, Exhibit E at 25). He testified that 
separation pay and retirement were treated differently by the 
Military, but that in his opinion the separation pay was an 
"advancement on retirement". (Tr. at 48-50, Exhibit E at 48-50). 
On June 9, 1997, the Honorable Leslie Lewis ordered that 
Mrs. Marsh be awarded ll/40ths of the disbursement received by 
Defendant in 1991, together with interest. (R. at 460, Exhibit G 
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at 7). Mr. Marsh appeals from that decision on the grounds that 
the payment he received was a separation payment and was not a 
pension or retirement benefit. 
In addition, Mrs. Marsh breached her obligation under the 
Divorce Decree by failing to make the mortgage payments and 
allowing the mortgage company to foreclose on the marital 
residence. (Veterans Affairs Letter of August 25, 1993, R. at 
200, Exhibit H at 1). Mrs. Marsh contends that her failure to 
make the mortgage payment was a direct result of Mr. Marsh's late 
support payments. (R. at 206, Exhibit I at 3). Commissioner 
Michael Evans recommended that Mrs. Marsh not be held in contempt 
for her failure to hold Mr. Marsh harmless on the debt. (Minute 
Entry, R. at 239, Exhibit J). Mr. Marsh objected to the 
commissioner's ruling. 
The Trial Court found that since Appellant was in arrears in 
his support at the time Appellee permitted the foreclosure, the 
Appellee had not failed in her duty under the Decree of Divorce. 
(R. at 454, Exhibit G at 2-3). Mr. Marsh appeals from this order 
on the grounds that the elements of a divorce decree are treated 
individually and an arrearage in support on his part does not 
justify her breach of the order to hold him harmless on the 
mortgage payment. 
The Decree of Divorce provides Mrs. Marsh a remedy in the 
event that Mr. Marsh gets behind on his support payments. The 
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Decree states "if the Defendant falls thirty (30) days or more in 
arrears in his child support obligation, the Plaintiff should be 
entitled to mandatory income withholding relief pursuant to Utah 
Code Annotated (78-45(d)-l et. seq.)(1984 as amended). (Tr. at 
41, Exhibit E at 41). This is her exclusive remedy and does not 
provide her the option of defaulting on her mortgage payment and 
allowing the mortgage company to foreclose on the house which is 
held jointly with Mr. Marsh. 
Mr. Marsh appeals from this decision on the grounds that 
obligations of a divorce decree are individual obligations which 
are not contingent upon the other obligations. Mr. Marsh has 
made up payment of all arrearages. In addition, at the time of 
the hearing on this matter, Mr. Marsh was current on his child 
support obligations as acknowledged by Mrs. Marsh's attorney. 
(Tr. at 14, Exhibit E at 14). 
VII. SUMMARY OF APPELLANT'S ARGUMENT ON APPEAL 
A military separation payment made under 10 U.S.C. §1174 and 
related statutes should not be treated as a pension or retirement 
payment when statutorily it was not made such a benefit and was 
intended to assist the individual in his re-entry into civilian 
life. At the Commissioner's recommendation, the trial court 
ruled that the payment Mr. Marsh received when he was 
involuntarily terminated from his military service was divisible 
o 
as part of the retirement and pension described in the Divorce 
Decree. 
Congress and the military have statutorily dealt with 
involuntary separations by creating a separation payment. This 
payment is different from a retirement or pension because 
retirement requires 20 years of service in the military while the 
separation pay requires only 6 years of service. While the 
expert testified that this separation was, in his opinion, an 
"advancement on retirement," that implies that everyone who 
receives a separation payment will receive retirement. That is 
clearly not the case. Mr. Marsh appeals the Trial Court's 
decision on the ground that the Court erred in considering the 
money a retirement benefit when it was, in fact, paid as a 
separation payment pursuant to 10 U.S.C. §1174. 
If Mr. Marsh subsequently retires from the military, a 
portion of his retirement pay will be applied toward the amount 
he received upon his separation from the military. If Mrs. Marsh 
receives ll/40ths of the separation pay, Mr. Marsh will be paying 
her ll/40ths of the money he may later be required to pay back. 
If Mr. Marsh is currently required to pay Mrs. Marsh her ll/40ths 
of the separation pay, in equity she must be required to pay back 
ll/40ths out of her portion of the retirement in the event that 
the repayment becomes necessary. 
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Mr. Marsh also appeals the order of the trial court which 
holds him responsible for the foreclosure on the marital 
residence in spite of the fact that in the Divorce Decree orders 
Mrs. Marsh to hold him harmless on that mortgage. The Trial 
Court found that she was not in contempt for breaching her 
obligation based on the fact that Mr. Marsh was behind in his 
support payments. Mr. Marsh contends that the obligations in a 
divorce decree are separate and should not be contingent upon one 
another. In addition, at the time of the hearing on this matter, 
Mr. Marsh had repaid all arrearages and was current in his 
support obligations. 
VIII. APPELLANT'S ARGUMENTS 
ARGUMENT I 
Under 10 U.S.C. §1174, Military Separation Payments are 
treated separate and apart from retirement and pensions and 
should be treated separately under a decree of divorce. 
Separation pay upon involuntary discharge or release form active 
duty is defined by §1174 to include termination of an individual 
"who has completed six or more but less than twenty, years of 
active service immediately before that discharge." It does not 
apply to those who have worked with the military in excess of 20 
years who are entitled to retirement. 
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The separation pay is computed as "10 percent of the product 
of A) his years of active service, and B) 12 times the monthly 
basic pay to which he was entitled at the time of his discharge 
or release from active duty." The statute further provides that 
if the discharged employee eventually collects retirement 
benefits, a percentage of those benefits will be deducted until 
the amount of the separation pay has been repaid. (10 U.S.C. 
§1174 (h)). (Exhibit A ). 
Pursuant to the Divorce Decree dated August 16, 1989, Mrs. 
Marsh is entitled to ll/40ths of Mr. Marsh's retirement benefits 
"upon his retirement from military service." (Tr. at 43, Exhibit 
E at 6.) Mrs. Marsh cites the case of Woodward v. Woodward. 456 
P.2d 431,(considering retirement benefits a marital asset) as 
controlling in this matter. The Divorce Decree clearly addresses 
how retirement benefits should be divided. That division of 
retirement benefits is not applicable here since Congress 
specifically has determined the separation payment to not be a 
retirement benefit. 
In the hearing on this matter, Mrs. Marsh's expert, Neil 
Crist, testified that the separation pay and retirement are 
handled differently since someone who receives the separation 
payment will not necessarily receive retirement. Among other 
possibilities, this would occur if the individual did not 
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complete 20 years of service in the Reserves or if the individual 
did not reach the age of 60. 
Mr. Crist testified that in his opinion, based on the 
repayment plan, the separation pay was an "advancement on the 
retirement." (Tr. at 49, Exhibit E at 49). An advancement, 
however, implies that the individual would later receive 
retirement. As Mr. Crist admitted, this may not be the case. 
(Tr. at 67, Exhibit E at 67). In the instance that the 
individual does not reach retirement age, the money is not 
repaid. Mr. Crist also acknowledged that §1174 relates to 
severance and separation pay and not retirement and pension. 
Mr. Marsh was released from active duty in the Navy under 10 
U.S.C. §632 commonly known as the "up or out" policy. Section 
632 provides in part: 
(a) Each officer. . .who holds the regular grade of captain 
or major. . .who has failed of selection for promotion to 
the next higher regular grade for the second time and whose 
name is not an a list of officers recommended for promotion 
to the next higher regular grade shall be discharged on 
the date requested by him and approved by the Secretary 
concerned, which date shall be not later than the first day 
of the seventh calendar month beginning after the month in 
which the President approves the report of the board which 
considered him for the second time. 
As a result of his involuntary discharge, Mr. Marsh was given a 
separation payment of $30,000 (before taxes), as provided in 10 
U.S.C. §1174. These benefits are provided for discharged 
employees who are not eligible for retirement because of their 
years of service. 
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Utah does not have any case law relating to military 
separation pay but the California case of Kuzmiak v. Kuzmiak, 
222 Cal. Rptr. 644 (Cal.App.2Dist. 1986) is precisely on point. 
(Exhibit B). The facts of the Kuzmiak case are very similar to 
the present case. While California (like Utah) recognizes a 
marital interest in retirement benefits earned during the 
marriage, the court held "that unlike military benefits based 
upon longevity of service, separation pay does not serve to 
compensate for past services. Although longevity of service 
determines the amount of this one-time payment, the right to 
separation pay occurs only when there is an involuntary discharge 
of the service member." Id at 64 6. The court further went on to 
state that the legislative history of §1174 shows that: 
the separation pay is a contingency payment for an officer 
who is career committed but to whom a full military career 
may be denied. It is designed to encourage him to pursue 
his service ambition, knowing that if he is denied a full 
career under the competitive system he can count on an 
adequate readjustment pay to ease his reentry into civilian 
life. 
Id. at 646, (quoting House Rep. No. 96-1462, reprinted in 1980 
U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News. P. 6333, 6361.) The court 
concluded that it was "satisfied that Congress did not intend 
separation pay to be compensation for past services. . . the 
payment is the separate property of the service member." Id. at 
647. 
14 
While Crist testified that it was clear in his mind that 
what Mr. Marsh received was severance or separation pay, Mrs. 
Marsh contends that it was a retirement benefit since Mr. Marsh 
indicated it as such on his W-2 form. The W-2 form does not 
contain a category for separation pay so as Mr. Crist indicated, 
the retirement line would be the appropriate place to include 
separation pay. (Tr. at 66, Exhibit E at 66). 
The $30,000 that Mr. Marsh received was compensation for his 
separation from the military under 10 U.S.C. §1174. (Exhibit A). 
It was designed to give him the opportunity to work back into 
civilian life. Although Mr. Marsh indicated on his tax form that 
the payment was retirement, the form did not provide an 
appropriate place for the entry of this figure. Since the amount 
paid to Mr. Marsh was separation pay as a part of his involuntary 
discharge, the reasoning used in the Kuzmiak case should be 
applied to determine that separation pay is not compensation for 
past services and is consequently not divisible in the divorce 
decree. 
If Mrs. Marsh is awarded ll/40ths of the separation pay, the 
issue arises about the repayment. In the event that Mr. Marsh 
becomes eligible for retirement, he will be required to repay the 
separation pay, and Mrs. Marsh will receive ll/40ths of the 
retirement. Equity requires that Mrs. Marsh be required to 
participate in the repayment if she receives part of the 
IS 
separation pay. If she receives her ll/40ths of the separation 
pay, she should be required to repay ll/40ths when and if she 
receives retirement benefits. 
ARGUMENT II 
Mr. Marsh appeals the Trial Court's decision making Mrs. 
Marsh's obligation to hold him harmless on the mortgage 
contingent on his payment of child support. Each party's duties 
were separate under the Decree of Divorce but the Trial Court has 
refused to enforce Appellee's duty to hold Appellant harmless on 
the mortgage obligation. As a result, Mr. Marsh or someone on 
his behalf must repay the Department of Veteran's Affairs the sum 
of $12,870.96 before the Appellant can once again be eligible for 
Veteran's loans. (Exhibit H). 
Cases concerning the separate obligations of a divorce 
decree deal primarily with linking child support with visitation. 
The Utah Supreme Court in the case of Rohr v. Rohr, 709 P.2d 382 
(Utah 1985) cited various jurisdictions and concluded that "A 
court may not deny the noncustodial parent visitation rights for 
the mere failure to pay child support, where the failure to pay 
is due to an inability to pay." The court in that case, however, 
ruled against the non-supporting parent because there was no 
evidence that he was unable to provide for the child, he had 
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abused his visitation rights and that his conduct was detrimental 
to the child. The court clearly indicated that the restrictions 
on the father's visitation rights were a result of plaintiff's 
"willful and intentional failure to support his child and his 
contumacy with respect to a court-ordered visitation schedule and 
attempt to forcefully remove the child from the custodial 
parent." 
The Utah Court of Appeals in Dana v. Dana, 789 P.2d 726 
(Utah App. 1990) further separated the obligations of child 
support and visitation by ruling that a father who did not meet 
his visitation schedule could not be required to pay additional 
child support. In child support and visitation cases, courts 
have treated each obligation as separate and not contingent upon 
one another. Kane v. Kane, 391 P.2d 361 (Colo. 1964); Wilson v. 
Wilson, 252 P.2d 197, (Idaho 1953); Garris V. McDuffie, 344 SE.2d 
186 (SC App. 1986). This is similar to our present case where 
provisions of a Divorce Decree should not be conditional upon one 
another unless the decree specifically links them. 
The Divorce Decree provided Mrs. Marsh a remedy in the event 
of an arrearage in support payments. The Decree states "if the 
Defendant falls thirty (30) days or more in arrears in his child 
support obligation, the Plaintiff should be entitled to mandatory 
income withholding relief pursuant to Utah Code Annotated (78-
45(d)(1) et. seq.)(1984 as amended)." This provides her an 
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exclusive remedy for collecting support. It does not, however, 
provide her justification to evade her obligations under the 
Decree. 
In the Affidavit of Scott Marsh, Dated October 7, 1997, Mr. 
Marsh testified that he has been current in the payment of his 
support obligations since 1992 except when the Court ordered 
retroactive support. At that time he quickly paid off any 
arrearages the court determined were owed. (Exhibit K). Mr. 
Marsh's arrearages were less than the debt Mrs. Marsh owes on the 
foreclosure of the home. 
Even if Mr. Marsh had been totally delinquent in his support 
payments, which he was not, that does not justify Mrs. Marsh's 
delinquency on the mortgage payment since her obligation to hold 
him harmless was not contingent upon his duty to pay support. 
Because Mr. Marsh has repaid all his arrearages, including 
interest, and has made Mrs. Marsh whole, it is now her obligation 
to make Mr. Marsh whole by repaying the debt of $12,870.96. Mr. 
Marsh has remained current in his support and has fulfilled his 
obligations under the Divorce Decree and is entitled to the same 
fulfillment of obligations from Mrs. Marsh. 
The obligations of the Divorce Decree are separate 
obligations and should be treated as such. The mere fact that 
Mr. Marsh was behind in his child support payments does not 
justify Mrs. Marsh's refusal to pay the mortgage payment and the 
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subsequent foreclosure on the marital home. Under the Divorce 
Decree, Mrs. Marsh had an exclusive remedy for income holding 
relief in the event of an arrearage on the payments. This is the 
remedy which should have been allowed to her. Mr. Marsh was 
current on his support payments at the time of the hearing on 
this matter but is subject to a payment of $12,870.96 before he 
will again be eligible for a loan from the department of 
Veteran's Affairs. Payment of this should be the responsibility 
of Mrs. Marsh since the Divorce Decree ordered her to hold Mr. 
Marsh harmless on the mortgage. 
IX. CONCLUSION 
Pursuant to the Decree of Divorce Mrs. Marsh was to receive 
ll/40ths of Mr. Marsh's retirement from the military. The money 
he received as separation pay from his involuntary discharge by 
statute was separation pay and not retirement. As such, the 
trial court erred in requiring Mr. Marsh to pay Mrs. Marsh 
ll/40ths of the military separation pay. The separation pay is 
not compensation for past service (as retirement is) but is 
instead a payment to help the individual work back into the 
civilian work force. As the court ruled in Kuzmiak, the 
separation payment should be considered separate property and 
awarded to Mr. Marsh in its entirety. 
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In the event Mr* Marsh is required to give Mrs. Marsh 
ll/40ths of the payment, she should be required to participate in 
the repayment plan. While it is uncertain that Mr. Marsh will 
ever receive his military retirement, if he does so, he will be 
required to repay the amount of the separation pay. If Mrs. 
Marsh is awarded a percentage of the separation pay, in equity, 
she should be required to repay that same percentage in the event 
the she receives the military retirement. 
Finally, the trial court erred in allowing Mrs. Marsh to 
breach her duties under the Decree of Divorce requiring her to 
hold Mr. Marsh harmless on the Mortgage. The foreclosure created 
a debt for Mr. Marsh of $12,870.96 which must be repaid, and has 
clouded his credit record. Duties of a divorce decree are 
separate and should not be contingent upon one another unless the 
divorce decree expressly links them. 
Based on the law and facts, the judgment of the Trial Court 
should be reversed to allow Mr. Marsh to keep the entire 
separation payment and to require Mrs. Marsh to be responsible 
for the repayment of the Veteran's Affairs loan. 
DATED t h i s J ^ L d a y of Ax~~f , 1998. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Richard N. Bigelow 
Attorney for Appellant 
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Sec 
630 Discharge of regular commissioned officers 
with less than five years of active commis-
sioned service or found not qualified for 
promotion for first lieutenant or lieuten 
ant (junior grade). 
631. Effect of failure of selection for promotion. 
regular first lieutenants and lieutenants 
(junior grade). 
632. Effect of failure of selection for promotion* 
regular captains and majors of the Army, 
Air Force, and Marine Corps and regular 
lieutenants and lieutenant commanders of 
the Navy. 
633. Retirement for years of service: regular lieu-
tenant colonels and commanders 
634. Retirement for years of service* regular colo-
nels and Navy captains. 
635. Retirement for years of service: regular brig-
adier geneials and rear admirals (lower 
half). 
636. Retirement for years of service* regular 
major generals and rear admirals. 
AMENDMENTS 
1985-Pub. L. 99-145, title V, § 514(b)(5)(B), Nov. 8, 
1985, 99 Stat. 628, substituted "rear admirals (lower 
half)" for "commodores" in item 635. 
1981—Pub. L. 97-86, title IV, § 405(b)(5)(B), Dec. 1, 
1981, 95 Stat. 1106, substituted "commodores" for 
"commodore admirals" in item 635. 
§ 627. Failure of selection for promotion 
An officer in a grade below the grade of colo-
nel or, in the case of an officer of the Navy, 
captain who is in or above the promotion zone 
established for his grade and competitive cate-
gory under section 623 of this title and is con-
sidered but not selected for promotion by a se-
lection board convened under section 611(a) of 
this title shall be considered to have failed of 
selection for promotion. 
(Added Pub. L. 96-513, title I, § 105, Dec. 12, 
1980, 94 Stat . 2859.) 
EFFECTIVE DATE 
Subchapter effective Sept. 15, 1981, but the author-
ity to prescribe regulations under this subchapter ef-
fective on Dec. 12, 1980, see section 701 of Pub. L. 
96 513, set out as an Effective Date of 1980 Amend-
ment note under section 101 of this title. 
TRANSITION PROVISIONS UNDER DEFENSE OFFICER 
PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT ACT 
For provisions to prevent extinction or premature 
termination of rights, duties, penalties, or proceedings 
that existed or were begun prior to the effective date 
of Pub. L. 96-513 and otherwise to allow for an orderly 
transition to the system of officer personnel manage-
ment put in place under Pub. L. 96-513, see section 601 
et seq. of Pub. L. 96-513, set out as a note under sec-
tion 611 of this title. 
§ 628. Special selection boards 
(a)(1) In the case of an officer who is eligible 
for promotion who the Secretary of the mili-
tary department concerned determines was not 
considered for selection for promotion by a se-
lection board because of administrative error, 
t he Secretary concerned, under regulations pre-
scribed by the Secretary of Defense, shall con-
vene a special selection board under this subsec-
tion (composed in accordance with section 612 
of this title or, in the case of a warrant officer, 
composed in accordance with section 573 of this 
title and regulations prescribed by the Secre-
tary of the military department concerned) to 
determine whether such officer should be rec-
ommended for promotion. 
(2) A special selection board convened under 
paragraph (1) shall consider the record of the 
officer as his record would have appeared to 
the board tha t should have considered him. 
Tha t record shall be compared with a sampling 
of the records of those officers of the same 
competitive category who were recommended 
for promotion, and those officers who were not 
recommended for promotion, by the board tha t 
should have considered him. 
(3) If a special selection board convened 
under paragraph (1) does not recommend for 
promotion an officer in a grade below the grade 
of colonel or, in the case of an officer of the 
Navy, captain whose name was referred to it for 
consideration, the officer shall be considered to 
have failed of selection for promotion. 
(b)(1) In the case of an officer who is eligible 
for promotion who was considered for selection 
for promotion by a selection board but was not 
selected, the Secretary of the military depart-
ment concerned, under regulations prescribed 
by the Secretary of Defense, may convene a 
special selection board under this subsection 
(composed in accordance with section 612 of 
this title or, in the case of a warrant officer, 
composed in accordance with section 573 of this 
title and regulations prescribed by the Secre-
tary of the military department concerned) to 
determine whether such officer should be rec-
ommended for promotion if the Secretary con-
cerned determines that— 
(A) the action of the board which consid-
ered the officer was contrary to law or in-
volved material error of fact or material ad-
ministrative error; or 
(B) the board did not have before it for its 
consideration material information. 
(2) A special selection board convened under 
paragraph (1) shall consider the record of the 
officer as his record, if corrected, would have 
appeared to the board t ha t considered him. 
T h a t record shall be compared with the records 
of a sampling of those officers of the same com-
petitive category who were recommended for 
promotion, and those officers who were not rec-
ommended for promotion, by the board that 
considered him. 
(3) If a special selection board convened 
under paragraph (1) does not recommend for 
promotion an officer whose name was referred 
to it for consideration, the officer incurs no ad-
ditional failure of selection for promotion. 
(c)(1) Each special selection board convened 
under this section shall submit to the Secretary 
of the military department concerned a written 
report, signed by each member of the board, 
containing the name of each officer it recom-
mends for promotion and certifying tha t the 
board has carefully considered the record of 
each officer whose name was referred to it. 
(2) The provisions of sections 617(b) and 618 
of this title apply to the report and proceedings 
of a special selection board convened under this 
section in the same manner as they apply to 
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the report and proceedings of a selection board 
convened under section 611(a) of this title. 
(d)(1) If the report of a special selection 
board convened under this section, as approved 
by the President, recommends for promotion to 
the next higher grade an officer whose name 
was referred to it for consideration, such officer 
shall, as soon as practicable, be appointed to 
the next higher grade in accordance with sub-
sections (b), (c), and (d) of section 624 of this 
title. 
(2) An officer who is promoted to the next 
higher grade as the result of the recommenda-
tion of a special selection board convened under 
this section shall, upon such promotion, have 
the same date of rank, the same effective date 
for the pay and allowances of that grade, and 
the same position on the active-duty list as he 
would have had if he had been recommended 
for promotion to that grade by the board which 
should have considered, or which did consider, 
him. 
(e) The provisions of section 613 of this title 
apply to members of special selection boards 
convened under this section. 
(Added Pub. L. 96-513, title I, § 105, Dec. 12, 
1980, 94 Stat. 2859; amended Pub. L. 98-525, 
title V, § 527(a), Oct. 19, 1984, 98 Stat. 2525; 
Pub. L. 102-190, div. A, title XI, § 1131(4), Dec. 
5, 1991, 105 Stat. 1506; Pub. L. 102-484, div. A, 
title X, § 1052(10), Oct. 23, 1992, 106 Stat. 2499.) 
AMENDMENTS 
1992—Subsec. (b)(1). Pub. L. 102-484 substituted 
"section 573" for "section 558". 
1991—Subsec. (a)(1). Pub. L. 102-190 substituted 
"section 573" for "section 558". 
1984—Subsecs. (a)(1), (b)(1). Pub. L. 98-525 substi-
tuted "(composed in accordance with section 612 of 
this title or, in the case of a warrant officer, composed 
in accordance with section 558 of this title and regula-
tions prescribed by the Secretary of the military de-
partment concerned)" for "(composed in accordance 
with section 612 of this title)". 
EFFECTIVE DATE OF 1991 AMENDMENT 
Amendment by Pub. L. 102-190 effective Feb. 1, 
1992, see section 1132 of Pub. L. 102-190, set out as a 
note under section 521 of this title. 
DELEGATION OF FUNCTIONS 
Functions of President under subsec. (dkl) to ap 
prove, modify, or disapprove report of a selection 
board delegated to Secretary of Defense to perform, 
without approval, ratification, or other action by 
President, and with authority for Secretary to redele-
gate, see Ex. Ord. No. 12396, §§ 1(a), 3, Dec. 9, 1982, 47 
F.R. 55897, 55898, set out as a note under section 301 
of Title 3, The President. 
SECTION REFERRED TO IN OTHER SECTIONS 
This section is referred to in sections 618, 641 of this 
title. 
§ 629. Removal from a list of officers recommended 
for promotion 
(a) The President may remove the name of 
any officer from a list of officers recommended 
for promotion by a selection board convened 
under this chapter. 
(b) If, after consideration of a list of officers 
approved for promotion by the President, the 
Senate does not give its advice and consent i<> 
the appointment of an officer whose name is on 
the list, that officer's name shall be removed 
from the list. 
(c)(1) An officer whose name is removed from 
a list under subsection (a) or (b) continues to be 
eligible for consideration for promotion. If he is 
recommended for promotion by the next selec-
tion board convened for his grade and competi-
tive category and he is promoted, the Secretary 
of the military department concerned may, 
upon such promotion, grant him the same date 
of rank, the same effective date for the pay and 
allowances of the grade to which promoted, and 
the same position on the active-duty list as he 
would have had if his name had not been so re-
moved. 
(2) If such an officer who is in a grade below 
the grade of colonel or, in the case of the Navy, 
captain is not recommended for promotion by 
the next selection board convened for his grade 
and competitive category, or if his name is 
again removed from the list of officers recom-
mended for promotion, of if the Senate again 
does not give its advice and consent to his pro-
motion, he shall be considered for all purposes 
to have twice failed of selection for promotion. 
(Added Pub. L. 96-513, title I, § 105, Dec. 12, 
1980, 94 Stat. 2860.) 
DELEGATION OF FUNCTIONS 
Functions of President under subsec. (a) to remove 
name of any officer from a promotion list to any grade 
below commodore or brigadier general delegated to 
Secretary of Defense to perform, without approval, 
ratification, or other action by President, and with au 
thority for Secretary to redelegate, see Ex. Ord. No. 
12396, §§ Kb), 3, Dec. 9, 1982, 47 P\R. 55897, 55898, set 
out as a note under section 301 of Title 3, The Presi-
dent. 
§ 630. Discharge of regular commissioned officers 
with less then five years of active commissioned 
service or found not qualified for promotion for 
first lieutenant or lieutenant (junior grade) 
The Secretary of the military department 
concerned, under regulations prescribed by the 
Secretary of Defense— 
(1) may discharge any regular officer on the 
active-duty list who— 
(A) has less than five years of active com-
missioned service; or 
(B) is serving in the grade of second lieu-
tenant or ensign and has been found not 
qualified for promotion to the regular grade 
of first lieutenant or lieutenant (junior 
grade); and 
(2) shall, unless the officer has been pro-
moted, discharge any officer described in 
clause (1KB) at the end of the 18-month 
period beginning on the date on which the of-
ficer is first found not qualified for promo-
tion. 
(Added Pub. L. 96-513, title I, § 105, Dec. 12, 
1980, 94 Stat. 2861; amended Pub. L. 98-525, 
title XIV, §1405(11), Oct. 19, 1984, 98 Stat. 
2622.) 
AMENDMENTS 
1984 k'ai. (2) Pub 1, 98 52b Mihbtituted "18 
uioiiil) " tin ' i ighteen month". 
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SECTION REFERRED TO IN OTHER SECTIONS 
This section is referred to in section 1174 of this 
title. 
§631. Effect of failure of selection for promotion: 
regular first lieutenants and lieutenants (Junior 
grade) 
(a) Except an officer of the Navy and Marine 
Corps who is an officer designated for limited 
duty (to whom section 5596(e) or 6383 of this 
title applies), each officer of the Regular Army, 
Regular Air Force, or Regular Marine Corps 
Who holds the regular grade of first lieutenant 
and has failed of selection for promotion to the 
regular grade of captain for the second time, 
and each officer of the Regular Navy who holds 
the regular grade of lieutenant (junior grade) 
and has failed of selection for promotion to the 
regular grade of lieutenant for the second time, 
Whose name is not on a list of officers recom-
mended for promotion to the next higher regu-
lar grade shall— 
(1) be discharged on the date requested by 
him and approved by the Secretary of the 
military department concerned, which date 
shall be not later than the first day of the 
seventh calendar month beginning after the 
month in which the President approves the 
report of the board which considered him for 
the second time; 
l^ > \l Yie te engYble ior retirement under any 
provision of law, be retired under that law on 
the date requested by him and approved by 
the Secretary concerned, which date shall be 
not later than the first day of the seventh 
calendar month beginning after the month in 
which the President approves the report of 
the board which considered him for the 
second time; or 
(3) if on the date on which he is to be dis-
charged under clause (1) he is within two 
years of qualifying for retirement under sec-
tion 3911, 6323, or 8911 of this title, be re-
tained on active duty until he is qualified for 
retirement and then be retired under that 
section, unless he is sooner retired or dis-
charged under another provision of law. 
(b) The retirement or discharge of an officer 
pursuant to this section shall be considered to 
be an involuntary retirement or discharge for 
purposes of any other provision of law. 
(c) An officer who is subject to discharge 
under subsection (a)(1) is not eligible for fur-
ther consideration for promotion. 
(Added Pub. L. 96-513, title I, § 105, Dec. 12, 
1980, 94 Stat. 2861; amended Pub. L. 98-525, 
tttAe V, * 53&Vc\ Oct. \$ , \SM, TO Stat. %%.> 
AMENDMENTS 
1984—Subsec. (c). Pub. L. 98-525 added subsec. (c). 
SECTION REFERRED TO IN OTHER SECTIONS 
This section is referred to in section 619 of this title. 
§632. Effect of failure of selection for promotion: 
regular captains and majors of the Army, Air 
Force, and Marine Corps and regular lieutenants 
and lieutenant commanders of the Navy 
(a) Except an officer of the Navy and Marine 
Corps who is an officer designated for limited 
duty (to whom section 5596(e) or 6383 of this 
title applies) and except as provided under sec-
tion 037(a) of this title, each officer of the Reg-
ular Army, Regular Air Force, or Regular 
Marine Corps who holds the regular grade of 
captain or major, and each officer of the Regu-
lar Navy who holds the regular grade of lieu-
tenant or lieutenant commander, who has 
failed of selection for promotion to the next 
higher regular grade for the second time and 
whose name is not on a list of officers recom-
mended for promotion to the next higher regu-
lar grade shall— 
(1) be discharged on the date requested by 
him and approved by the Secretary con-
cerned, which date shall be not later than the 
first day of the seventh calendar month be-
ginning after the month in which the Presi-
dent approves the report of the board which 
considered him for the second time; 
(2) if he is eligible for retirement under any 
provision of law, be retired under that law on 
the date requested by him and approved by 
the Secretary concerned, which date shall be 
not later than the first day of the seventh 
calendar month beginning after the month in 
which the President approves the report of 
the board which considered him for the 
second time; or 
(3) if on the date on which he is to be dis-
charged under clause (1) he is within two 
years of qualifying for retirement under sec-
tion 3911, 6323, or 8911 of this title, be re-
tained on active duty until he is qualified for 
retirement and then retired under that sec-
tion, unless he is sooner retired or discharged 
under another provision of law. 
(b) The retirement or discharge of an officer 
pursuant to this section shall be considered to 
be an involuntary retirement or discharge for 
purposes of any other provision of law. 
(Added Pub. L. 96-513, title I, § 105, Dec. 12, 
1980, 94 Stat. 2862.) 
SECTION REFERRED TO IN OTHER SECTIONS 
This section is referred to in section 637 of this title. 
§ 633. Retirement for years of service: regular lieuten-
ant colonels and commanders 
Except an officer of the Navy designated for 
limited duty to whom section 5596(e) of this 
title applies and an officer of the Marine Corps 
designated for limited duty to whom section 
5596(e) or section 6383 of this title applies and 
except as provided under section 637Cb) of this 
title, each officer of the Regular Army, Regular 
Air Force, or Regular Marine Corps who holds 
the regular grade of lieutenant colonel, and 
each officer of the Regular Navy who holds the 
regular grade of commander, who is not on a 
list of officers recommended for promotion to 
the regular grade of colonel or captain, respec-
tively, shall, if not earlier retired, be retired on 
the first day of the month after the month in 
which he completes 28 years of active commis-
sioned service. During the period beginning on 
July 1, 1993, and ending on October 1,1999, the 
preceding sentence shall not apply to an officer 
(1) there is evidence satisfactory to the Sec-
retary concerned that the member is under 
eighteen years of age; and 
(2) the member enlisted without the written 
consent of his parent or guardian. 
(Added Pub. L. 90-235, § 3(a)(1)(A), Jan. 2, 1968, 
81 Stat. 757.) 
§ 1171. Regular enlisted members: early discharge 
Under regulations prescribed by the Secre-
tary concerned and approved by the President, 
any regular enlisted member of an armed force 
may be discharged within three months before 
the expiration of the term of his enlistment or 
extended enlistment. A discharge under this 
section does not affect any right, privilege, or 
benefit that a member would have had if he 
completed his enlistment or extended enlist-
ment, except that the member is not entitled to 
pay and allowances for the period not served. 
(Added Pub. L. 90-235, § 3(a)(1)(A), Jan. 2, 1968, 
81 Stat. 757.) 
Ex. ORD. NO. 11498. DELEGATION OF AUTHORITY TO 
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 
Ex. Ord. No. 11498, Dec. 1, 1969, 34 P.R. 19125, pro-
vided: 
By virtue of the authority vested in me by section 
301 of title 3 of the United States Code, and as Presi-
dent of the United States, it is ordered that the Secre-
tary of Defense is hereby designated and empowered 
to approve regulations issued by the Secretaries con-
cerned under section 1171 of title 10, United States 
Code, effective January 2, 1968, which relate to the 
early discharge of regular enlisted members of the 
armed forces. 
RICHARD NIXON. 
SECTION REFERRED TO IN OTHER SECTIONS 
This section is referred to in title 38 section 5303A. 
§1172. Enlisted members: during war or emergency; 
discharge 
A person enlisted under section 518 of this 
title may be discharged at any time by the 
President, or otherwise according to law. 
(Added Pub. L. 90-235, § 3(a)(1)(A), Jan. 2, 1968, 
81 Stat. 757.) 
§ 1173. Enlisted members: discharge for hardship 
Under regulations prescribed by the Secre-
tary concerned, a regular enlisted member of an 
armed force who has dependents may be dis-
charged for hardship. 
(Added Pub. L. 93-64, title I, § 102, July 9, 1973, 
87 Stat. 147.) 
EFFECTIVE D A T E 
Section effective July 1, 1973, see section 206 of Pub. 
L. 93-64, set out as a note under section 401 of Title 
37, Pay and Allowances of the Uniformed Services. 
SECTION REFERRED TO IN OTHER SECTIONS 
This section is referred to in title 37 sections 404, 
406; title 38 section 5303A. 
§ 1174. Separation pay upon involuntary discharge or 
release from active duty 
(a) REGULAR OFFICERS.—(1) A regular officer 
who is discharged under chapter 36 of this title 
(except under section 630(1)(A) or 643 of such 
chapter) or under section 580, 1177, or 6383 of 
this title and who has completed six or more, 
but less than twenty, years of active service im-
mediately before that discharge is entitled to 
separation pay computed under subsection 
(d)(1). 
(2) A regular commissioned officer of the 
Army, Navy, Air Force, or Marine Corps who is 
discharged under section 630UXA), 643, or 1186 
of this title, and a regular warrant officer of 
the Army, Navy, Air Force, or Marine Corps 
who is separated under section 1165 or 1166 of 
this title, who has completed six or more, but 
less than twenty, years of active service imme-
diately before that discharge or separation is 
entitled to separation pay computed under sub-
section (d)(1) or (d)(2), as determined by the 
Secretary of the military department con-
cerned, unless the Secretary concerned deter-
mines that the conditions under which the offi-
cer is discharged or separated do not warrant 
payment of such pay. 
(b) REGULAR ENLISTED MEMBERS.—(1) A regu-
lar enlisted member of an armed force who is 
discharged involuntarily or as the result of the 
denial of the reenlistment of the member and 
who has completed six or more, but less than 
20, years of active service immediately before 
that discharge is entitled to separation pay 
computed under subsection (d) unless the Sec-
retary concerned determines that the condi-
tions under which the member is discharged do 
not warrant payment of such pay. 
(2) Separation pay of an enlisted member 
shall be computed under paragraph (1) of sub-
section (d), except that such pay shall be com-
puted under paragraph (2) of such subsection 
in the case of a member who is discharged 
under criteria prescribed by the Secretary of 
Defense. 
(c) OTHER MEMBERS.—(1) Except as provided 
in paragraphs (2) and (3), a member of an 
armed force other than a regular member who 
is discharged or released from active duty and 
who has completed six or more, but fewer than 
20, years of active service immediately before 
that discharge or release is entitled to separa-
tion pay computed under subsection (d)(1) or 
(d)(2), as determined by the Secretary con-
cerned, if— 
(A) the member's discharge or release from 
active duty is involuntary; or 
(B) the member was not accepted for an ad-
ditional tour of active duty for which he vol-
unteered. 
(2) If the Secretary concerned determines 
that the conditions under which a member de-
scribed in paragraph (1) is discharged or sepa-
rated do not warrant separation pay under this 
section, that member is not entitled to that 
pay. 
(3) A member described in paragraph (1) who 
was not on the active-duty list when discharged 
or separated is not entitled to separation pay 
under this section unless such member had 
completed at least six years of continuous 
active duty immediately before such discharge 
or release. For purposes of this paragraph, a 
period of active duty is continuous if it is not 
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interrupted by a bieak in SPIV ice of inoie than 
30 days. 
(d) AMOUNT OF SEPARATION P A Y . - T h e amount 
of separation pay which may be paid to a 
member under this section is— 
(1) 10 percent of the product of (A) his 
years of active service, and (B) 12 t imes the 
m o n t h l y basic pay to which he was entit led at 
the t ime of his discharge or release from 
active duty; or 
(2) one-half of the amount computed under 
clause (1). 
(e) REQUIREMENT FOR SERVICE IN READY R E -
SERVE; EXCEPTIONS T O ELIGIBILITY.—(1)(A) As a 
condit ion of receiving separation pay under this 
sect ion, a person otherwise eligible for that pay 
shall be required to enter into a written agree-
m e n t with the Secretary concerned to serve in 
t h e Ready Reserve of a reseive component for 
a period of not less than three years following 
the person's discharge or release from active 
duty. If the person has a service obligation 
under sect ion 651 of this title or under any 
other provision of law that is not completed at 
t h e t ime t h e person is discharged or released 
from active duty, the three-year obligation 
under this subsect ion shall begin on the day 
after the date on which the person completes 
t h e person's obligation under such section or 
o ther provision of law, 
(B) Each person w h o enters into an agree-
m e n t referred to in subparagraph (A) who is 
not already a Reserve of an armed force and 
w h o is qualified shall , upon such p e r s o n s dis-
charge or release from active duty, be enlisted 
or appointed, as appropriate, as a Reserve and 
be transferred to a reserve component . 
(2) A member who is discharged or released 
from active duty is not eligible for separation 
pay under this sect ion if the m e m b e r -
(A) is discharged or released from active 
duty at his request; 
(B) is discharged or released from active 
duty during an initial term of enl i s tment or 
an initial period of obligated service; 
(C) is released from active duty for training; 
or 
(D) upon discharge or release from active 
duty, is immediate ly eligible for retired or re-
tainer pay based on his military service. 
(f) COUNTING FRACTIONAL YEARS OF SERVICE.— 
In determining a member's years of active serv-
ice for the purpose of comput ing separation 
pay under this sect ion, each full m o n t h of serv-
ice t h a t is in addition to t h e number of full 
years of service creditable to the member is 
counted as one-twelf th of a year and any re-
maining fractional part of a m o n t h is disregard-
ed. 
(g) COORDINATION W I T H OTHER SEPARATION OR 
SEVERANCE P A Y BENEFITS .—A period for which a 
member has previously received separat ion pay 
under th i s sect ion or severance pay or readjust-
m e n t pay under any other provision of law 
based on service in t h e armed forces may not be 
included in determining t h e years of service 
t h a t may be counted in comput ing t h e separa-
t ion pay of t h e member under th is sect ion. 
(h ) COORDINATION W I T H RETIRED OR RETAINER 
P A Y AND D I S A B I L I T Y COMPENSATION.—(1) A 
membei \\\\o has leceived sepaiat ion pay under 
this section, or separation pay, severance pay, 
or readjustment pay under any other provision 
of law, based on service in the armed forces, 
and who later qualifies for retired or retainer 
pay under this tit le or title 14 shal l have de-
ducted from each payment of such retired or 
retainer pay so much of such pay as is based on 
the service for which he received separation 
pay under this section or separation pay, sever-
ance pay, or readjustment pay under any other 
provision of law until the total amount deduct-
ed is equal to the total amount of separation 
pay, severance pay, and readjustment pay re-
ceived. 
(2) A member w h o has received separation 
pay under this section, or severance pay or re-
adjustment pay under any other provision of 
law, based on service in the armed forces shall 
not be deprived, by reason of his receipt of such 
separation pay, severance pay, or readjustment 
pay, of any disability compensat ion to which he 
is entit led under the laws administered by the 
Department of Veterans Affairs, but there shall 
be deducted from that disability compensat ion 
an amount equal to the total amount of separa-
tion pay, severance pay, and readjustment pay 
received. Notwi thstanding the preceding sen-
tence, no deduction may be made from disabil-
ity compensat ion for the amount of any separa-
tion pay, severance pay, or readjustment pay 
received because of an earlier discharge or re-
lease from a period of active duty if the disabil-
ity which is the basis for that disability com-
pensat ion was incurred or aggravated during a 
later period of active duty. 
(i) REGULATIONS; CREDITING OF OTHER COMMIS-
SIONED SERVICE.—(1) T h e Secretary of Defense 
shall prescribe regulations, which shall be uni-
form for the Army, Navy, Air Force, and 
Marine Corps, for the administration of this 
section. 
(2) Active commiss ioned service in the Nation-
al Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration or 
the Public Heal th Service shall be credited as 
active service in the armed forces for the pur-
poses of this section. 
(Added Pub. L. 96-513, title I, § 109(c), Dec. 12, 
1980, 94 Stat . 2870; amended Pub. L. 97-22, 
§ 10(b)(10)(A), July 10, 1981, 95 Stat . 137; Pub. 
L. 98-94, t it le IX, §§ 911(a), (b), 923(b), title X, 
§ 1007(c)(2), Sept . 24, 1983, 97 Stat . 639, 640, 
643, 662; Pub. L. 98-498, t it le III, § 320(a)(2), 
Oct. 19, 1984, 98 Stat . 2308: Pub. L. 101-189, div. 
A, tit le XVI, § 1621(a)(1), Nov. 29, 1989, 103 
Stat . 1602; Pub. L. 101-510, div. A. title V, 
§501(a)- (d) , (g), (h) , Nov. 5, 1990, 104 Stat. 
1549-1551; Pub. L. 102-190, div. A, title XI, 
§ 1131(6), Dec. 5, 1991, 105 Stat . 1506; Pub. L. 
103-160, div. A, tit le V, § 501(a), Nov. 30, 1993, 
107 Stat . 1644; Pub. L. 103-337, div. A, title V, 
§ 560(c), Oct. 5, 1994, 108 Stat . 2778.) 
AMENDMENTS 
1994—Subsec. (a)(1). Pub. L. 103-337 inserted 
", 1177," after "section 580". 
1993—Subsec. (a)(1). Pub. L. 103-160 substituted 
"six" for "five". 
1991—Subsec. (a)(1). Pub. L. 102-190 substituted 
"section 580" for "section 564". 
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1990—Subsec. (a). Pub. L. 101-510, § 501(a)(1), insert-
ed heading. 
Subsec. (a)(1). Pub. L. 101-510, § 501(g)(1), substitut-
ed "or under section 564 or 6383 of this title" for 
", under section 564 or 6383 of this title, or under sec-
tion 603 or 604 of the Defense Officer Personnel Man-
agement Act" and struck out "or release" after "that 
discharge". 
Subsec. (a)(2). Pub. L. 101-510, § 501(b)(1), substitut-
ed "six or more" for "five or more". 
Pub. L. 101-510, § 501(a)(2), redesignated subsec. (b) 
as subsec. (a)(2). 
Subsec. (b). Pub. L. 101-510, § 501(a)(3), added 
subsec. (b). Former subsec. (b) redesignated (a)(2). 
Subsec. (c). Pub. L. 101-510, § 501(h)(1), inserted 
heading. 
Subsec. (c)(1). Pub. L. 101-510, § 501(g)(2), struck out 
"after September 14, 1981," after "member who" in in-
troductory provisions. 
Pub. L. 101-510, § 501(b)(1), substituted "six or 
more" for "five or more" in introductory provisions. 
Subsec. (c)(3). Pub. L. 101-510, § 501(b)(2), substitut-
ed "at least six years" for "at least five years". 
Subsec. (d). Pub. L. 101-510, § 501(h)(2), inserted 
heading. 
Subsec. (d)(1). Pub. L. 101-510, § 501(c)(1)(A), struck 
out "or $30,000, whichever is less" after "active duty". 
Subsec. (d)(2). Pub. L. 101-510, § 501(c)(1)(B), struck 
out ", but in no event more than $15,000" after "under 
clause (1)". 
Subsec. (e). Pub. L. 101-510, § 501(d), amended 
subsec. (e) generally. Prior to amendment, subsec. (e) 
read as follows: "A member w h o -
'd) is discharged or released from active duty at 
his request; 
"(2) is released from active duty for training; or 
"(3) upon discharge or release from active duty, is 
immediately eligible for retired or retainer pay 
based on his military service; 
is not eligible for separation pay under this section." 
Subsec. (f). Pub. L. 101-510, § 501(h)(3), inserted 
heading. 
Subsec. (g). Pub. L. 101-510, § 501(h)(4), inserted 
heading. 
Pub. L. 101-510, §501(0(2), struck out "(1)" after 
"(g)" and struck out par. (2) which read as follows: 
"The total amount that a member may receive in sepa-
ration pay under this section and severance pay and 
readjustment pay under any other provision of law, 
other than section 1212 of this title, based on service 
in the armed forces may not exceed $30,000." 
Subsec. (h). Pub. L. 101-510, § 501(h)(5), inserted 
heading. 
Subsec. (i). Pub. L. 101-510, § 501(h)(6), inserted 
heading. 
1989—Subsec. (h)(2). Pub. L. 101-189 substituted 
"Department of Veterans Affairs" tor "Veterans' Ad-
ministration". 
1984—Subsec. (h)(1). Pub. L. 98-498 substituted "sep-
aration pay, severance pay," for "severance pay" 
before "or readjustment pay" in two places. 
1983—Subsec. (c). Pub. L. 98-94, § 911(a), amended 
subsec. (c) generally, designating existing provisions as 
par. (1) and existing pars. (1) and (2) as subpars. (A) 
and (B), respectively, and in provisions preceding 
subpar. (A) substituted "Except as provided in para-
graphs (2) and (3), a member" for "A member" and 
"fewer than 20, years of active service immediately 
before that discharge or release is entitled to separa-
tion pay" for "less than twenty, years of active service 
immediately before that discharge or release is enti-
tled, unless the Secretary concerned determines that 
the conditions under which the member is discharged 
or separated do not warrant such pay, to separation 
pay", and added pars. (2) and (3). 
Subsec. (f). Pub. L. 98-94, § 923(b), amended subsec. 
(f) generally, substituting "each full month of service 
that is in addition to the number of full years of serv 
ice creditable to the member is counted as one-tweltth 
of a year and any remaining Iractional part of a 
month is disregarded" for "a part of a year that is six 
months or more is counted as a whole year and a part 
of a year that is less than six months is disregarded". 
Subsec. (g)(2). Pub. L. 98-94, § 911(b), inserted 
", other than section 1212 of this title," after "any 
other provision of law". 
Subsec. (i). Pub. L. 98-94, § 1007(c)(2), designated ex-
isting provisions as par. (1) and added par. (2). 
1981—Subsec. (c). Pub. L. 97-22 substituted "after 
September 14, 1981," for "on or after the effective 
date of the Defense Officer Personnel Management 
Act". 
EFFECTIVE DATE OF 1993 AMENDMENT 
Section 501(b) of Pub. L. 103-160 provided that: 
"(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2), the amend-
ment made by subsection (a) [amending this section] 
shall apply with respect to any regular officer who is 
discharged after the date of the enactment of this Act 
[Nov. 30, 19931. 
"(2) The amendment made by subsection (a) shall 
not apply with respect to an officer who on the date of 
the enactment of this Act has five or more, but less 
than six, years of active service in the Armed Forces." 
EFFECTIVE DATE OF 1991 AMENDMENT 
Amendment by Pub. L. 102-190 effective Feb. 1, 
1992, see section 1132 of Pub. L. 102-190, set out as a 
note under section 521 of this title. 
EFFECTIVE DATE OF 1990 AMENDMENT 
Section 501(e) of Pub. L. 101-510 provided that: 
"(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2), subsection 
(b) of section 1174 of title 10, United States Code, as 
added by subsection (a), and the amendments made by 
subsections (b), (c), and (d) [amending this section] 
shall apply with respect to a member of the Armed 
Forces who is discharged, or released from active duty, 
after the date of the enactment of this Act [Nov. 5, 
1990]. 
"(2) The amendments made by subsection (b) 
[amending this section] shall not apply in the case of 
a member (other than a regular enlisted member) of 
the Armed Forces who (A) is serving on active duty on 
the date of the enactment of this Act, (B) is dis-
charged, or released from active duty, after that date; 
and (C) on that date has five or more, but less than 
six, years of active service in the Armed Forces " 
EFFECTIVE DATE OF 1983 AMENDMENT 
Section 911(c) of Pub. L. 98 94 provided that: The 
amendments made by this section [amending this sec-
tion] shall take effect on October 1, 1983." 
Section 923(g) of Pub. L. 98 94 provided that: "The 
amendments made by this section [amending this sec-
tion and sections 1401, 1402, 1402a, 3991, 3992, 6151, 
6328, 6330, 6404, 8991, and 8992 of this title, section 
423 of Title 14, Coast Guard, section 853o of Title 33, 
Navigation and Navigable Waters, and section 212 of 
Title 42, The Public Health and Welfare] shall apply 
with respect to (1) the computation of retired or re-
tainer pay of any individual who becomes entitled to 
that pay after September 30, 1983, and (2) the recom 
putation of retired pay under section 1402, 1402a, 
3992, or 8992 of title 10, United States Code, of any in-
dividual who after September 30, 1983, becomes enti-
tled to recompute retired pay under any such section." 
EFFECTIVE DATE OF 1981 AMENDMENT 
Section 10(b) of Pub. L. 97-22 provided that the 
amendment made by that section is effective Sept. 15, 
1981. 
EFFECTIVE DATE 
Section effective Sept. 15, 1981, but the authority to 
prescribe regulations under this section effective on 
Dec. 12, 1980, see section 701 of Pub. L. 96 513, set out 
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ns an Effective Dale of 1980 Amendment note undet 
section 101 of this title 
' iKANSniON PROVISIONS UNDER DEFENSE OFFICER 
PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT A n 
For provisions to prevent extinction or premature 
termination of rights, duties, penalties, or proceedings 
that existed or were begun prior to the effective date 
of Pub. L. 96-513 and otherwise to allow for an orderly 
transition to the system of officer personnel manage-
ment put in place under Pub. L. 96-513, see section 601 
et seq. of Pub. L. 96-513. set out as a note under sec-
tion 611 of this title. 
SECTION REFERRED TO TN OTHER SECTIONS 
This section is referred to in sections 580, 642, 1165, 
1166, 1174a, 1186.6383, 14517, 14905 of this title. 
§ 1174a. Special separation benefits programs 
(a) REQUIREMENT FOR PROGRAMS.—The Secre-
tary concerned shall carry out a special separa 
tion benefits program under this section. An el-
igible member of the armed forces may request 
separation under the program. The request 
shall be subject to the approval of the Secre-
tary. 
(b) BENEFITS.—Upon the approval of the re-
quest of an eligible member, the member 
shall -
(1) be released from active duty or full-time 
National Guard duty or discharged, as the 
case may be; and 
(2) be entitled to— 
(A) separation pay equal to 15 percent of 
the product of (i) the member's years of 
active service, and (ii) 12 times the monthly 
basic pay to which the member is entitled 
at the time of his discharge or release from 
active duty; and 
(B) the same benefits and services as are 
provided under chapter 58 of this title, sec-
tions 404 and 406 of title 37, and section 
503(c) of the National Defense Authoriza-
tion Act for Fiscal Year 1991 (104 Stat. 
1558; 37 U.S.C. 406 note) for members of 
the armed forces who are involuntarily sep-
arated within the meaning of section 1141 
of this title. 
(c) ELIGIBILITY.—Subject to subsections (d) 
and (e), a member of an armed force is eligible 
for voluntary separation under a program es-
tablished for that armed force pursuant to this 
section if the member— 
(1) has not been approved for payment of a 
voluntary separation incentive under section 
1175 of this title; 
(2) has served on active duty or full-time 
National Guard duty or any combination of 
active duty and full-time National Guard 
duty for more than 6 years; 
(3) has served on active duty or full-time 
National Guard duty or any combination of 
active duty and full-time National Guard 
duty for not more than 20 years; 
(4) has served at least 5 years of continuous 
active duty or full-time National Guard duty 
or any combination of active duty and full-
time National Guard duty immediately pre-
ceding the date of the member's separation 
from active duty; and 
(5) meets such other requirements as the 
Secretary may prescribe, which may include 
requirements relating to— 
(A) years of service; 
(B) skill or rating; 
<C) grade or rank; and 
(D) remaining period of obligated service. 
(d) PROGRAM APPLICABILITY.—The Secretary 
concerned may provide for the program under 
this section to apply to any of the following 
members: 
( D A regular officer or warrant officer of an 
armed force. 
(2) A regular enlisted member of an armed 
force. 
(3) A member of an armed force other than 
a regular member. 
(e) APPLICABILITY SUBJECT TO NEEDS OF THE 
SERVICE.—(1) Subject to paragraphs (2) and (3), 
the Secretary concerned may limit the applica-
bility of a program under this section to any 
category of personnel defined by the Secretary 
in order to meet a need of the armed force 
under the Secretary's jurisdiction to reduce the 
number of members in certain grades, the 
number of members who have completed a cer-
tain number of years of active service, or the 
number of members who possess certain mili-
tary skills or are serving in designated competi-
tive categories. 
(2) Any category prescribed by the Secretary 
concerned for regular officers, regular enlisted 
members, or other members pursuant to para-
graph (1) shall be consistent with the catego-
ries applicable to regular officers, regular en-
listed members, or other members, respectively, 
under the voluntary separation incentive pro-
gram under section 1175 of this title or any 
other program established by law or by that 
Secretary for the involuntary separation of 
such members in the administration of a reduc-
tion in force. 
(3) A member of the armed forces offered a 
voluntary separation incentive under section 
1175 of this title shall also be offered the op-
portunity to request separation under a pro-
gram established pursuant to this section. If 
the Secretary concerned approves a request for 
separation under either such section, the 
member shall be separated under the authority 
of the section selected by such member. 
(f) APPLICATION REQUIREMENTS.—(1) In order 
to be separated under a program established 
puisuant to this section— 
(A) a regular enlisted member eligible for 
separation under that program shall— 
(i) submit a request for separation under 
the program before the expiration of the 
member's term of enlistment; or 
(ii) upon discharge at the end of such 
term, enter into a written agreement (pur-
suant to regulations prescribed by the Sec-
retary concerned) not to request reenlist-
ment in a regular component; and 
(B) a member referred to in subsection 
(d)(3) eligible for separation under that pro-
gram shall submit a request for separation to 
the Secretary concerned before the expira-
tion of the member's established term of 
active service. 
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RFFFKENCFS IN T F X T 
Srcl ion 1.131 of this title, referred to in subsecs 
( c ) ' l ) and (d)(1), was renumbered section 12731 of this 
title and amended generally by Pub. L. 103-337, div. A. 
title XVI, §1662(j ) ( l ) . Oct. 5, 1994, 108 Stat. 2998. 
2999. A new section 1331 was added by section 
1662(j)(7) of Pub. L. 103-337 
Chapter 67 of this title, referred to in subsec. (d)(1), 
was transferred to part II of subtitle E of this title, re-
numbered as chapter 1223, and amended generally bv 
Pub. L. 103-337, div. A, title XVI. $ 1662(j)(l) , Oct. 5. 
1994, 108 Stat . 2998. A new chapter 67 (§ 1331) of this 
title was added by section 1662(i)(7) of Pub. L. 
103-337. 
PRIOR PROVISIONS 
A prior section 1407, added Pub. L. 96-342, title VIII, 
§ 813(a)(1), Sept. 8, 1980, 94 Stat. 1100; amended Pub. 
L. 96-513, title I, § 113(c), title V. §§501(21), 511(53), 
Dec. 12, 1980, 94 Stat. 2877, 2908, 2925, related to de-
termination of retired base pav, prior to repeal by 
Pub. L. 99 348, § 104(b). 
AMENDMENTS 
1994-Subsec . (c)(2)(B). Pub. L. 103-337, 
§ 1662(j)(5)(A). which directed substitution of "chap-
ter 1223" for "chapter 67", could not be executed be-
cause the words "chapter 67" did not appear subse-
quent to amendment by Pub. L. 101-189, § 651(a)(2), 
(4). See 1989 Amendment note below. 
Subsec. (f)(2). Pub. L. 103-337, § 1662(j)(5)(B), which 
directed amendment of subsec. (f)(2) by substituting 
"Chapter 1223" for "Chapter 67" in heading and "sec-
tion 12731" for "section 1331" in text , could not be ex-
ecuted because of previous repeal of subsec. (f) by 
Pub. L. 101-189, § 651(a)(2). See 1989 Amendment note 
below. 
1 9 8 9 - S u b s e c . (b). Pub. L. 101-189, § 651(a)(1), (b)(2), 
subst i tuted "person" for "member", "persons" for 
"members" , and "subsection (c) or (d)" for "subsec-
tion (c)". 
Subsec. (c). Pub. L. 101-189, § 651(a)(2), (4), added 
subsec. (c) and struck out former subsec. (c) which re-
lated to computat ion of high-three average. 
Subsec. (d). Pub. L. 101-189. § 651(a)(4), added 
subsec. (d). Former subsec. (d) redesignated (e). 
Subsec. (e). Pub. L. 101-189, § 651(a)(2), (3). redesig-
nated subsec. (d) as (e) and struck out former subsec. 
(e) which related to special rules for short-term dis-
ability retirees. 
Subsecs. (f), (g). Pub. L. 101-189, § 651(a)(2), struck 
out subsec. (f) which related to special rule for mem-
bers retiring with non-regular service, and subsec. (g) 
which defined the term "years of creditable service". 
EFFECTIVE DATE OF 1994 AMENDMENT 
Amendment by Pub. L. 103-337 effective Dec. 1, 
1994, except as otherwise provided, see section 1691 of 
Pub. L. 103-337, set out as an Effective Date note 
under section 10001 of this title. 
SECTION REFERRED TO IN OTHER SECTIONS 
This sect ion is referred to in sections 1401, 1402a, 
3991, 3992, 6151, 6333, 6334, 8991, 8992, 12739 of this 
title; title 14 sect ions 357, 423, 424; title 33 section 
853o; t it le 42 sect ions 211, 212. 
§ 1408. Payment of retired or retainer pay in compli-
ance with court orders 
(a) DEFINITIONS.—In this section: 
(1) The term "court" means— 
(A) any court of competent jurisdiction of 
any State, the District of Columbia, the 
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Guam, 
American Samoa, the Virgin Islands, the 
Northern Mariana Islands, and the Trust 
Territory of the Pacific Islands; 
(B) any court of the United States (as de-
fined in section 451 of title 28) having com-
petent jurisdiction; and 
(C) any court of competent jurisdiction of 
a foreign country with which the United 
States has an agreement requiring the 
United States to honor any court order of 
such country. 
(2) The term "court order" means a final 
decree of divorce, dissolution, annulment, or 
legal separation issued by a court, or a court 
ordered, ratified, or approved property settle-
ment incident to such a decree (including a 
final decree modifying the terms of a previ-
ously issued decree of divorce, dissolution, an-
nulment, or legal separation, or a court or-
dered, ratified, or approved property settle-
ment incident to such previously issued 
decree), which— 
(A) is issued in accordance with the laws 
of the jurisdiction of that court; 
(B) provides for— 
(i) payment of child support (as defined 
in section 462(b) of the Social Security 
Act (42 U.S.C. 662(b))); 
(ii) payment of alimony (as defined in 
section 462(c) of the Social Security Act 
(42 U.S.C. 662(c))); or 
(iii) division of property (including a di-
vision of community property); and 
(C) in the case of a division of property, 
specifically provides for the payment of an 
amount, expressed in dollars or as a per-
centage of disposable retired pay, from the 
disposable retired pay of a member to the 
spouse or former spouse of that member. 
(3) The term "final decree" means a decree 
from which no appeal may be taken or from 
which no appeal has been taken within the 
time allowed for taking such appeals under 
the laws applicable to such appeals, or a 
decree from which timely appeal has been 
taken and such appeal has been finally decid-
ed under the laws applicable to such appeals. 
(4) The term "disposable retired pay" 
means the total monthly retired pay to which 
a member is entitled less amounts which— 
(A) are owed by that member to the 
United States for previous overpayments of 
retired pay and for recoupments required 
by law resulting from entitlement to retired 
pay; 
(B) are deducted from the retired pay of 
such member as a result of forfeitures of re-
tired pay ordered by a court-martial or as a 
result of a waiver of retired pay required by 
law in order to receive compensation under 
title 5 or title 38; 
(C) in the case of a member entitled to re-
tired pay under chapter 61 of this title, are 
equal to the amount of retired pay of the 
member under that chapter computed using 
the percentage of the member's disability 
on the date when the member was retired 
(or the date on which the member's name 
was placed on the temporary disability re-
tired list); or 
(D) are deducted because of an election 
under chapter 73 of this title to provide an 
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annuity to a spouse or former spouse to 
whom payment of a portion of such mem-
ber's retired pay is being made pursuant to 
a court order under this section. 
(5) The term "member" includes a former 
member entitled to retired pay under section 
1331 » of this title. 
(6) The term "spouse or former spouse" 
means the husband or wife, or former hus-
band or wife, respectively, of a member who, 
on or before the date of a court order, was 
married to tha t member. 
(7) The term "retired pay" includes retainer 
pay. 
(b) EFFECTIVE SERVICE OF PROCESS.—For the 
purposes of this section— 
(1) service of a court order is effective if— 
(A) an appropriate agent of the Secretary 
concerned designated for receipt of service 
of court orders under regulations prescribed 
pursuant to subsection (i) or, if no agent 
has been so designated, the Secretary con-
cerned, is personally served or is served by 
certified or registered mail, return receipt 
requested; 
(B) the court order is regular on its face; 
(C) the court order or other documents 
served with the court order identify the 
member concerned and include, if possible, 
the social security number of such member; 
and 
(D) the court order or other documents 
served with the court order certify tha t the 
rights of the member under the Soldiers' 
and Sailors' Civil Relief Act of 1940 (50 
U.S.C. App. 501 et seq.) were observed; and 
(2) a court order is regular on its face if the 
order— 
(A) is issued by a court of competent juris-
diction; 
(B) is legal in form; and 
(C) includes nothing on its face tha t pro-
vides reasonable notice tha t it is issued 
without authori ty of law. 
(c) AUTHORITY FOR COURT To TREAT RETIRED 
PAY AS PROPERTY OF THE MEMBER AND SPOUSE.— 
(1) Subject to the limitations of this section, a 
court may treat disposable retired pay payable 
to a member for pay periods beginning after 
June 25, 1981, either as property solely of the 
member or as property of the member and his 
spouse in accordance with the law of the juris-
diction of such court. A court may not treat re-
tired pay as property in any proceeding to 
divide or partit ion any amount of retired pay of 
a member as the property of the member and 
the member's spouse or former spouse if a final 
decree of divorce, dissolution, annulment, or 
legal separation (including a court ordered, rati-
fied, or approved property sett lement incident 
to such decree) affecting the member and the 
member's spouse or former spouse (A) was 
issued before June 25, 1981, and (B) did not 
treat (or reserve jurisdiction to treat) any 
amount of retired pay of the member as proper-
ty of the member and the member's spouse or 
former spouse. 
1
 See Reference in Tex I note below. 
(2) Notwithstanding any other provision of 
law, this section does not create any right, title, 
or interest which can be sold, assigned, trans-
ferred, or otherwise disposed of (including by 
inheritance) by a spouse or former spouse. Pay-
ments by the Secretary concerned under sub-
section (d) to a spouse or former spouse with re-
spect to a division of retired pay as the proper-
ty of a member and the member's spouse under 
this subsection may not be treated as amounts 
received as retired pay for service in the uni-
formed services. 
(3) This section does not authorize any court 
to order a member to apply for ret irement or 
retire at a particular time in order to effectuate 
any payment under this section. 
(4) A court may not t reat the disposable re-
tired pay of a member in the manner described 
in paragraph (1) unless the court has jurisdic-
tion over the member by reason of (A) his resi-
dence, other than because of military assign-
ment, in the territorial jurisdiction of the court, 
(B) his domicile in the territorial jurisdiction of 
the court, or (C) his consent to the jurisdiction 
of the court. 
(d) PAYMENTS BY SECRETARY CONCERNED To 
SPOUSE OR FORMER SPOUSE.—(1) After effective 
service on the Secretary concerned of a court 
order providing for the payment of child sup-
port or alimony or, with respect to a division of 
property, specifically providing for the pay-
ment of an amount of the disposable retired 
pay from a member to the spouse or a former 
spouse of the member, the Secretary shall 
make payments (subject to the limitations of 
this section) from the disposable retired pay of 
the member to the spouse or former spouse in 
an amount sufficient to satisfy the amount of 
child support and alimony set forth in the 
court order and, with respect to a division of 
property, in the amount of disposable retired 
pay specifically provided for in the court order. 
In the case of a member entitled to receive re-
tired pay on the date of the effective service of 
the court order, such payments shall begin not 
later than 90 days after the date of effective 
service. In the case of a member not entitled to 
receive retired pay on the date of the effective 
service of the court order, such payments shall 
begin not later than 90 days after the date on 
which the member first becomes entitled to re-
ceive retired pay. 
(2) If the spouse or former spouse to whom 
payments are to be made under this section was 
not married to the member for a period of 10 
years or more during which the member per-
formed at least 10 years of service creditable in 
determining the member's eligibility for retired 
pay, payments may not be made under this sec-
tion to the extent tha t they include an amount 
resulting from the t reatment by the court 
under subsection (c) of disposable retired pay of 
the member as property of the member or 
property of the member and his spouse. 
(3) Payments under this section shall not be 
made more frequently than once each month, 
and the Secretary concerned shall not be re-
quired to vary normal pay and disbursement 
cycles for retired pay in order to comply with a 
court order. 
3 1 108 I1TLE 10 ARMED FORCES Page 818 
(4) Payments from the disposable retired pav 
of a member pursuant to this section shall tn 
initiate in accordance with the terms of the ap-
plicable court order, but not later than the date 
of the death of the member or the date of the 
death of the spouse or former spouse to whom 
payments are being made, whichever occurs 
first. 
(5) If a court order described in paragraph (1) 
provides for a division of property (including a 
division of community property) in addition to 
an amount of child support or alimony or the 
payment of an amount of disposable retired 
pay as the result of the court's treatment of 
such pay under subsection (c) as property of 
the member and his spouse, the Secretary con-
cerned shall pay (subject to the limitations of 
this section) from the disposable retired pay of 
the member to the spouse or fotmer spouse of 
the member, any part of the amount payable to 
the spouse or former spouse under the division 
of property upon effective service of a final 
court order of garnishment of such amount 
from such retired pay. 
(e) LIMITATIONS.—(1) The total amount of the 
disposable retired pay of a member payable 
under all court orders pursuant to subsection 
(c) may not exceed 50 percent of such dispos-
able retired pay. 
(2) In the event of effective service of more 
than one court order which provide for pay-
ment to a spouse and one or more former 
spouses or to more than one former spouse, the 
disposable retired pay of the member shall be 
used to satisfy (subject to the limitations of 
paragraph (1)) such court orders on a first-
come, first-served basis. Such court orders shall 
be satisfied (subject to the limitations of para-
graph (1)) out of that amount of disposable re-
tired pay which remains after the satisfaction 
of all court orders which have been previously 
served. 
OKA) In the event of effective service of con-
flicting court orders under this section which 
assert to direct that different amounts be paid 
during a month to the same spouse or former 
spouse of the same member, the Secretary con-
cerned shall— 
(i) pay to that spouse from the member's 
disposable retired pay the least amount di-
rected to be paid during that month by any 
such conflicting court order, but not more 
than the amount of disposable retired pay 
which remains available for payment of such 
court orders based on when such court orders 
were effectively served and the limitations of 
paragraph (1) and subparagraph (B) of para-
graph (4); 
(ii) retain an amount of disposable retired 
pay that is equal to the lesser of— 
(I) the difference between the largest 
amount required by any conflicting court 
order to be paid to the spouse or former 
spouse and the amount payable to the 
spouse or former spouse under clause (i); 
and 
(II) the amount of disposable retired pay 
which remains available for payment of any 
conflicting court order based on when such 
court order was effectively served and the 
limitations of paragraph (1) and subpara-
graph (B) of paragraph (4); and 
(iii) pay to that member the amount which 
is equal to the amount of that member's dis-
posable retired pay (less any amount paid 
dining such month pursuant to legal process 
served under section 459 of the Social Securi-
ty Act (42 U.S.C. 659) and any amount paid 
dining such month pursuant to court orders 
effectively served under this section, other 
than such conflicting court orders) minus— 
(I) the amount of disposable retired pay 
paid under clause (i); and 
(II) the amount of disposable retired pay 
retained under clause (ii). 
(B) The Secretary concerned shall hold the 
amount retained under clause (ii) of subpara-
graph (A) until such time as that Secretary is 
provided with a court order which has been cer-
tified bv the member and the spouse or former 
spouse to be valid and applicable to the re-
tained amount. Upon being provided with such 
an order, the Secretary shall pay the retained 
amount in accordance with the order. 
(4)(A) In the event of effective service of a 
court order under this section and the service 
of legal process pursuant to section 459 of the 
Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 659), both of 
which provide for payments during a month 
from the same member, satisfaction of such 
court orders and legal process from the retired 
pay of the member shall be on a first-come, 
first-served basis. Such court orders and legal 
process shall be satisfied out of moneys which 
are subject to such orders and legal process and 
which remain available in accordance with the 
limitations of paragraph (1) and subparagraph 
(B) of this paragraph during such month after 
the satisfaction of all court orders or legal proc-
ess which have been previously served. 
(B) Notwithstanding any other provision of 
law, the total amount of the disposable retired 
pay of a member payable by the Secretary con-
cerned under all court orders pursuant to this 
section and all legal processes pursuant to sec-
tion 459 of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 
659) with respect to a member may not exceed 
65 percent of the amount of the retired pay 
payable to such member that is considered 
under section 462 of the Social Security Act (42 
U.S.C. 662) to be remuneration for employment 
that is payable by the United States. 
(5) A court order which itself or because of 
previously served court orders provides for the 
payment of an amount which exceeds the 
amount of disposable retired pay available for 
payment because of the limit set forth in para-
graph (1), or which, because of previously 
served court orders or legal process previously 
served under section 459 of the Social Security 
Act (42 U.S.C. 659), provides for payment of an 
amount that exceeds the maximum amount 
permitted under paragraph (1) or subparagraph 
(B) of paragraph (4), shall not be considered to 
be irregular on its face solely for that reason. 
However, such order shall be considered to be 
fully satisfied for purposes of this section by 
the payment to the spouse or former spouse of 
the maximum amount of disposable retired pay 
permitted under paragraph (1) and subpara-
graph (B) of paragraph (4). 
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(6) Nothing in this section shall be construed 
to relieve a member of liability for the payment 
of alimony, child support, or other payments 
required by a court order on the grounds that 
payments made out of disposable retired pay 
under this section have been made in the maxi-
mum amount permitted under paragraph (1) or 
subparagraph (B) of paragraph (4). Any such 
unsatisfied obligation of a member may be en-
forced by any means available under law other 
than the means provided under this section in 
any case in which the maximum amount per-
mitted under paragraph (1) has been paid and 
under section 459 of the Social Security Act (42 
U.S.C. 659) in any case in which the maximum 
amount permitted under subparagraph (B) of 
paragraph (4) has been paid. 
(f) IMMUNITY OF OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES OF 
UNITED STATES.—(1) The United States and any 
officer or employee of the United States shall 
not be liable with respect to any payment made 
from retired pay to any member, spouse, or 
former spouse pursuant to a court order that is 
regular on its face if such payment is made in 
accordance with this section and the regula-
tions prescribed pursuant to subsection (i). 
(2) An officer or employee of the United 
States who, under regulations prescribed pursu-
ant to subsection (i), has the duty to respond to 
interrogatories shall not be subject under any 
law to any disciplinary action or civil or crimi-
nal liability or penalty for, or because of, any 
disclosure of information made by him in carry-
ing out any of his duties which directly or indi-
rectly pertain to answering such interrogato-
ries. 
(g) NOTICE To MEMBER OF SERVICE OF COURT 
ORDER O N SECRETARY CONCERNED.—A person re-
ceiving effective service of a court order under 
this section shall, as soon as possible, but not 
later than 30 days after the date on which ef-
fective service is made, send a written notice of 
such court order (together with a copy of such 
order) to the member affected by the court 
order at his last known address. 
(h) BENEFITS FOR DEPENDENTS WHO ARE VIC-
TIMS OF ABUSE BY MEMBERS LOSING RIGHT TO 
RETIRED PAY.—(1) If, in the case of a member or 
former member of the armed forces referred to 
in paragraph (2)(A), a court order provides (in 
the manner applicable to a division of property) 
for the payment of an amount from the dispos-
able retired pay of that member or former 
member (as certified under paragraph (4)) to 
an eligible spouse or former spouse of that 
member or former member, the Secretary con-
cerned, beginning upon effective service of such 
court order, shall pay that amount in accord-
ance with this subsection to such spouse or 
former spouse. 
(2) A spouse or former spouse of a member or 
former member of the armed forces is eligible 
to receive payment under this subsection if— 
(A) the member or former member, while a 
member of the armed forces and after becom-
ing eligible to be retired from the armed 
forces on the basis of years of service, has eli-
gibility to receive retired pay terminated as a 
result of misconduct while a member involv-
ing abuse of a spouse or dependent child (as 
defined in regulations prescribed by the Sec 
retary of Defense or, for the Coast Guard 
when it is not operating as a service in the 
Navy, by the Secretary of Transportation); 
and 
(B) the spouse or former spouse— 
(i) was the victim of the abuse and was 
married to the member or former member 
at the time of that abuse; or 
(ii) is a natural or adopted parent of a de-
pendent child of the member or former 
member who was the victim of the abuse. 
(3) The amount certified by the Secretary 
concerned under paragraph (4) with respect to 
a member or former member of the armed 
forces referred to in paragraph (2)(A) shall be 
deemed to be the disposable retired pay of that 
member or former member for the purposes of 
this subsection. 
(4) Upon the request of a court or an eligible 
spouse or former spouse of a member or former 
member of the armed forces referred to in 
paragraph (2)(A) in connection with a civil 
action for the issuance of a court order in the 
case of that member or former member, the 
Secretary concerned shall determine and certi-
fy the amount of the monthly retired pay that 
the member or former member would have 
been entitled to receive as of the date of the 
certification— 
(A) if the member or former member's eligi-
bility for retired pay had not been terminated 
as described in paragraph (2)(A); and 
(B) if, in the case of a member or former 
member not in receipt of retired pay immedi-
ately before that termination of eligibility for 
retired pay, the member or former member 
had retired on the effective date of that ter-
mination of eligibility. 
(5) A court order under this subsection may 
provide that whenever retired pay is increased 
under section 1401a of this title (or any other 
provision of law), the amount payable under 
the court order to the spouse or former spouse 
of a member or former member described in 
paragraph (2)(A) shall be increased at the same 
time by the percent by which the retired pay of 
the member or former member would have 
been increased if the member or former 
member were receiving retired pay. 
(6) Notwithstanding any other provision of 
law, a member or former member of the armed 
forces referred to in paragraph (2MA) shall 
have no ownership interest in, or claim against, 
any amount payable under this section to a 
spouse or former spouse of the member or 
former member. 
(7)(A) If a former spouse receiving payments 
under this subsection with respect to a member 
or former member referred to in paragraph 
(2)(A) marries again after such payments begin, 
the eligibility of the former spouse to receive 
further payments under this subsection shall 
terminate on the date of such marriage. 
(B) A person's eligibility to receive payments 
under this subsection that is terminated under 
subparagraph (A) by reason of remarriage shall 
be resumed in the event of the termination of 
that marriage by the death of that person's 
spouse or by annulment or divorce. The re-
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sumption of payments shall begin as of the first 
day of the month in which that marriage is so 
terminated. The monthly amount of the pay 
ments shall be the amount that would have 
been paid if the continuity of the payments 
had not been interrupted by the marriage. 
(8) Payments in accordance with this subsec-
tion shall be made out of funds in the Depart-
ment of Defense Military Retirement Fund es-
tablished by section 1461 of this title or, in the 
case of the Coast Guard, out of funds appropri-
ated to the Department of Transportation for 
payment of retired pay for the Coast Guard. 
(9)(A) A spouse or former spouse of a member 
or former member of the armed forces referred 
to in paragraph (2)(A), while receiving pay-
ments in accordance with this subsection, shall 
be entitled to receive medical and dental care, 
to use commissary and exchange stores, and to 
receive any other benefit that a spouse or a 
former spouse of a retired member of the 
armed forces is entitled to receive on the basis 
of being a spouse or former spouse, as the case 
may be, of a retired member of the armed 
forces in the same manner as if the member or 
former member referred to in paragraph (2)(A) 
was entitled to retired pay. 
(B) A dependent child of a member or former 
member referred to in paragraph (2)(A) who 
was a member of the household of the member 
or former member at the time of the miscon-
duct described in paragraph (2)(A) shall be en-
titled to receive medical and dental care, to use 
commissary and exchange stores, and to have 
other benefits provided to dependents of re-
tired members of the armed forces in the same 
manner as if the member or former member re-
ferred to in paragraph (2)(A) was entitled to re-
tired pay. 
(C) If a spouse or former spouse or a depend-
ent child eligible or entitled to receive a par-
ticular benefit under this paragraph is eligible 
or entitled to receive that benefit under an-
other provision of law, the eligibility or entitle-
ment of that spouse or former spouse or de-
pendent child to such benefit shall be deter-
mined under such other provision of law in-
stead of this paragraph. 
(10XA) For purposes of this subsection, in the 
case of a member of the armed forces who has 
been sentenced by a court-martial to receive a 
punishment that will terminate the eligibility 
of that member to receive retired pay if execut-
ed, the eligibility of that member to receive re-
tired pay may, as determined by the Secretary 
concerned, be considered terminated effective 
upon the approval of that sentence by the 
person acting under section 860(c) of this title 
(article 60(c) of the Uniform Code of Military 
Justice). 
(B) If each form of the punishment that 
would result in the termination of eligibility to 
receive retired pay is later remitted, set aside, 
or mitigated to a punishment that does not 
result in the termination of that eligibility, a 
payment of benefits to the eligible recipient 
under this subsection that is based on the pun-
ishment so vacated, set aside, or mitigated shall 
cease. The cessation of payments shall be effec-
tive as of the first day of the first month fol-
i™irincy thp month in which the Secretary con-
cerned notifies the recipient of such benefits in 
writing that payment of the benefits will cease. 
The recipient may not be required to repay the 
benefits received before that effective date 
(except to the extent necessary to recoup any 
amount that was erroneous when paid). 
(11) In this subsection, the term "dependent 
child", with respect to a member or former 
member of the armed forces referred to in 
paragraph (2)(A), means an unmarried legiti-
mate child, including an adopted child or a 
stepchild of the member or former member, 
who— 
(A) is under 18 years of age; 
(B) is incapable of self-support because of a 
mental or physical incapacity that existed 
before becoming 18 years of age and is de-
pendent on the member or former member 
for over one-half of the child's support; or 
(C) if enrolled in a full-time course of study 
in an institution of higher education recog-
nized by the Secretary of Defense for the 
purposes of this subparagraph, is under 23 
years of age and is dependent on the member 
or former member for over one-half of the 
child's support. 
(i) REGULATIONS.—The Secretaries concerned 
shall prescribe uniform regulations for the ad-
ministration of this section. 
(Added Pub. L. 97-252, title X, § 1002(a), Sept. 
8, 1982, 96 Stat. 730; amended Pub. L. 98-525, 
title VI, §643(a)-(d), Oct. 19, 1984, 98 Stat. 
2547; Pub. L. 99-661, div. A, title VI, § 644(a), 
Nov. 14, 1986, 100 Stat. 3887; Pub. L. 100-26, 
§§ 3(3), 7(h)(1), Apr. 21, 1987, 101 Stat. 273, 282; 
Pub. L. 101-189, div. A, title VI, § 653(a)(5), title 
XVI, § 1622(e)(6), Nov. 29, 1989, 103 Stat. 1462, 
1605; Pub. L. 101-510, div. A, title V, 
§ 555(a)-(d), (f), (g), Nov. 5, 1990, 104 Stat. 1569, 
1570; Pub. L. 102-190, div. A, title X, 
§ 1061(a)(7), Dec. 5, 1991, 105 Stat. 1472; Pub. L. 
102-484, div. A, title VI, § 653(a), Oct. 23, 1992, 
106 Stat. 2426; Pub. L. 103-160, div. A, title V, 
§ 555(a), (b), title XI, § 1182(a)(2), Nov. 30, 1993, 
107 Stat. 1666, 1771.) 
REFERENCES IN TEXT 
Section 1331 of this title, referred to in subsec. 
(a)(5), was renumbered section 12731 of this title and 
amended generally by Pub. L. 103-337, div. A, title 
XVI, § 1662(j)(l), Oct. 5, 1994, 108 Stat. 2998, 2999. A 
new section 1331 was added by section 1662(j)(7) of 
Pub. L. 103-337. 
The Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act, referred 
to in subsec. (b)(1)(D), is act Oct. 17, 1940, ch. 888, 54 
Stat. 1178, as amended, which is classified to section 
501 et seq. of the Appendix to Title 50, War and Na-
tional Defense. For complete classification of this Act 
to the Code, see section 501 of the Appendix to Title 
50 and Tables. 
AMENDMENTS 
1993—Subsecs. (b)(1)(A), (f)(1), (2). Pub. L. 103-160, 
§ 1182(a)(2)(A), substituted "subsection (i)" for "sub-
section (h)". 
Subsec. (h)(2)(A). Pub. L. 103-160, § 555(b)(1), insert-
ed "or, for the Coast Guard when it is not operating as 
a service in the Navy, by the Secretary of Transporta-
tion" after "Secretary of Defense". 
Subsec. (h)(4)(B). Pub. L. 103-160, § 1182(a)(2)(B), 
inserted "of" after "of that termination". 
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Subsec. (h)(8). Pub. L. 103-160, § 555(b)(2), inserted 
before period at end "or, in the case of the Coast 
Guard, out of funds appropriated to the Department 
of Transportation for payment of retired pay for the 
Coast Guard". 
Subsec. (h)(10), (11). Pub. L. 103-160, § 555(a), added 
par. (10) and redesignated former par. (10) as (11). 
1992—Subsecs. (h), (i). Pub. L. 102-484 added subsec. 
(h) and redesignated former subsec. (h) as (i). 
1991—Pub. L. 102-190 inserted "or retainer" after 
"retired" in section catchline. 
1990—Pub. L. 101-510, § 555(f)(2), substituted "re-
tired pay" for "retired or retainer pay" in section 
catchline. 
Subsec. (a). Pub. L. 101-510, § 555(g)(1), inserted 
heading. 
Subsec. (a)(2)(C). Pub. L. 101-510, § 555(f)(2), substi-
tuted "retired pay" for "retired or retainer pay" wher-
ever appearing. 
Subsec. (a)(4). Pub. L. 101-510, § 555(f)(2), substitut-
ed "retired pay" for "retired or retainer pay" wherever 
appearing in introductory provisions and in subpar. 
(D). 
Subsec. (a)(4)(A). Pub. L. 101-510, § 555(b)(1), insert-
ed before semicolon at end "for previous overpay-
ments of retired pay and for recoupments required by 
law resulting from entitlement to retired pay". 
Subsec. (a)(4)(B). Pub. L. 101-510, § 555(b)(2), added 
subpar. (B) and struck out former subpar. (B) which 
read as follows: "are required by law to be and are de-
ducted from the retired or retainer pay of such 
member, including fines and forfeitures ordered by 
courts-martial, Federal employment taxes, and 
amounts waived in order to receive compensation 
under title 5 or title 38;". 
Subsec. (a)(4)(C) to (F). Pub. L. 101-510, § 555(b)(3), 
(4), redesignated subpars. (E) and (F) as (C) and (D), 
respectively, and struck out former subpars. (C) and 
(D) which read as follows: 
"(C) are properly withheld for Federal, State, or 
local income tax purposes, if the withholding of such 
amounts is authorized or required by law and to the 
extent such amounts withheld are not greater than 
would be authorized if such member claimed all de-
pendents to which he was entitled: 
"(D) are withheld under section 3402(i) of the Inter-
nal Revenue Code of 1986 if such member presents 
evidence of a tax obligation which supports such with-
holding;". 
Subsec. (a)(7). Pub. L. 101-510, § 555(f)(1), added par. 
(7). 
Subsec. (b). Pub. L. 101-510, § 555(g)(2), inserted 
heading. 
Subsec. (c). Pub. L. 101-510, § 555(g)(3), inserted 
heading. 
Subsec. (c)(1). Pub. L. 101-510, § 555(f)(2), substitut-
ed "retired pay" for "retired or retainer pay". 
Pub. L. 101-510, § 555(a), inserted at end "A court 
may not treat retired pay as property in any proceed-
ing to divide or partition any amount of retired pay of 
a member as the property of the member and the 
member's spouse or former spouse if a final decree of 
divorce, dissolution, annulment, or legal separation 
(including a court ordered, ratified, or approved prop-
erty settlement incident to such decree) affecting the 
member and the member's spouse or former spouse 
(A) was issued before June 25, 1981, and (B) did not 
treat (or reserve jurisdiction to treat) any amount of 
retired pay of the member as property of the member 
and the member's spouse or former spouse." 
Subsec. (c)(2). Pub. L. 101-510, § 555(c), inserted at 
end "Payments by the Secretary concerned under sub-
section (d) to a spouse or former spouse with respect 
to a division of retired pay as the property of a 
member and the member's spouse under this subsec-
tion may not be treated as amounts received as retired 
pay for service in the uniformed services." 
Subsec. (c)(4). Pub. L. 101-510, § 555(f)(2), substitut-
ed "retired pay" for "retired or retainer pay". 
Subsec. (d). Pub. L. 101-510, § 555(g)(4), inserted 
heading. 
Pub. L. 101-510, § 555(f)(2), substituted "retired pay" 
for "retired or retainer pay" wherever appearing. 
Subsec. (e). Pub. L. 101-510, § 555(g)(5), inserted 
heading. 
Pub. L. 101-510, § 555(f)(2), substituted "retired pay" 
for "retired or retainer pay" wherever appearing. 
Subsec. (e)(1). Pub. L. 101-510, § 555(d)(1), substitut-
ed "payable under all court orders pursuant to subsec-
tion (c)" for "payable under subsection (d)". 
Subsec. (e)(4)(B). Pub. L. 101-510, § 555(d)(2), substi-
tuted "the amount of the retired pay payable to such 
member that is considered under section 462 of the 
Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 662) to be remuneration 
for employment that is payable by the United States" 
for "the disposable retired or retainer pay payable to 
such member". 
Subsec. (f). Pub. L. 101-510, § 555(g)(6), inserted 
heading. 
Subsec. (f)(1). Pub. L. 101-510, § 555(f)(2), substitut-
ed "retired pay" for "retired or retainer pay". 
Subsec. (g). Pub. L. 101-510, § 555(g)(7), inserted 
heading. 
Subsec. (h). Pub. L. 101-510, § 555(g)(8), inserted 
heading. 
1989—Subsec. (a)(1), (2). Pub. L. 101-189, 
§ 1622(e)(6), substituted "The term court" for 
" 'Court" in introductory provisions. 
Subsec. (a)(3). Pub. L. 101-189, § 1622(e)(6), substi-
tuted "The term final" for " 'Final". 
Subsec. (a)(4). Pub. L. 101-189, § 1622(e)(6), substi-
tuted "The term disposable" for " 'Disposable" in in-
troductory provisions. 
Subsec. (a)(4)(D). Pub. L. 101-189, § 653(a)(5)(A), 
struck out "(26 U.S.C. 3402(D)" after "Code of 1986". 
Subsec. (a)(5). Pub. L. 101-189, §§ 653(a)(5)(B), 
1622(e)(6), substituted "The term member" for 
" 'Member" and inserted "entitled to retired pay under 
section 1331 of this title" after "a former member". 
Subsec. (a)(6). Pub. L. 101-189, § 1622(e)(6), substi-
tuted "The term 'spouse" for " 'Spouse". 
1987—Subsec. (a)(4). Pub. L. 100-26, §3(3), made 
technical amendment to directory language of Pub. L. 
99-661, § 644(a). See 1986 Amendment note below. 
Subsec. (a)(4)(D). Pub. L. 100-26, § 7(h)(1), substitut-
ed "Internal Revenue Code of 1986" for "Internal Rev-
enue Code of 1954". 
1986—Subsec. (a)(4). Pub. L. 99-661, § 644(a), as 
amended by Pub. L. 100-26, §3(3), struck out "(other 
than the retired pay of a member retired for disability 
under chapter 61 of this title)" before "less amounts" 
in introductory text, added subpar. (E), and struck out 
former subpar. (E) which read as follows: "are deduct-
ed as Government life insurance premiums (not in-
cluding amounts deducted for supplemental coverage); 
or". 
1984—Subsec. (a)(2)(C). Pub. L. 98-525, § 643(a), in-
serted "in the case of a division of property,". 
Subsec. (b)(1)(C). Pub. L. 98-525, § 643(b), inserted 
", if possible,". 
Subsec. (d)(1). Pub. L. 98-525, § 643(c)(1), substituted 
"After effective service on the Secretary concerned of 
a court order providing for the payment of child sup-
port or alimony or, with respect to a division of prop-
erty, specifically providing for the payment of an 
amount of the disposable retired or retainer pay from 
a member to the spouse or a former spouse of the 
member, the Secretary shall make payments (subject 
to the limitations of this section) from the disposable 
retired or retainer pay of the member to the spouse or 
former spouse in an amount sufficient to satisfy the 
amount of child support and alimony set forth in the 
court order and, with respect to a division of property, 
in the amount of disposable retired or retainer pay 
specifically provided for in the court order" for "After 
effective service on the Secretary concerned of a court 
order with respect to the payment of a portion of the 
retired or retainer pay of a member to the spouse or a 
former spouse of the member, the Secretary shall, 
subject to the limitations of this section, make pay-
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ments to the spouse or f o i m n spouse in the amount 
of the disposable retired or ietainei pay of the 
member specifically provided for in the court order". 
Subsec. (d)(5). Pub. L. 98-525, $ 643(c)(2). substituted 
"child support or al imony or the payment of an 
amount of disposable retired or retainer pay as the 
result of the c o u r t s treatment of such pay under sub-
section (c) as property of the member and his spouse, 
the Secretary concerned shall pay (subject to the limi-
tations of this section) from the disposable retired or 
retainer pay of the member to the spouse or former 
spouse of the member, any part" for "disposable re-
tired or retainer pay, the Secretary concerned shall , 
subject to the l imitations of this section, pay to the 
spouse or former spouse of the member, from the dis-
posable retired or retainer pay of the member, any 
part". 
Subsec. (e)(2). Pub. L 98-525, § 643(d)(1), substituted 
", the disposable retired or retainer pay of the 
member" for "from the disposable retired or retainer 
pay of a member, such pay" before "shall be used to 
satisfy". 
Subsec. (e)(3)(A). Pub. L. 98-525, § 643(d)(2)(A), 
struck out "from the disposable retired or retainer 
pay" before "of the same member". 
Subsec. (e)(3)(A)(i). Pub. L. 98-525, § 643(d)(2)(B), 
subst i tuted "from the member's disposable retired or 
retainer pay the least amount" for "the least amount 
of disposable retired or retainer pay" before "directed 
to be paid". 
Subsec. (e)(2)(A)(ii)(I). Pub. L. 98-525, § 643(d)(2)(C), 
struck out "of retired or retainer pay" before "re-
quired by any conflicting". 
Subsec. (e)(4)(A). Pub. L. 98-525, § 643(d)(3), struck 
out "the retired or retainer pay of" before "the same 
member" and substituted "satisfaction of such court 
orders and legal process from the retired or retainer 
pay of the members shall be" for "such court orders 
and legal process shall be satisfied". 
Subsec. (e)(5). Pub. L. 98-525, § 643(d)(4), struck out 
"of disposable retired or retainer pay" after "payment 
of an amount" in two places and substituted "dispos-
able retired or retainer pay" for "such pay" before 
"available for payment". 
EFFECTIVE DATE OF 1993 AMENDMENT 
Section 555(c) of Pub. L. 103-160 provided that: 
"The amendments made by this section [amending 
this sect ion] shall take effect as of October 23, 1992, 
and shall apply as if the provisions of the paragraph 
(10) of sect ion 1408(h) of title 10, United States Code, 
added by such subsection were included in the amend-
ment made by section 653(a)(2) of Public Law 102-484 
(106 Stat . 2426) [amending this sect ion] ." 
EFFECTIVE DATE OF 1990 AMENDMENT 
Sect ion 555(e) of Pub. L. 101-510, as amended by 
Pub. L. 102-190, div. A, title X, § 1062(a)(1), Dec. 5, 
1991, 105 Stat . 1475, provided that: 
"(1) T h e amendment made by subsection (a) 
[amending this sect ion] shall apply with respect to 
judgments issued before, on, or after the date of the 
enactment of this Act [Nov. 5, 1990]. In the case of a 
judgment issued before the date of the enactment of 
this Act, such amendment shall not relieve any obliga-
tion, otherwise valid, to make a payment that is due to 
be made before the end of the two-year period begin-
ning on the date of the enactment of this Act. 
"(2) T h e amendments made by subsections (b), (c), 
and (d) [amending this sect ion] apply with only re-
spect to divorces, dissolutions of marriage, annul-
ments , and legal separations that become effective 
after the end of the 90-day period beginning on the 
date of the enactment of this Act." 
EFFECTIVE DATE OF 1987 AMENDMENT 
Amendment by section 3(3) of Pub. L. 100-26 appli-
cable as if included in Pub. L. 99-661 when enacted on 
Nov. 14, 1986, see section 12(a) of Pub. L. 100-26, set 
out as a note under section 776 of this title. 
EFFECTIVE DATE OF 1986 AMENDMENT 
Section 644(b) of Pub. L. 99-661 provided that: "The 
amendments made by subsection (a) [amending this 
sect ion] shall apply with respect to court orders issued 
after the date of the enactment of this Act [Nov. 14, 
1986]." 
EFFECTIVE DATE OF 1984 AMENDMENT 
Section 643(e) of Pub. L. 98-525 provided that: "The 
amendments made by this section [amending this sec-
t ion] shall apply with respect to court orders for 
which effective service (as described in section 
1408(b)(1) of title 10, United States Code, as amended 
by subsection (b) of this section) is made on or after 
the date of the enactment of this Act [Oct. 19, 1984]." 
EFFECTIVE DATE: TRANSITION PROVISIONS 
Section 1006 of title X of Pub. L. 97-252, as amended 
by Pub. L. 98-94, title IX. § 941(c)(4), Sept. 24, 1983, 97 
Stat . 654; Pub. L. 98-525, title VI, § 645(b), Oct. 19, 
1984, 98 Stat . 2549, provided that: 
"(a) T h e amendments made by this title [amending 
this section and sections 1072, 1076, 1086, 1447. 1448, 
and 1450 of this title and enacting provisions set out as 
notes under this section and section 1408 of this t it le] 
shall take effect on the first day of the first month 
[February 1983] which begins more than one hundred 
and twenty days after the date of the enactment of 
this title [Sept. 8, 1982]. 
"(b) Subsect ion (d) of section 1408 of title 10, United 
States Code, as added by section 1002(a), shall apply 
only with respect to payments of retired or retainer 
pay for periods beginning on or after the effective 
date of this title [Feb. 1. 1983, provided in subsec. (a)] , 
but without regard to the date of any court order. 
However, in the case of a court order that became 
final before June 26, 1981, payments under such sub-
section may only be made in accordance with such 
order as in effect on such date and without regard to 
any subsequent modifications. 
"(c) T h e amendments made by section 1003 of this 
title [amending sections 1447, 1448, and 1450 of this 
t i t le] shall apply to persons who become eligible to 
participate in the Survivor Benefit Plan provided for 
in subchapter II of chapter 73 of title 10, United 
States Code [section 1447 et seq. of this t i t le ] , before, 
on, or after the effective date of such amendments . 
"(d) T h e amendments made by section 1004 of this 
title [amending sect ions 1072, 1076, and 1086 of this 
t i t le] and the provisions of section 1005 of this title 
[set out as a note under this sect ion] shall apply in the 
case of any former spouse of a member or former 
member of the uniformed services whether the final 
decree of divorce, dissolution, or annulment of the 
marriage of the former spouse and such member or 
former member is dated before, on, or after February 
1, 1983. 
"(e) For the purposes of this section— 
"(1) the term 'court order' has the same meaning 
as provided in section 1408(a)(2) of title 10, United 
States Code (as added by section 1002 of this title); 
"(2) the term 'former spouse' has the same mean-
ing as provided in section 1408(a)(6) of such title (as 
added by section 1002 of this title); and 
"(3) the term 'uniformed services' has the same 
meaning as provided in section 1072 of title 10, 
United States Code." 
TERMINATION OF T R U S T TERRITORY OF THE PACIFIC 
ISLANDS 
For termination of Trust Territory of the Pacific Is-
lands, see note set out preceding section 1681 of Tit le 
48, Territories and Insular Possessions. 
ACCRUAL OF PAYMENTS; PROSPECTIVE APPLICABILITY 
Section 653(c) of Pub. L. 102-484 provided that: "No 
payments under subsection (h) of section 1408 of title 
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10, United States Code (as added by subsection (a)), 
shall accrue for periods before the date of the enact-
ment of this Act [Oct. 23, 1992]." 
STUDY CONCERNING BENEFITS FOR DEPENDENTS WHO 
ARE VICTIMS OF ABUSE 
Section 653(e) of Pub. L. 102-484 provided that: 
"(1) The Secretary of Defense shall conduct a study 
in order to estimate— 
"(A) the number of persons who will become eligi-
ble to receive payments under subsection (h) of sec-
tion 1408 of title 10, United States Code (as added by 
subsection (a)), during each of fiscal years 1993 
through 2000; and 
"(B) for each of fiscal years 1993 through 2000, the 
number of members of the Armed Forces who, after 
having completed at least one, and less than 20, 
years of service in that fiscal year, will be approved 
in that fiscal year for separation from the Armed 
Forces as a result of having abused a spouse or de-
pendent child. 
"(2) The study shall include a thorough analysis of— 
"(A) the effects, if any, of appeals and requests for 
clemency in the case of court-martial convictions on 
the entitlement to payments in accordance with sub-
section (h) of section 1408 of title 10, United States 
Code (as added by subsection (a)); 
"(B) the socio-economic effects on the dependents 
of members of the Armed Forces described in sub-
section (h)(2) of such section that result from termi-
nations of the eligibility of such members to receive 
retired or retainer pay; and 
"(C) the effects of separations of such members 
from the Armed Forces on the mission readiness of 
the units of assignment of such members when sepa-
rated and on the Armed Forces in general. 
"(3) Not later than one year after the date of the en-
actment of this Act [Oct. 23, 1992], the Secretary shall 
submit to Congress a report on the results of the 
study." 
COMMISSARY AND EXCHANGE PRIVILEGES 
Section 1005 of Pub. L. 97-252, which directed Secre-
tary of Defense to prescribe regulations to provide 
that an unremarried former spouse described in 10 
U.S.C. 1072(2)(F)(i) is entitled to commissary and post 
exchange privileges to the same extent and on the 
same basis as the surviving spouse of a retired member 
of the uniformed services, was repealed and restated 
in section 1062 of this title by Pub. L. 100-370, 
§ 1(c)(1), (5). 
SECTION REFERRED TO IN OTHER SECTIONS 
This section is referred to in sections 1059, 1078a, 
1447, 1461, 1463 of this title. 
§1409. Retired pay multiplier 
(a) RETIRED PAY MULTIPLIER FOR REGULAR-
SERVICE NONDISABILITY RETIREMENT.—In com-
puting— 
(1) the retired pay of a member of a uni-
formed service who is entitled to tha t pay 
under any provision of law other than— 
(A) chapter 61 of this title (relating to re-
t irement or separation for physical disabil-
ity); or 
(B) chapter 1223 of this title (relating to 
ret irement for non-regular service); or 
(2) the retainer pay of a member who is 
transferred to the Fleet Reserve or the Fleet 
Marine Corps Reserve under section 6330 of 
this title, 
the retired pay multiplier (or retainer pay mul-
tiplier) is the percentage determined under sub-
section (b). 
(b) PERCENTAGE.— 
(1) GENERAL RULE.—Subject to paragraphs 
(2) and (3), the percentage to be used under 
subsection (a) is the product (stated as a per-
centage) of— 
(A) 2V2, and 
(B) the member's years of creditable serv-
ice (as defined in subsection (c)). 
(2) REDUCTION APPLICABLE TO NEW-RETIRE-
MENT MEMBERS WITH LESS THAN 30 YEARS OF 
SERVICE.—In the case of a member who first 
became a member of a uniformed service 
after July 31, 1986, has less than 30 years of 
creditable service, and is under the age of 62 
at the time of retirement, the percentage de-
termined under paragraph (1) shall be re-
duced by— 
(A) 1 percentage point for each full year 
t ha t the member's years of creditable serv-
ice are less than 30; and 
(B) Vi2 of 1 percentage point for each 
month by which the member's years of 
creditable service (after counting all full 
years of such service) are less than a full 
year. 
(3) 75 PERCENT LIMIT.—In the case of a 
member with more than 30 years of credita-
ble service, the percentage to be used under 
subsection (a) is 75 percent. 
(c) YEARS OF CREDITABLE SERVICE DEFINED.—In 
this section, the term "years of creditable serv-
ice" means the number of years of service cred-
itable to a member in computing the member's 
retired or retainer pay (including Vi* of a year 
for each full month of service tha t is in addi-
tion to the number of full years of service of 
the member). 
(Added Pub. L. 99-348, title I, § 101, July 1, 
1986, 100 Stat . 683; amended Pub. L. 101-189, 
div. A, title VI, § 651(b)(3), Nov. 29, 1989, 103 
Stat . 1460; Pub. L. 103-337, div. A, title XVI, 
§ 1662(j)(6), Oct. 5, 1994, 108 Stat . 3005.) 
AMENDMENTS 
1994—Subsec. (a)(1)(B). Pub. L. 103-337 substituted 
"chapter 1223" for "chapter 67". 
1989—Subsec. (a)(1). Pub. L. 101-189 substituted 
"who is entitled to that pay" for "who is retired" in in-
troductory provisions. 
EFFECTIVE DATE OF 1994 AMENDMENT 
Amendment by Pub. h. 103-337 effective Dec. 1, 
1994, except as otherwise provided, see section 1691 of 
Pub. L. 103-337, set out as an Effective Date note 
under section 10001 of this title. 
SECTION REFERRED TO IN OTHER SECTIONS 
This section is referred to in sections 1401, 1402a, 
1410, 1447, 1451, 1452, 3991, 3992, 6151, 6333, 6334, 
8991, 8992 of this title; title 14 section 423; title 33 sec-
tion 853o; title 42 sections 211, 212. 
§1410. Restoral of full retirement amount at age 62 
for members entering on or after August 1, 1986 
In the case of a member or former member 
who first became a member of a uniformed 
service on or after August 1, 1986, and who be-
comes entitled to retired pay before the age of 
62, the retired pay of such member or former 
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great bodily injury), but remand the case 
for resentencing on count VL23 
PAULINE DAVIS HANSON, Acting 
P.J., and HAMLIN, J., concur. 
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In re MARRIAGE of Patricia A. and 
Michael A. KUZMIAK. 
|jj52Patricia A.,KUZMIAK, Respondent 
and Appellant, 
v. 
Michael A. KUZMIAK, Petitioner 
and Respondent 
Civ. B003410. 
Court of Appeal, Second District, 
Division 6. 
Jan. 27, 1986. 
Certified for Partial Publication * 
Review Denied May 22, 1986.** 
Wife filed for divorce. The Superior 
Court, Santa Barbara County, Zel Canter, 
J., entered final judgment dissolving mar-
riage and decided property division two and 
one-half years later. On appeal the Court 
of Appeal, Gilbert, J., held that: (1) separa-
tion pay as a severance benefit upon invol-
untary discharge from military is separate 
property of the service member, and (2) 
wife whose husband received separation 
pay upon involuntary discharge from mili-
tary had present community property inter-
est in husband's nonmatured longevity pen-
sion including the separation pay after hus-
band reenlisted. 
Reversed and remanded. 
23. As to count VI, the court imposed a consecu-
tive sentence of one-third of the middle term of 
three years, namely, one year. Count II was 
used as the base term. 
1. Divorce <3=>252.3(4) 
Separation pay as a severance benefit 
upon involuntary discharge from military 
under 10 U.S.C.A. § 1174 is not disposable 
retired or retainer pay under Federal Uni-
formed Service Former Spouse's Protection 
Act, 10 U.S.C.A. § 1408(c)(1), permitting 
state court to treat disposable retired or 
retainer pay payable to member either as 
property solely of member or as property 
of member and his spouse and is separate 
property of the military service member, 
where unlike military benefits based upon 
longevity of service separation pay does 
not serve to compensate for past service 
but right to separation pay occurs only 
when there is involuntary discharge of ser-
vice member. 
2. Husband and Wife <3=>249(3) 
Wife whose husband received separa-
tion pay as a severance benefit upon invol-
untary discharge from military under 10 
U.S.C.A. § 1174 had present community 
property interest in husband's nonmatured 
longevity pension including the separation 
pay after husband reenlisted, since 10 U.S. 
C.A. § 1174(h)(1) compels reimbursement 
of separation pay from the service mem-
ber's retirement benefits and hence pur-
poses of separation pay to ease service 
member's reentry into civilian life have not 
been fulfilled. 
j^i54Rodney S. Melville, Melville & Iwas-
ko, Santa Maria, and Robert O. Angle, San-
ta Barbara, for respondent and appellant 
Charles G. Ward, Lompoc, for petitioner 
and respondent. 
GILBERT, Associate Justice. 
Husband Michael A. Kuzmiak appeals 
the order of the trial court finding that the 
division of his Air Force separation pay is 
* Pursuant to Rule 976.1 of the California Rules of 
Court this opinion is certified for partial publi-
cation. 
** Reynoso, J., is of the opinion the petition 
should be granted. 
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community property. (10 U.S.C. § 1174.)l policy. (§ 632.)^ 
We reverse the order and hold that al-
though the trial court had jurisdiction to 
divide the assets of the marriage, hus-
band's military separation pay is his sepa-
rate property unless he applies for military 
longevity retirement. 
645 
FACTS 
Husband enlisted in the United States 
Air Force in New Jersey on May 6, 1966. 
He married Patricia A. Kuzmiak four 
months later. The parties moved under 
military orders to Texas the day of their 
marriage. The Air Force later assigned 
husband to duty in New York, Ndrth Dako-
ta and fjnally,n55 California. The couple 
arrived in Lompoc, California in 1975 and 
lived together there for five years until 
wife filed for divorce on June 9, 1980. The 
trial court entered a final judgment dissolv-
ing the marriage on May 21, 1981, and 
decided property division two and one half 
years later.2 
On February 28, 1983, between the time 
of the final judgment dissolving the mar-
riage and the trial of the property issues, 
the Air Force released husband from his 
command under the military's "up or out" 
1. All statutory references are to title 10 of the 
United States Code unless otherwise stated. 
2. Trial on the property issues occurred after the 
Unilted States Supreme Court decision in McCar-
ty v. McCarty (1981) 453 U.S. 210, 101 S.Ct. 
2723, 69 L.Ed.2d 589 and after the enactment of 
the Federal Uniformed Services Former 
Spouse's Protection Act (FUSFSPA). (§ 1408, 
enacted September 8, 1982.) 
\. Section 632 provides in part: 
"(a) [E]ach officer . . . who holds the regular 
grade of captain or major . . . who has failed of 
selection for promotion to the next higher regu-
lar grade for the second time and whose name 
is not on a list of officers recommended for 
promotion to the next higher regular grade shall 
(1) be discharged on the date requested by him 
and approved by the Secretary concerned, 
which date shall be not later than the first day 
of the seventh calendar month beginning after 
the month in which the President approves the 
report of the board which considered him for 
the second time; . . . 
(b) The retirement or discharge of an officer 
pursuant to this section shall be considered to 
Husband was then enti-
tledTxP'separation pay," calculated in part 
on the number of years he served and his 
annual salary. (§§ 642, 1174.) (The sepa-
ration award formula is ten percent of 
twelve times the member's monthly basic 
pay times his years of active service, with a 
cap of $30,000. (§ 1174, subd. (d)(1).)4) 
Husband, a captain with sixteen years of 
military service, received the maximum 
award of $30,000. At the time of hus-
band's release from duty, he was not enti-
tled to longevity retirement benefits be-
cause he had not completed twenty years 
of serviceI_(§ 3911.) 
Three or four days after his release, hus-
band reenlisted in the Air Force. He will 
become entitled to longevity retirement 
benefits once he achieves twenty years of 
military service. (§ 3911.) However, the 
government will deduct the $30,000 separa-
tion pay from the retirement benefits hus-
band will receive. (§ 1174, subd. (h)(1).)5 
As husband explained at trial, "[W]hen I 
gothi56kicked out of the service, the option 
that they present to you, if you choose to 
stay in the service and you do get to retire-
ment and you have collected this money, 
you must give it back I will start 
be an involuntary retirement or discharge for 
purposes of any other provision of law." 
4. Subdivision (d) of section 1174 provides: 
'The amount of separation pay which may be 
paid to a member under this section is— 
(1) 10 percent of the product of (A) his years 
of active service, and (B) 12 times the monthly 
basic pay to which he was entitled at the time of 
his discharge or release from active duty or 
$30,000, whichever is less; . . ." 
5. Subdivision (h)(1) of section 1174 provides: 
"A member who has received separation pay 
under this section, or separation pay, severance 
pay, or readjustment pay undtr any other provi-
sion of law, based on service in the armed 
forces, and who later qualifies for retired or 
retainer pay under this title or title 14 shall have 
deducted from each payment of such retired or 
retainer pay so much of such pay as is based on 
the service for which he received separation pay 
under this section or separation pay, severance 
pay, or readjustment pay under any other provi-
sion of law until the total amount deducted is 
equal to the total amount of separation pay, 
severance pay, and readjustment pay received." 
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collecting retirement when the $30,000 is 
paid back." 
The trial judge divided the $30,000 as a 
community retirement benefit or payment 
in lieu of retirement. 
On appeal husband contends that his mil-
itary separation pay is his separate proper-
ty under McCarty v. McCarty (1981) 453 
U.S. 210, 101 S.Ct. 2728, 69 L.Ed.2d 589, 
and the Federal Uniformed Services For-
mer Spouse's Protection Act (FUSFSPA) 
(§ 1408) and that by analogy, California 
courts have found layoff and termination 
benefits to be the separate property of the 
receiving spouse. 
DISCUSSION 
Separation Pay 
For many years under California law, a 
spouse had a community property interest 
in retirement benefits earned by the other 
spouse from employment during the mar-
riage. In 1981 McCarty v. McCarty, su-
pra, 453 U.S. 210, 101 S.Ct. 2728, 69 
L.Ed.2d 589, held that a state may not 
divide military longevity retired pay inci-
dent to a divorce absent a federal statute 
permitting such action. The United States 
Supreme Court examined the military re-
tirement scheme and concluded that appli-
cation of state community property laws 
conflicted with that scheme because Con-
gress intended retired pay to be a personal 
entitlement of the service member. 
(McCarty, supra, at pp. 223, 232-236, 101 
S.Ct. at pp. 2736, 2741-2743.) Thus, the 
court impliedly overruled California deci-
sions as contrary to congressional intent. 
In direct response to McCarty, Congress 
enacted the Federal Uniformed Services 
Former Spouse's Protection Act (FUSFS-
PA). (§ 1408; House Conference Report 
No. 97-749, 1982 U.S. Code Congressional 
& Admin. News, pp. 1555, 1570.) FUSFS-
PA, however, does not permit the states 
unlimited powers over military retirement 
benefits. For example, a nonmember 
spouse may not sell or assign his or her 
interest. (Subd. (c)(2).) The parties must 
have been jj^i57married 10 years (subd. 
(d)(2))
 tand payments to the nonmember 
spouse may not exceed 50 percent of the 
member's disposable pay (subd. (e)(1)). (hi 
re Marriage o/Costo (1984) 156 Cal.App.3d 
781, 786-787, 203 Cal.Rptr. 85.) Moreover, 
subdivision (c)(1) of FUSFSPA permits a 
state court to "treat disposable retired or 
retainer pay payable to a member for pay 
periods beginning after June 25, 1981, ei-
ther as property solely of the member or as 
property of the member and his 
spouse " (Emphasis added.) 
Although separation pay is calculated in 
a fashion similar to retired pay (§ 1401), we 
think it is not embraced within the meaning 
of "disposable retired or retainer pay" un-
der FUSFSPA. Subdivision (a)(4) defines 
retired or retainer pay as a "monthly" pay-
ment; husband's separation pay here was a 
one-time payment. Moreover, section 1174 
describes the severance benefit upon invol-
untary discharge as "separation pay." 
FUSFSPA does not mention separation pay 
in defining retired or retainer pay. 
Furthermore, unlike military benefits 
based upon longevity of service, separation 
pay does not serve to compensate for past 
services. Although longevity of service de-
termines the amount of this one-time pay-
ment, the right to separation pay occurs 
only when there is an involuntary dis-
charge of the service member. The legisla-
tive history'of section 1174, awarding sepa-
ration pay upon involuntary discharge, 
states that the purpose of the payment is 
to financially assist the member during the 
transition period until he or she obtains 
private employment: "The separation pay 
is a contingency payment for an officer 
who is career committed but to whom a full 
military career may be denied. It is de-
signed to encourage him to pursue his ser-
vice ambition, knowing that if he is denied 
a full career under the competitive system, 
he can count on an adequate readjustment 
pay to ease his reentry into civilian life." 
(House Rep. No. 96-1462, reprinted in 1980 
U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News. pp. 6333, 
6361.) 
If a marriage subsists at the time the 
service member is involuntarily discharged, 
176 CaI.App.3d 1159 IN RE MARRIAGE OF KUZMIAK 
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the loss of employment becomes a commu-
nity loss and separation pay serves to ame-
liorate this loss. If the service member is 
not married at the time of discharge, how-
ever, the adjustment to civilian life is his 
alone to make. Accordingly, the separa-
tion pay should be his separate property. 
We have located but one reported deci-
sion analyzing the community or separate 
property characteristics of separation pay. 
In Perez v. Perez (Tex.1979) 587 S.W.2d 
(171, the military released the husband from 
duty under circumstances entitling him to 
separation pay. Despite their divorce sev-
en years earlier, wife sued for a portion of 
the payment, contending it was »a retire-
ment benefit acquired during ihe marriage. 
The Texas Supreme |1158CoUrt concluded 
the purpose of the payment was to assist 
the service member in adjusting to civilian 
life, and the payment was not recompense 
for past services. (Perez, supra, at p. 673.) 
The court also held that application of com-
munity property principles to the payment 
would defeat federal objectives. (Ibid.) 
The court expressly declined to rule, how-
ever, whether wife was entitled to any re-
tirement benefits if husband reenlisted and 
served until retirement. (Ibid. ) 
In similar cases, California courts have 
analyzed the purposes of "termination" or 
"layoff benefits in determining their sepa-
rate property or community character. In 
re Marriage of Skaden (1977) 19 Cal.3d 
679, 139 Cal.Rptr. 615, 566 P.2d 249, con-
cerned termination benefits consisting of a 
percentage of insurance premiums collect-
ed on insurance policies placed by a former 
insurance agent. Our Supreme Court con-
cluded that the language of the employ-
ment contract indicated that the commis-
sions were community property because 
they were deferred compensation for the 
agent's previous endeavors. (Skaden, su-
pra, at pp. 687-688, 139 Cal.Rptr. 615, 566 
P.2d 249.) 
In In re Marriage of Wright (1983) 140 
Cal.App.3d 342, 189 Cal.Rptr. 336, an as-
sistant hospital administrator received ter-
mination pay when he resigned his position. 
Wright's employer testified that the pay-
ment was made in recognition that Wright 
would encounter difficulties in securing fu-
ture employment as a hospital administra-
tor. (Id., p. 343, 189 Cal.Rptr. 336.) Since 
the payment was made after the parties 
separated, the court held the payment was 
separate property. (Id., p. 345, 189 Cal. 
Rptr. 336.) 
In re Marriage of Flockhart (1981) 119 
Cal.App.3d 240, 173 Cal.Rptr. 818, con-
cerned a "weekly layoff benefit'' paid to 
displaced timber employees when the 
government expanded Redwood National 
Park. The court analogized the federal 
layoff benefit to disability benefits and rec-
ognized that both compensate the recipient 
for loss of future earnings occasioned by 
layoff or disability. (Flockhart, supra, at 
p. 243, 173 Cal.Rptr. 818.) The court then 
denied wife any community interest in the 
layoff benefits because they did not com-
pensate husband for employment during 
marriage. (Ibid. ) 
[1] We are satisfied that Congress did 
not intend separation pay to be compensa-
tion for past services, and that under the 
reasoning of Flockhart and the California 
disability benefits decisions (In re Mar-
riage of Stenquist, (1978) 21 Cal.3d 779, 
787, 148 Cal.Rptr. 9, 582 P.2d 96), the pay-
ment is the separate property of the service 
member. Furthermore, FUSFSPA does 
not discuss court division of separation pay 
incident to divorce. This would end the 
matter if it were not for subdivision (h)(1) 
of section 1174 (fn. 5, supra), permitting 
the government to deduct separation pay 
from a service member's longevity retire-
ment benefits as they are received. 
|U59If a member reenlists after involun-
tary discharge and subsequently receives a 
longevity pension after serving 20 years, 
the purposes of the separation pay have 
not been fulfilled. Subdivision (h)(1) of sec-
tion 1174 recognizes this by compelling re-
imbursement of separation pay from the 
member's retirement payments. There is 
no reason for finding separation pay to be 
the member's separate property once the 
member reenlists and earns a longevity 
pension. 
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Therefore we conclude, wife presently 
has an interest in husband's nonmatured 
longevity pension, (hi re Marriage of 
Brown (1976) 15 Cal.3d 838, 842, 126 Cal. 
Rptr. 633, 544 P.2d 561.) Husband's appli-
cation for a longevity retirement pension 
and the government's withholding of $30,-
000 from this retirement pay deprives wife 
of her community property interest in 
these funds. Our Supreme Court has held, 
that when a husband who is a service mem-
ber elects to take a disability pension over 
a longevity pension, he cannot defeat the 
community property interests of his wife 
by unilaterally transmuting community 
property infco separate property, (hi re 
MarriaXje of Stenquist, supra, 21 Cal.3d 
779, 782, 148 Cal.Rptr. 9, 582 P.2d 96. 
Such an election is inconsistent with "the 
protective philosophy of the community 
property law." (Ibid.) We think this rea-
soning pertains here. 
Although McCarty v. McCarty, supra, 
appears inconsistent with In re Marriage 
of Stenquist, supra, the reasoning of Sten-
quist is still vital. Our Supreme Court 
recently affirmed and applied the Sten-
quist reasoning to private disability insur-
ance proceeds purchased with community 
funds in In re Marriage of Saslow (1985) 
40 Cal.3d 848, 221 Cal.Rptr. 546, 710 P.2d 
346. The court declared that ". . . disabili-
ty benefits have been denominated commu-
nity property to the extent that they equal 
the benefits foregone under a retirement 
pension. (Ibid.) 
We also note that McCarty technically 
did not discuss an election of one form of 
benefit over another. (In re Marriage of 
Mastropaolo (1985) 166 Cal.App.3d 953, 
959, 213 Cal.Rptr. 26.) Moreover, within 
months of McCarty, Congress enacted 
FUSFSPA with the manifest purpose of 
nullifying McCarty. (Id., at p. 960, 213 
Cal.Rptr. 26.) 
[2] For these reasons, we conclude that 
wife has a community property interest in 
husband's longevity pension, including the 
$30,000 separation pay the government will 
withhold from his retirement benefits. 
This holding recognizes the separate prop-
erty characteristic of the separation pay 
(until husband's actions ir\ reenlisting and 
earning a- longevity pension) and also pro-
tects wife's rights to a community property 
asset. Moreover, our holding does not 
frustrate congressional intent that separa-
tion pay ease the service member's reentry 
into civilian life. 
ln60The proper division of husband's lon-
gevity retirement benefits remains within 
the trial court's discretion. The parties 
may reach a reasonable agreement con-
cerning division of the benefits. (In re 
Marriage of Gillmore (1981) 29 Cal.3d 418, 
428, 174 Cal.Rptr. 493, 629 P.2d 1.) If not, 
the trial judge may divide the benefits ac-
cording to any of the methods described by 
our Supreme Court in Gillmore, pp. 428-
429, 174 Cal.Rptr. 493, 629 P.2d 1, or Ska-
den, supra, 19 Cal.3d 679, 688-689, 139 
Cal.Rptr. 615, 566 P.2d 249. 
Accordingly, the order is reversed and 
the case remanded for a new hearing. 
Each party to bear own costs on appeal. 
STONE, P.J., and ABBE, J., concur. 
JU\
 w 
( O | KEY NUMBER SYSTEM> 
176 Cal.App.3d 1161 
_jj^ i6iln re Christopher FALCO on 
Habeas Corpus. 
In re Roy E. SMITH on 
Habeas Corpus. 
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IN THE TEIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * * * * 
MARION MARSH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SCOTT ALLAN MARSH, 
Defendant . 
Q.\5>ioo 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 
Civil No. 894901070DA 
Judge Raymond S. Uno 
* * * * * * * * * 
This matter came on for Hearing on August 16, 1989 before 
the Honorable Raymond S. Uno, one of the Judges of the 
above-entitled Court. Plaintiff was present and represented by 
her attorney, Mark C. McLachlan, and Defendant was not present or 
represented by counsel; and the parties having entered into a 
Stipulation and Property Settlement Agreement; and the Court 
having approved the Stipulation as reasonable; that the Defendant 
having consented, among other things, that his Answer be stricken 
and that his default be entered; and pursuant to the terms and 
conditions of the Stipulation of the parties, the default of 
the Defendant was duly entered, and the Plaintiff having been 
sworn and testified in her own behalf, and the Court having 
reviewed the files herein and the pleadings contained therein; 
and based upon the Motion of Plaintifffs counsel, and more than 
ninety (90) days having elapsed since the filing of the Complaint 
in this action; the Court, being fully advised in the premises, 
and having heretofore made and entered its Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, now, therefore: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
1. Plaintiff is hereby granted a Decree of Divorce, 
dissolving the bonds of matrimony heretofore existing between the 
parties, the same to become final and effective immediately upon 
being signed by the Judge and entered by the Clerk in the 
Register of Actions. 
2. That Plaintiff and Defendant are hereby awarded the 
joint legal custody and control of the minor children of the 
parties, to wit: Bryana Marsh, age 5; Ana Maia Marsh, age 
10; Christopher Marsh, age 12; and Stephen Marsh, age 14; subject 
to the terms and conditions hereinafter set forth: 
(a) The primary physical residence of the children 
shall be the residence of Marion Marsh. 
(b) The primary care taker of the children and the 
primary legal residence of the children shall be with Marion 
Marsh. 
(c) Plaintiff and Defendant are hereby ordered to 
exchange information concerning the health, education, and 
- 2 -
welfare of the children and, where possible, confer before making 
decisions concerning any of these areas. 
(d) It is ordered that the rights and duties of each 
parent regarding the children's present and future physical care, 
religious training, support, and education shall be made jointly 
by the parties except as specifically provided for herein; 
however, if the parties are unable to agree on an issue, after 
conferring with a mutually-agreeable third party, the decision of 
Marion Marsh shall be controlling. 
(e) It is ordered that at all times during the school 
year, the children shall reside with Marion Marsh, except as the 
parties may mutually otherwise agree in writing. 
(f) The Defendant is hereby ordered to pay the 
full cost of lodging, meals and transportation for transporting 
the children between Plaintiff's and Defendant's residences. 
(g) Each party is hereby ordered to encourage the 
children to reside with Scott Marsh for substantial periods of 
time while not attending school; however, if a child expresses 
his or her desire not to reside with Scott Marsh while not 
attending school, the parties will make reasonable efforts to 
encourage the child to reside with Scott Marsh, but shall not use 
undue pressure on the children or force the children against the 
child's will to reside with Scott Marsh. 
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3. That Defendant is ordered to pay to Plaintiff the 
sum of Three Hundred Dollars ($300.00) per month, per child, for 
the support and maintenance of said minor children, commencing on 
August 1, 1989. It is further ordered that said child support 
payments shall continue until said children shall attain the age 
of eighteen (18) years or graduate from high school in the normal 
course of his or her high school education, whichever last 
occurs. Further, if the Defendant falls thirty (30) days or 
more in arrears in his child support obligation, the Plaintiff 
should be entitled to mandatory income withholding relief, 
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated (78-45(d)-l et. seq.) (1984 as 
amended). Further, it is ordered that the Plaintiff is entitled 
to claim the two youngest minor children as exemptions for 
purposes of Federal and State Income Taxes and that Defendant 
is entitled to claim the two oldest children for such exemptions 
and the Plaintiff and the Defendant are ordered to execute Form 
8332, waiving their claim to the exemptions not awarded to them 
for the purposes of Federal and State Income Tax. In addition to 
the child support obligations provided for herein, Defendant 
is ordered to pay the monthly obligation presently being incurred 
at the Utah Boys Ranch, for Stephen Marsh, until such time as 
Stephen Marsh is released. Said obligation being approximately 
Four Hundred Dollars ($400.00) per month. Further, although the 
parties hereto have agreed to joint legal custody of the minor 
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children, as hereinbefore defined and modified, Defendant is 
hereby ordered, at all times until said minor children reach the 
age of majority, to pay child support to Plaintiff for each child 
as provided for herein, even if said child resides with 
Defendant, unless said child resides with Defendant pursuant to a 
written agreement wherein Plaintiff waives her claim to child 
support for said child or an Order is entered by this Court 
relieving the Defendant from the obligation of paying child 
support for said child. 
4. Defendant is hereby ordered to pay to Plaintiff tne sum 
of Four Hundred Sixty-eight Dollars ($468.00) per month as 
alimony, commencing August 1, 1989, and payable on the 1st day of 
each month thereafter. Said alimony payment to decrease to Three 
Hundred ($300.00) per month after Plaintiff completes paying for 
Plaintiff's Honda automobile under the current terms of the loan 
agreement, but in no event later than July 1, 1992. Said alimony 
payments shall continue until Plaintiff remarries; provided, 
however, should Plaintiff remarry prior to the time the 
automobile is paid in full, Defendant shall continue to pay 
Plaintiff the sum of Two Hundred Sixty-eight Dollars ($268.00) 
per month until the automobile loan is paid in full. 
5. Plaintiff is hereby awarded all right, title and 
interest in and to the home and real property located at 8966 
South 3860 West, West Jordan, Utah, and more particularly 
described as: 
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Lot 28, Val ley West No. 1, according to the o f f i c i a l 
p l a t thereof recorded in Book 79-12 of P l a t s a t Page 
352, records of Sal t Lake County, Utah, 
the 1988 Honda Civic au tomobi le , and, except as s p e c i f i c a l l y 
here inaf te r awarded to Defendant, a l l fu rn i tu re , appliances and 
household goods located in the home at 8966 South 3860 West, West 
Jordan, Utah, P l a i n t i f f ' s clothing and personal ef fects and a l l 
b a l a n c e s on d e p o s i t in P l a i n t i f f ' s c h e c k i n g and s a v i n g s 
accounts• 
6. Defendant is hereby awarded the 1988 Ford Ranger pickup 
t ruck, a l l sums on deposi t in his checking and savings accounts, 
t o g e t h e r w i th a l l p e r s o n a l p r o p e r t y and pe r sona l e f f e c t s 
present ly in the possession of Defendant . F u r t h e r , Defendant 
i s he reby awarded the bedroom d r e s s e r , mir ror and two (2) 
n ights tands , and one-half (1/2) of a l l video tapes , a l l of which 
items except the video tapes are present ly in the possession of 
the P l a i n t i f f and should be made avai lab le to the Defendant upon 
reasonable n o t i c e . 
7. P l a i n t i f f i s hereby awarded l l / 4 0 t h s of a l l pension and 
r e t i r e m e n t b e n e f i t s t h a t the Defendant may r e c e i v e upon h i s 
r e t i r e m e n t from m i l i t a r y s e r v i c e wi th t h e Uni ted S t a t e s 
Government and Defendant i s hereby awarded 29/40ths of such 
pension and ret i rement b e n e f i t s . 
8. P l a i n t i f f i s hereby ordered to assume, pay, and hold 
the Defendant harmless on the o b l i g a t i o n with F l e e t Mortgage 
- 6 -
Company in the amount of approximately Seventy-five Thousand 
Dollars ($75/000.00)/ which obligation is secured with the home 
and real property located at 8966 South 3860 West/ West Jordan, 
Utah, together with the balances presently owed upon the credit 
cards, against which Plaintiff has made purchases. 
9. Defendant is hereby ordered to assume, pay# and hold 
the Plaintiff harmless on the obligation with Naval Federal 
Credit Union, which is secured with, among other things, the 
Honda Civic XL 1988 automobile herein awarded to Plaintiff. 
This obligation assumed by Defendant shall not be construed as 
being in addition to the total alimony payment of Four Hundred 
Sixty-eight Dollars ($468.00)per month, unless Defendant dies 
before the obligation is paid. 
10. Defendant is hereby required to assume, pay, and hold 
Plaintiff harmless on all other debts and obligations incurred 
during the marriage not herein specifically ordered to be assumed 
by Plaintiff. 
11. Defendant is hereby ordered to maintain health/ dental 
and accident insurance for the benefit of the minor children and 
each party is hereby ordered to pay one-half (1/2) of any medical 
or non-elective dental bills not covered by insurance. 
12. Defendant is hereby ordered to keep in effect his life 
insurance policy through the United States Government in the 
amount of Fifty Thousand Dollars ($50,000.00)/ naming the minor 
- 7 -
children of the parties as beneficiaries until such minor 
children shall reach the age of majority. 
13. Defendant is hereby ordered to pay Five Hundred Dollars 
($500.00) towards Plaintiff's attorney's fees and costs incurred 
in this action. 
14. Each party is hereby ordered to cooperate with each 
other to effectuate changes and titles to properties agreed to be 
divided hereunder, to change the names and responsibility for 
payment under the charge accounts and other debts divided herein, 
and to cooperate as may be necessary or proper to insure that the 
terms of this Decree of Divorce are carried out in detail. 
DATED this /# day of August, 1989. 
BY THE COURT 
(7 
^T-TC aJ-.J^ 
RAYMOND S. UNO ' 
District Court Judoe 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing DECREE OF DIVORCE was mailed, postage prepaid, to Scott 
A. Marsh, 6500 Hampton Boulevard, Norfolk, VA 23508, this x£? 
day of August, 1989. 
TabD 
Exhibit 
D 
KELLIE F. WILLIAMS #3493 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
CORPORON & WILLIAMS, P.C. 
808 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: 801-328-1162 
FILED P m m i I C B W I 
Third Judic ia l District 
JUN 9 1997 
Pe&uty Cisrk 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, DIVISION I 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MARION MARSH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SCOTT ALLAN MARSH, 
Defendant. 
ORDER AND ORDER OF MODIFICATION 
316 ICO 
Civil No. 894901070 DA 
Judge Leslie A. Lewis 
Comm. Michael S. Evans 
THE ABOVE-CAPTIONED MATTER having come on regularly for trial 
before the above-entitled court on April 17, 1997, at the hour of 
9:30 a.m., the Honorable Leslie A. Lewis, Third District Court 
Judge, presiding, on Plaintiff's motions and petitions, and 
Plaintiff being present in person and being represented by counsel, 
Kellie F. Williams, and Defendant being present in person and being 
represented by counsel, Richard Bigelow, and the parties having 
testified and having presented exhibits to the court and Plaintiff 
having called Neil B. Crist as an expert witness, and the court 
Marsh v. Marsh 
Order of Modification 
June 3, 1997 
EXHIBIT A 
having reviewed the file, the case law, and having considered the 
exhibits and testimony, and the court having also considered 
Defendant's Objection to Commissioner's Recommendation, and the 
court having previously entered its Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, based thereon, and for good cause appearing 
therefore; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
1. The $30,000.00 disbursement Defendant received on January 
31, 1991 was either a marital assert or in anticipation of 
retirement and, therefore, an advance on retirement. Plaintiff is 
awarded ll/40ths of the disbursement. 
2. Defendant is ordered to provide Plaintiff with his 1991 
tax return immediately. Plaintiff's ll/40ths shall be calculated 
by assessing the actual tax rate and tax paid by Defendant on the 
$30,000.00. Plaintiff is hereby awarded judgment against Defendant 
in the sum of ll/40ths of that net sum, together with interest at 
the rate of 7.64% from February 1, 1991 to the present. If 
Defendant fails to provide his 1991 tax return to Plaintiff 
immediately, then judgment shall enter in the sum of $8,250.00, 
together with interest at 7.64% on that sum since February 1, 1991. 
1 \ J / A Marsh v. Marsh 
3. Each party shall pay their own attorneys fees and court 
costs. ^ j J ) 
DATED THIS / ':^day of V / Lt/}^j{ ^ — , 1997 
APPROVED: 
LESLIE A. LEWIS < ,;x_- ^ 
Third District Court judge"' 
RICHARD BIGELOW 
Attorney for Defendant 
DATED: 
Marsh v. Marsh 
Order of Modification 
June 3, 1997 
Page 3 
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SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH; APRIL 17, 1997; A.M. SESSION 
THE COURT: Counsel and the parties, welcome. 
Let me indicate that I have now had an opportunity in 
Marsh V. Marsh to look at the objection to 
commissioner's recommendation. And first, I want to 
apologize, a 4-501 was filed on that a long time ago, 
although it doesn't look like it was filed, at least the 
one I spotted, near the time that the recommendation, or 
the objection was filed. But clearly November 4 of '96 
there was a notice to submit for decision filed, and it 
never came to my attention. For that I apologize. 
I've now had an opportunity to review the J 
objection to the commissioner's recommendation. The 
recommendation itself- - And the response to the 
objection, and the objection is denied. It appears that 
the recommendation was appropriate at the time, 
well-reasoned, and the same reasoning was articulated. 
Specifically that the reason the plaintiff 
became delinquent in the mortgage payments was as a 
direct result of not having been paid child support and 
alimony as ordered, therefore the commissioner 
determined it appropriate to handle it in the manner he 
did, and this court supports that. 
We are here today in Marsh V. Marsh, J 
894901070, to deal with two issues that remain from the 
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trial that 
petition t 
retirement 
was 
o mo 
pay 
how that ought 
pleadings 
generally 
particular 
testimony 
argument, 
there's ve 
happy to h 
conducted on November 7th of '96 on the 
dify. The remaining issues are the 
and separation pay of the defendant, and 
to be treated. 
I will indicate that I've read all of the 
on f ile from beginning to end, I believe I'm 
conversant with the facts of the case and this 
issue, I understand there will be some 
addu 
and 
ced, and perhaps some proffers and 
that this is primarily a legal issue, and 
ry little question as to the facts. And I'm 
ear 
Ms. 
MS. 
brief opening 
indeed, in 
issues, be 
court, or 
alluded to 
the questi 
our 
from counsel. 
Williams, would you like to lead off? 
WILLIAMS: Yes, Your Honor, I'd like a 
statement, just to explain to the court, 
opinion there is one issue, not two 
cause the retirement/severance issue that the 
sepa 
is 
THE 
MS. 
ons, 
clarification, 
and the ne 
marital as 
ration pay issue that the court has 
the same issue. 1 
COURT: It's a single issue? 
WILLIAMS: It is a single issue. One of 
initial questions before the court is a 
or definition of what Mr. Marsh received, 
xt question for the court is whether it is a 
set. We strongly believe, and believe the 
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court should find that it is a marital asset, accrued 
during the marriage, that should be divided. 
We believe that the testimony will show that 
it is appropriately divided, and that, frankly, if it 
isn't divided by this court, there is little likelihood 
that Ms. Marsh would receive the retirement that she was 
awarded in paragraph 7 of the decree of divorce. 
When the parties divorced in 1989, the now 
Ms. Garner was awarded eleven-fortieths of the military 
pension of Mr. Marsh. I was not representing Ms. Garner 
at that time, and though they had been married for 
fourteen years—they'd been married longer than fourteen 
years, but they'd been married during fourteen years of 
his service—for whatever reason she was only awarded 
eleven fortieths. But we're working with that 
provision. 
In 1991, subsequent to the parties' divorce, 
Mr. Marsh did receive a $30,000 distribution, which, on 
the W-2, was indicated as pension plan. Different 
evidence that the court will hear will call it variable, 
different things, different names. But ultimately, we 
believe that, whether it be called separation pay or 
pension, that she is entitled to her eleven fortieths of 
that distribution, and that, again, if the court does 
not award it, that she will be foreclosed from getting 
COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPT 
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her portion. 
There is just no other way to make certain 
that this asset, this marital asset is divided without 
her receiving the portion that we're requesting. 
And there is a case that will be referred to 
by counsel that I will argue in closing, if the court 
gives us that opportunity, that is a California case, 
and I don't believe it's applicable, nor is it binding 
on this court. 
THE COURT: And you will certainly both have 
an opportunity for closings. 
Mr. Bigelow? 
MR. BIGELOW: Thank you, Your Honor. Just 
very briefly, I would indicate to the court that I 
believe that the statutes that we will argue are quite 
clear on the nature of the payment that was received by 
Mr. Marsh, and clear on the distribution and resolution 
of the issue. And that, coupled with the case law that 
I will cite the court to and provide for the court, 
would indicate that the retirement pay issue addressed 
in the decree of divorce has not yet arisen. 
The risks inherent in receiving that 
retirement pay are the same risks inherent in any award 
of retirement benefits that will not be available until 
some future date, and would indicate to the court that 
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Mr. Marsh's proffer of testimony, along with the 
statutes we would submit, I think will clearly show the 
court at least how the congress intended that these two 
issues, or the issue of severance pay versus retirement 
pay, are to be treated. And that in this case it should 
be held as a severance pay, to be treated as set forth 
in those statutes and cases. Thank you. 
THE COURT: All right, and you may proceed. 
MS. WILLIAMS: Your Honor, would you like the 
proffer of- - We have stipulated that we can proffer 
clients' testimony. It would appear that it would 
probably be a little clearer to the court if we 
proffered our clients' testimony before Mr. Crist 
testifies. 
THE COURT: I think that's appropriate. 
MR. BIGELOW: We have agreed to that. 
THE COURT: You have or have not, counsel? 
MR. BIGELOW: We have. 
THE COURT: All right, thank you. 
MS. WILLIAMS: Your Honor, if my client were 
called to testify, she would testify that the parties 
were married in 1974 and divorced by this court in 
August of 1989, at that time having had four children at 
the time of the divorce. They were ages five through 
fourteen. 
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paragraph 
fortieths 
Mr. Marsh. 
been marri 
At the time of the decree of divorce, in 
7 of that decree, she was awarded eleven 
of the pension and retirement benefits of 
That at the time of the decree that she had 
ed to him for a period of fourteen years, 
during which he was in the military, and so that she was 
a military 
homemaker 
retirement 
she, in fa 
approximat 
wife for that fourteen years. 
She would testify, Your Honor, that she was a 
during the marriage, that she accrued no 
benefits of her own during the marriage, that 
ct, only worked minimally for, I believe, 
ely six months during the entire time of the 
marriage on a part-time basis only, and that the parties 
relied upo n Mr. Marsh and his future, and military J 
service for their future and for their retirement. 
Ms. Marsh would testify that she was informed 
that Mr. Marsh, on February 22nd, 1991, received a 
$30,000 di 
the disbur 
received, 
Plaintiff' 
Plaintiff' 
sbursement from the Navy Finance Center, that 
sement was indicated on the 1991 W-2 that he 
marked on the W-2 as a pension—and I have 
s Exhibit 1- - And I would ask to admit 
s Exhibit 1. 
THE COURT: Any objection? 
MR. BIGELOW: No objection, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right, thank you, it's 
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received. 
(WHEREUPON Exhibit Number 1 was received into 
evidence, 
.) 
MS. 
has calculated 
that was made, 
gross and the ] 
WILLIAMS: That Ms. Garner, now 
her eleven fortieths of the dist 
and that we have calculated both 
Garner, 
ribution 
the 
net calculations, and also included in 
those calculations the interest that was, that 
Ms. Garner wou. 
received 
if I can 
until 
Id request from the date that it was 
today's date at 10 percent interest. And 
approach the court- -
THE 
MS. 
COURT: You may. 
WILLIAMS: The Plaintiff's Exhib 
3 are the gross and net computations. 
Honor. 
that you 
THE 
MR. 
MS. 
COURT: Any objection to those? 
BIGELOW: I have not seen those 
WILLIAMS: I'm sorry, these are 
had prior. 
MR. BIGELOW: Actually, my objection 
its 2 and 
yet, Your 
the same 
to the 
one—I don't have the numbers on them, Your Honor—the 
one I think is 
marked? 
THE 
MR. 
the gross- -
COURT: Wait a minute, have they 
BIGELOW: I'm not sure what they 
been 
are. 
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excuse me 
Mr. Marsh 
MS. 
• 
THE 
MR. 
rece 
this is showim 
have any 
Just that 
THE 
objec 
MR. 
the 
THE 
understanding. 
evidence. 
WILLIAMS: I gave you the wrong ones, 
COURT: 
BIGELOW 
What is your objection? 
: I believe the proffer was that 
ived a $30,000 distribution, and I believe 
g a $33, 
COURT: 
tion? 
BIGELOW 
000. 
Well, with that exception, do you 
: Not as to P-2, Your Honor. 
calculations need to be adjusted. 
COURT: 
(WHEREUPON 
) 
MR. BIGELOW 
P-3, except that I hav 
to the 10 
numbers. 
received 
were she 
do. 
basis. 
P-2 is received with that 
Exhibit Number 2 was received into 
: And P-3, I have no objection to 
e not- - Obviously we don't agree 
percent interest. We don't stipulate to the 
THE COURT: Do you stipulate that it may be 
as illustrative of the plaintiff's testimony, 
to testify? 
MR. 
THE 
BIGELOW 
COURT: 
: That's correct, Your Honor, I 
All right, it's received on that 
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(WHEREUPON Exhibit Number 3 was received into 
evidence.) 
MS. WILLIAMS: Also Ms. Garner would testify 
that she has been addressing this issue, now, for a 
period of approximately five years. 
Initially, back in 1992, there was an order 
that the defendant, Mr. Marsh, provide Ms. Garner with 
severance information, and that she be provided 
information in order to assess whether the payment made 
in '91 was separation pay, and somehow excluded, or was 
retirement, or in the nature of retirement, and 
specifically that at that time she was awarded the right 
to assert an interest in that asset. 
That since that time that this matter has 
been pending she has made vigorous efforts to resolve 
the issue, it has resulted in a trial before Your Honor. 
She would testify that at the time of a pretrial where 
she was present with counsel, that counsel for Mr. Marsh 
indicated at the pretrial that he, indeed, agreed that 
it was a pension disbursement. 
There was a retraction of that at a later 
pretrial, and that, based upon those sequence, or that 
sequence of events, that she believes it is appropriate 
that she be awarded her attorneys fees. 
She has no savings or source of moneys other 
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than from Mr. Marsh's income to pay those attorneys 
fees. Indeed, this matter did proceed to trial before 
Your Honor earlier on the issue, or various other 
issues. There was attorneys fees awarded at that time 
of some substance. Even though we've attempted, there 
has been no payment of those fees. 
And again, Ms. Garner is in a position that 
she is in need, and unable to bear the expense of the 
attorneys fees. And I have prepared our affidavit of 
attorneys fees related to this issue only, and J 
subsequent to finalization of the earlier issues and 
documents related to the first trial in this matter. 
And that those sums are due and owing and have not been 
paid by Ms. Garner. J 
I would then call myself to testify, if 
Mr. Bigelow believes that's necessary, or I would ask to 
submit the affidavit. J 
MR. BIGELOW: Your Honor, I have no objection 
to Ms. Williams' affidavit as illustrative of what her 
testimony would be. 
THE COURT: All right. And it's received 
with that understanding. 
MS. WILLIAMS: And that's Plaintiff's Exhibit 
5, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right, 5's received. I 
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(WHEREUPON Exhibit Number 5 was received into ' 
evidence.) 
you-
this 
mome 
Don' 
THE COURT: Ms. Williams, let me just ask 
-and certainly I'll want to hear from Mr. Bigelow on 
question, as well--is the defendant current at the 
nt on child support and alimony? 
MS. 
t you hate 
THE 
MS. 
WILLIAMS: Your Honor, since the last- -
it when people don't say yes or no? 
COURT: Take whatever time you need. 
WILLIAMS: Since the last trial, when one 
of the children ended up in the custody of Mr. Marsh, 
that 
Mrs. 
child has now moved over into the custody of 
Marsh. And so I believe that, under the current 
court orders, technically he is current. 
But 
because that's 
cust 
because the child has moved over, and 
an issue, so that she's back in her 
ody, that's an issue that really wasn't before the 
court, we haven't been able to address that. 
she' 
The] 
s not gett. 
technically he 
Mrs. 
THE 
Marsh? 
MS. 
THE 
re are certainly support issues, because 
ing adequate support at this time. But 
is currently current in support. 
COURT: But two of the children are with 
WILLIAMS: That's correct. 1 
COURT: All right, that gives me a better 
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feel for i 
commensura 
would like 
over wheth 
t. And Mr. Bigelow? Would you like to make a 
te proffer? 
MR. BIGELOW: Yes, Your ] Honor, I would. 
THE COURT: You may proceed, counsel. 
MR. BIGELOW: Thank you, Your Honor. First I 
to indicate that we do have a disagreement 
er the one child that was 
being returned to the custody of Ms 
really is the case. It's my unders' 
child is in the custody of juvenile 
just referred to as 
. Garner, if that 
tanding that that 
court presently. 1 
THE COURT: Well, and counsel, I appreciate 
hearing from you, because I heard from Ms. Williams 
briefly on 
me today. 
issue, I'm 
this. 
resolved. 
it, but I'm not actually 
Unless both parties want 
going to leave it up to < 
sure that's before 
me to look at this 
counsel to resolve 
MR. BIGELOW: I believe that will be 
Mr. Marsh indicated he h< as already agreed to, 
with Recovery Services, I believe, to pay additional 
support ba 
court. 
Mr. Marsh 
Mr. Marsh' 
sed upon this child being 
I would like to indicate 
would proffer, or I would 
s testimony, first of all 
the calculation to arrive at eleven 
in with juvenile 
to the court that 
proffer as I 
, that the issue of 
fortieths of the 
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separation pay, or excuse me, the eleven fortieths 
calculation that's reflected in paragraph 7 of the 
decree of 
agreement 
divorce was arrived at by way of a stipulated 
at the time of the prior divorce. 
THE COURT: And that is really not before me, 
either. That's what it is. So do you dispute the J 
figure? 
figure. I 
to dispute 
the case. 
court that 
MR. BIGELOW: No, we do not dispute the 
thought counsel was going to make an argument 
the figures, for some reason. 
THE COURT: I didn't understand that to be 
MR. BIGELOW: Okay. I would indicate to the 
Mr. Marsh was, his proffer would be that he 
was involuntarily separated from the Navy on November 
11th, 1991 
There is a 
Defendant' 
problem wi 
objection, 
examine. 
to, proffe 
, due to not being selected for higher tenure. 
letter we would submit, Exhibit 14, 
s Exhibit 14, to substantiate that. I 
THE COURT: Ms. Williams, do you have any 
th that as being received? 
MS. WILLIAMS: Your Honor, I do have an 
because the individual is not here to 
THE COURT: All right. You can, if you wish 
r what the defendant would say, just as he 
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might speak to this issue were he called. But I think 
Ms. Williams' point, with reference to my receiving an 
exhibit without foundation, is well taken. 
MR. BIGEL0W: Your Honor, Mr. Marsh- - I 
understand that. Mr. Marsh would testify that that was 
the basis on which he was separated from the Navy, that 
it was involuntary, and it was done as a result of his 
being passed over for promotion. 
He would proffer that he was, at the time he 
was separated, a lieutenant in the Navy, grade 0-3, and 
he'd been passed over for promotion to the rank of 
lieutenant commander, 0-4. And that as a result of that 
separation, that Mr. Marsh was then- -
THE COURT: Let me get a little clarification 
on this. Are you saying that in the Navy if you're 
eligible, along with other individuals, for a promotion, 
and you don't get promotion, that they also terminate 
you? 
MR. BIGELOW: Yes, that's correct, Your 
Honor. 
THE COURT: Why is that? 
MR. BIGELOW: There are- - I'm not certain 
all the reasons, but the ones I'm aware of, Your Honor, 
are that they have a process whereby they- - That's 
their way of, in essence, determining if someone is, in 
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their view 
the review 
instituted 
are passed 
officer—I 
, fit for continuing in a full-time career, 
for promotion looks at that. And so they've 
a rule, as I understand it, that says if you 
over for promotion, I think, especially as an 
don't know if the same applies to enlisted 
men—but if you're passed over for promotion a certain 
number of 1 
separate y< 
curious. 
looking at 
bimes, you then are, they do involuntarily 
DU. I have a couple of statutes. 
THE COURT: I'm not disputing. I'm just 
It seems a little- - It's a different way of 
it. 
MR. BIGELOW: Additionally, Mr. Marsh would 
testify that it was his understanding that when this 
happened in '91, there was a lot of national pressure to 
reduce the size of the military, and this became a 
sensible way for the armed forces, as well, to reduce 
the number 
there that 
confident, 
of personnel in the armed forces. 
So there may have been some other thinking 
we're not aware of. But at any rate, I am 
Your Honor, that it does happen, that they do 
involuntarily separate individuals if they're passed 
over a sufficient number of times for promotion. 
upon this t 
I would indicate to the court that, based 
separation, there was a separation pay made to 
Mr. Marsh on or about the date proffered by Ms. Marsh, 
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or by 
was, 
' Ms. 
in fa 
retirement 
Exhit >it 13 
previously 
Garner, of $30,000. And that $30,000 amount 
ct, a separation, or severance pay, and not a 
payment. And I would submit Defendant's 
in 
THE 
support of that, Your Honor. 
COURT: On Exhibit 13, is this the one 
discussed to which you have an objection, 
Ms. Williams? 
Your 
into 
that 
Honor 
evide 
addit 
would test 
severance 
that 
10? 
into 
MR. 
MS. 
. 
THE 
BIGELOW: No. 
WILLIAMS: I don't have any objection, 
COURT: All right, 13 is received. 
(WHEREUPON Exhibit Number 13 was received 
nee. 
MR. 
iona 
ify 
pay 
we would 
evide 
THE 
MS. 
THE 
) 
BIGELOW: Your Honor, I would indicate 
lly the defendant, or excuse me, Mr. Marsh 
that the total gross amount of the 
paid to him is reflected on the worksheet 
submit as Defendant's Exhibit Number 10. 
COURT: Any objection to the receipt of 
WILLIAMS: No, Your Honor. 
COURT: All right, 10 is received. 
(WHEREUPON Exhibit Number 10 was received 
nee. 
MR. 
) 
BIGELOW: If I might, Your Honor, I'd 
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give them to the court. 
And I would indicate, Your Honor, that 
reviewing those two exhibits, Mr. Marsh would testify 
that, as I said, the gross was thirty, that the- - That 
he actually, or there was an amount of $6,000 withheld 
that's reflected on Exhibit 13 for federal income tax 
withholding when this lump sum was paid to Mr. Marsh. 
So in reality, he only received $24,000, and the taxes 
on that distribution were paid at that time. 
So that in the event the court concludes that 
it is going to award an amount to Ms. Marsh pursuant to 
her petition, that the court would please take note of 
the fact that the gross amount was thirty, but the net 
was twenty-four, and the taxes have been paid, and 
therefore it would be Mr. Marsh's position that only the 
net amount would be the appropriate amount to consider 
if the court were going to consider that. 
Mr. Marsh would also, we also proffer his 
testimony that at the time he was separated from the 
Navy, he was not entitled to retirement benefits, that 
those would not be available to him until he was the 
statutory age, which he understood to be sixty years of 
age. He was only thirty-nine when he was separated from 
the Navy, and therefore had no claim on any retirement 
benefits. 
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THE 
he alludes to 
How do they ca 
MR. 
COURT: What is the 
as the severance pay 
lculate 
BIGELOW 
the amount? 
f: It is bas 
service calculation, as I understa 
is, based upon 
rate had been 
years o 
as of th 
separation. And that 
don't believe 
THE 
something, equ 
for a period o 
regroup. It's 
MR. 
understanding 
can find the s 
specifically 1 
THE 
well, right? 
MR. 
f service, a 
e time of th 
formula is 1 
I have that exact st 
COURT: 
ivalent 
f six mo 
So it's not 
to what one 
severance pay, what 
, predicated upon? 
ed upon a years of 
nd it, Your Honor. It 
nd whatever his pay 
e severance or 
aid out by statute. I 
atute with me. 
for six months or 
was earning per month 
nths to allow one to sort of 
based upon years of 
BIGELOW 
of it is 
tatute, 
ays out 
COURT: 
BIGELOW 
side has an expert. 
THE 
for a side. I 
COURT: 
assume 
It is- -
that, Your 
while we're 
the formula 
And we have 
: If I can 
service, then? J 
Well, my 
Honor. I'll see if I 
sitting here, that J 
for that. 
an expert today, as 
come- - The other J 
Well, I assume he's not an expert 
he may have 
side, but my understanding is he's 
expert. But we'll see , I suppose. 
been called by one 1 
an independent 
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MR. BIGELOW: At any rate, Your Honor, that 
would be Mr. Marsh's proffer, except, to the extent that 
he would indicate that he, too, has incurred costs and 
legal fees in 
severance pay ' 
And 
this matter regarding the separation, 
versus retirement pay issue. 
while the divorce decree is clearly J 
speaks to retirement pay and retirement benefits, it 
does not speak 
on that basis i 
fees, and two, 
incur legal fe 
to separation or severance pay. And that 
we'd, one, deny any liability for legal 
indicate to the court that he has had to 
es, as well, to contest this matter. And 
Your Honor, that would be under Mr. Marsh's proffer. 
The 
be, I intended 
time and legal 
this matter. 
THE 
affidavit? 
MR. 
THE 
you to raise y< 
in? 
only other evidence we would have would 
to simply testify as to the amount of 1 
fees incurred by me in preparation for 
I did not prepare- -
COURT: All right, this is in lieu of an 
BIGELOW: Yes. 
COURT: Before I hear from you, can I get 
our right hand and we'll just swear you 
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RICHARD N. BIGELOW 
called as a witness by and on behalf of the Defendant, 
having been first duly sworn, was examined and testified 
as follows: 
DIRECT TESTIMONY 
BY MR. BIGELOW: 
Thank you. My name is Richard N. Bigelow, 
I'm an attorney for the defendant in this matter. I've 
been licensed to practice law in the state of Idaho 
since 1978, and the state of Utah since 1983. I've 
practiced law continuously in Salt Lake City since 1983. 
My, a substantial portion of my time as a 
legal practitioner has been devoted to domestic cases 
such as this one. My current customary billing rate is 
$150 an hour. I believe, for someone of my time as an 
attorney, and experience, that that is a reasonable 
rate. 
I would proffer to the court that my time in 
doing legal research to prepare for this hearing today 
was two hours, that my preparation in preparing for this 
trial today was two hours, and that I obviously am in 
court now, and am billing my client for the time to be 
here. And would ask that the court, in the event it 
finds that an award of attorneys fees in this issue is 
appropriate, would award the four hours prior to coming 
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here today, and the time for being in court, and 
finalizing the documentation that's required in this 
matter, at the rate of my normal billing rate of $150 an 
hour. That would be my testimony. 
THE COURT: What part of Idaho, counsel? 
MR. BIGELOW: I grew up in Idaho Falls, I 
lived there for about four years while I was practicing 
law. 
THE COURT: Thank you. And Ms. Williams, do 
you wish the opportunity to cross examine Mr. Bigelow? 
He's not- - He's chosen to testify, which is most 
appropriate, on this point, rather than submitting an 
affidavit. But I think, given that, you're entitled to 
cross. 
MS. WILLIAMS: I have no cross examination. 
THE COURT: All right, fine, and I accept the 
representation of counsel. You may be seated. 
THE COURT: And I guess what remains is to 
adduce the remaining testimony, Ms. Williams. 
MS. WILLIAMS: I'd like to call Mr. Neil 
Crist. 
THE COURT: Mr. Crist, if you'd come forward 
to be sworn. 
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NEIL 
called as a witness by and 
having b een first < 
as follows: 
BY MS. WILLIAMS: 
Q 
address, 
A 
Would y< 
please. 
My name 
is 380 North 200 W< 
Q 
in relat 
A 
like me 
reserve 
Q 
A 
retired 
Can you 
ion to mil. 
I can. 
to go back 
for almost 
B. CRIST 
on behalf of the Plaintiff, 
iuly sworn, was examined and testified 
DIRECT 
DU state 
is Neil 
EXAMINATION 
your name and your business 
Berry Crist, my law practice 
sst, Suite 260, Bountiful, Utah. 
describ e for the court your expertise 
itary retirement and separation pay? 
I'm not 
, but l'< 
thirty-
With what? 
With th< * United 
as a colonel, 0-6. 
have managed three 
programs 
dealt wi 
numerous 
attorney 
the stat 
separat 
for the Air Force 
th the severance a 
occasions . 
I believe the c 
, and I've 
e of Utah, 
sure how far the court would 
ve been on active duty and 
five years. 
States Air Force. I recently 
For the past ten years I 
e substantial manpower 
Reserve, in which I have 
nd separation issue on 1 
ourt is aware that I am an 
practiced law since April of 1978 in 
with a , very heavy concentration in 
COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPT 
26 
domestic. And I've taught many seminars for both the 
Air Force and for the Utah State Bar in relation to the 
retirement type issues. I've taught at the Air Force 
Institute of Technology and for the Air University and 
for the JAG Course, 
on the 
Q 
Judge Advocate General-type people, 
same type things. 
And that' 
retirement? 
A 
that's 
Q 
rs with regarding military 
That's with the Air Force on those issues, 
correct. 
Does the Air Force military retirement differ 
from the Naval retirement? 1 
A 
10 USC 
No, it's 
11-74 is the 
deals with that. 
Q 
all dealt with under the same, 
United States code section that 
So the armed forces are one group, when it 
comes to issues relating to severance pay or retired 
pay? 
A 
yes. 
Q 
It's all handled as Department of Defense, 
Okay. In your education background, your 
teaching background 
on the 
A 
, can you tell me when you last spoke 
issue? Or taught on the issue? 
The last 
three weeks ago for 
time I taught a seminar was about 
the Utah State Bar. 
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THE COURT: Ms. Williams, can I ask for 
clarification on one point? This may show my ignorance. 
But I,m not clear on what Mr. Crist meant when he said 
for ten years he's managed substantial manpower 
programs. Could we clarify that at some point, as well? 
MS. WILLIAMS: Yes. 
THE WITNESS: I'll answer that directly, if 
that's okay. 
MS. WILLIAMS: Okay. 
THE WITNESS: I have a hard time being a 
witness instead of the attorney. I have been, for the 
last ten years, in a portion of the Air Force Reserve 
where I would work about ninety days a year, eighty or 
ninety days a year, as the senior mobilization augmentee 
for either Air Force Materiel Command or Air Combat 
Command, managing reserve programs. 
It's sort of an unusual type hybrid 
situation, where you have an active duty counterpart, 
but the management of the entire reserve side of the 
house is delegated to the reserve mobilization 
augmentee. And that's what I have done. I've been 
responsible for hiring all the reserve people, many of 
which are these people that have separated under the 
VSI-type programs. 
THE COURT: All right, I understand. Thank 
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you. 
Q 
employment 
related to 
pay? 
A 
(BY MS. WILLIAMS) And through that 
, have you developed an expertise, or a skill 
military retirements, military separation 
Yes, 
actual case-by-
employed. 
Q 
Force pers 
A 
And 
I've dealt with it many times on an 
case basis with people that we've 
as an attorney, have you represented Air 
ons out of Hill Air Force Base? 
I've 
the Air Force p 
Q 
divisions 
A 
Q 
A 
it's been 
Q 
seminar se 
in Utah? 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
And 
of re 
That 
And 
represented both sides. The wives of 
eople, and the members themselves. 
prepared military allocation orders, or 
tirement assets, military retirements? 
's correct. J 
how many do you think you've prepared? 
A lot. More than 100. Two hundred, 300, 
quite 
Okay 
tting 
Yes, 
And 
It's 
Okay 
a few. 
In addition to your teaching in a 
, have you testified as an expert before 
in Judge Medley's court. 
when was that? 
been about six months ago. J 
And you were designated as an expert 
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at that time? 
A Nobody challenged it. 
THE COURT: I think, then, it would be fair 
to say you were so qualified. 
Q (BY MS. WILLIAMS) Are you, or can you tell 
the court what documents you have reviewed in relation 
to this case, Marsh versus Marsh? 
A Yes. I reviewed- - I went back and checked 
the statutory foundation, which is 10 USC 11-74. 
THE COURT: One more time. Ten- - | 
THE WITNESS: USC 11-74, and the relevant 
section of that statute, if the court wants a complete 
reference, is section small "H," paren 1, that I believe 
is the one that the court's going to be most interested 
in. 
And I also checked the Department of Defense, 
they changed the whole regulation system, here, about 
two years ago, and I think they're called DOD-FMR's, 
which is the Department of Defense Financial Management 
Regulation, which also deals with this sort of the 
implementing regulation, sort of like the IRS regs J 
implement the IRS code. 
And I also looked at some documents that you 
provided me, one of which was, I think, Defendant's 
Exhibit 10, which was the worksheet on the allocation of 
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the severance pay, or how they calculated it. And 
a letter that I guess you objected to, from DFAS 
Cleveland, 
I saw 
that's Defense Finance Accounting Service, 
and the abbreviation is DFAS. Cleveland, which is 
central Department of Defense management point for 
these kind 
Q 
decree of 
A 
too. 
Q 
to as Plai 
A 
Q 
of things, now. 
the 
all 
(BY MS. WILLIAMS) And did you review the 
divorce? 
Oh, yes, I did review the decree of divorce, 
And did you review the W-2 that was referred 
ntiff s Exhibit 1? 
I don't remember if I saw the W-2. 
THE COURT: Here is the original, counse 
(BY MS. WILLIAMS) Did you have an 
opportunity to review Plaintiff's Exhibit 1? 
A 
document, 
organizati 
under the 
they show 
Oh, I think I did see this, yes. This 
I would note, predates the current 
onal structure, where everything is combi 
Department of Defense now. In actuality, 
here is the Navy finance center is now th 
entire financial management center for the entire 
Department 
Q 
A 
of Defense for these type of issues. 
Okay. 
So yes, I have seen that, and I do note 
a. 
.ned 
what 
Le 
that 
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it's checked as pension funds. 
Q 
Plaintiff 
U.S. code 
A 
page, deal 
discharge 
Q 
Let me show you what I've had marked as 
s Exhibit 15. Is that the statute for the 
provision that you were referencing? 
Yes, it starts down at the bottom of the 
ing with separation pay upon involuntary 
or release from active duty. 
Okay. After reviewing the documents that 
we've referred 
to a concl 
the moneys 
retirement 
A 
objection, 
to in the code provisions, have you come 
usion or formed an opinion regarding whether 
received by Mr. Marsh are retired pay, 
, or 
The 
MR. 
connected to the retirement? 
short- -
BIGELOW: Your Honor, could I make an 
here? I think we'll solve it, but I don't 
believe you've 
an expert. 
would ask 
and qualif 
case. 
finds. Th 
THE 
MS. 
got, moved to have Mr. Crist admitted as 
COURT: That's true. 
WILLIAMS: I apologize. I jumped. I 
the court to find that Mr. Crist is an expert, 
ied to testify regarding his opinion in this 
MR. 
THE 
BIGELOW: And I have no objection. 
COURT: All right, and the court so 
e court finds that Mr. Crist is an expert in 
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matters 
benefits 
I think 
have we? 
pertaining to legal interpretation of retirement 
for the Department of Defense. 
MR. 
you re 
THE 
MS. 
it was 15. 
MR. 
THE 
was received, 
request 
Q 
before I 
for ye 
MS. 
THE 
(BY 
get b 
separation pay 
A 
question 
years of 
Yes 
BIGELOW: The next issue I have was that 
ferred to an Exhibit 16 just now? 
COURT: I don't know that we've had a 16, 
WILLIAMS: It was 15? Okay. I'm sorry, 
BIGELOW: Thank you, I've now seen 15. 
COURT: Just one moment. Let's see, 10 
as was 13, and 15 we had not made a 1 
t. 
WILLIAMS: No. 
COURT: All right. Then you may proceed. 
MS. WILLIAMS) Let me back up just a bit 
ack into the opinion. Can you tell me how 
is calculated? 
I noticed that the judge had that 
earlier, I made a note of it. Basically it's a 
service type formula. It is specifically not 
six months of 
asked. 
In 
that exhibit y 
center, 
pay or something like that, like the court 
this particular case, if I can speak to 
ou objected to from the Navy finance 
they refer in there that this was based upon 
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fifteen years' service. The $30,000 was calculated 
based upon fifteen years of service. So it is. 
And there's a threshold that you have to be 
beyond--and I'm not sure how far the court wants to get 
into this—but depending on the career field and the 
personnel management policies that they're trying to 
implement- -
And Mr. Bigelow mentioned that in 1991, 
that's correct, I was, I worked for the assistant 
secretary of the Air Force for acquisition at that time, 
and I was involved fairly heavily in the policy matters 
that went into this. And depending on the career field 
for the Department of Defense, generally it was you had 
to have at least six years. J 
There are different, pilots are treated 1 
somewhat differently, doctors are treated somewhat 
differently, but generally the policy, underlying policy 
consideration was that people who were within their 1 
mandatory service requirement for courses that they'd 
taken or schooling that they'd received or whatever, did 
not qualify for this. J 
Q So you needed a certain number of years of J 
service before you could be considered for separation 
pay? 
A Right, before you could even get it at all. 
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Q 
Strike tha 
A 
active or 
service 
of your 
Now, as 
basis. 
Q 
pay and 
Okay. And what is the relationship- -
t. How is retired pay calculated? 
Retirement pay, depending on whether you're 
reserve, is calculated based upon a years of 
formula. Basically it's two and a half percent 
ba 
a 
It 
se pay for each year of active duty service. 
reservist, it's calculated on a different 
's a point system. 
But the formula for calculating separation 
retired pay, am I correct that it's basically 
the same? 
A 
Or similar? I 
It's very similar, yes. And in terms of the 
time element. The formulas are not the same, obviously. 
And that's 
which prog 
actual pol 
basically 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
bearing 
A 
on 
and that's 
why I asked specifically earlier exactly J 
ram he received the payment under, because the 
icies are pretty much the same. It's 
about $2,000 a year. J 
On separation pay? 1 
On the separation pay, yes. 
Based on past service. 
Prior- - Service at the time of separation. 
And so future service doesn't have any 
it. 
No. No, future service does have a bearing, 
why I think section 11-74-H is so critical to 
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this, because there is a provision where a person who is 
involuntary separated for being passed over, like 
apparently Mr. Marsh was- - And that is a DOD-wide 
policy for up and out, Your Honor. It's strictly a 
management, flow of the promotion-type management tool. 
Q You're referring to Plaintiff's Exhibit 15? 
A Fifteen, yes. 
Q Okay. Can you tell me what connection the 
separation pay has with the pension and retirement 
benefits? 
A Yes. The relevant portion of this is 
subsection 1, "A member who has received separation pay 
under this section or separation pay, severance pay, or 
readjustment pay under any other provision of law based 
on service in the armed forces, and who later qualifies 
for retired or retainer pay under this title or Title 
14, shall have deducted from each payment of such 
retired or retainer pay as is based on the service for 
which he received separation pay under this section, 
until the total amount deducted is equal to the total 
amount of the separation pay received." 
Q Can you tell us, in laymen terms, what that 
means? 
A Well, just to make sure that I understood it 
correctly, since I was going to have to testify about 
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it, I called the Air Force Reserve expert in Denver and 
went through it with them. And it's probably a good 
thing I di< 
be repaid. 
little bit 
the number 
hearsay on 
somebody's 
foundation 
i, because my understanding was that it had to 
But the mechanics of how it was repaid are a 
different than I expected. J 
Basically what they will do is they will take 
of months- -
MR. BIGELOW: I'm going to object to this as 
Mr. Grist's part. He's testifying about what 
told him. 
THE COURT: Will you lay some additional 
, Ms. Williams as to whether the witness has 
an independent working knowledge of this? 
the court * 
ability—ai 
ability to 
of informa* 
MS. WILLIAMS: Your Honor, I would submit to 
that, as an expert witness, he has the J 
nd as an exception to the hearsay rule—the 
gather information, and through the gathering 
tion as an expert, in needing to gather that 
information for a particular case, he can rely on 
what- -
foundation 
instead. 
Q 
THE COURT: All right, and that requires 
, too. So you may wish to ask that question 
MS. WILLIAMS: Okay. 
(BY MS. WILLIAMS) In the preparation for 
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this case 
provision 
A 
Q 
research 
A 
military 
all the e 
implement 
, in order tc 
, did you do 
Yes, I did. 
) more fully understand the US code 
further research or inquiry? 
And what was the- - What did you do in that 
or inquiry? 
Well, based [ on my prior experience with my 
duties, I knew that the office that had the, 
xpertise for 
ation of this 
the Air Force on the actual 
provision was located at the Air 
Force person, Air Force Reserve Personnel Center in 
Denver. 
Q 
And I called and spoke to that individual. 
When you have questions relating to finance 
issues, is that where 
A 
Q 
A 
you call? 
That's correct. 
And you- -
And I also 
Finance and Accounting 
the peopl 
spoke with the people at Defense 
Service in Cleveland, which is 
e that actually implement this for the 
Department of Defense, 
right tra 
Q 
ck. 
And do you 
in your reserve status 
A 
Q 
on other 
Yes. 
And do you 
to make sure that I was on the 
use that service in your, acting 
as employed by the military? 
regularly contact them, as well, 
financial issues related to the military? 
COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPT 
38 
A 
and voir 
was that 
if you'd 
inquiry, 
Jim, I'm 
Yes. 
MR. BIGELOW: Your Honor, if I might object 
dire simply on the issue of who the individual 
he spoke to. 
THE COURT: Well, you're welcome to voir dire 
like to. Would you like to ask that? 
MR. BIGELOW: Yes, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: And sir, if you remember the 
you can answer that. 
THE WITNESS: Yes. The individual's name is 
not positive of his last name, it's like J 
Hebertsen, it starts with "H." And if you call the 
personnel center, his extension is 246. I didn't bring 
that piece of paper with me. I 
THE COURT: That's all right. Anything 
further by way of voir dire? 
Q 
MR. BIGELOW: No, thank you. J 
THE COURT: You may proceed. J 
(BY MS. WILLIAMS) And in your services in 
the reserve, and as an attorney preparing military J 
allocations orders, do you regularly contact these 1 
entities, 
A 
carry it 
Q 
and rely on the information you receive? 
I do. They are the people that actually 
out. 
And after the contact, were you able to gain 
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more understanding of how the code provision, sub H, is 
implemented? 
A Yes. And the other thing I would point out 
is that I did review the Department of Defense financial 
management regulation, which is the regulatory guidance 
for implementing that, also. 
Q And do you recall the cite on that 
regulation? 
A Yes, it's DOD-FMR, as in Frank, Mike, Romeo, 
Volume 7, part B, paragraph 60308, and it's that whole 
section. Paren C is the one that's really the most 
important, I think. 
Q And after doing that investigation, again, 
what, how is the pay back of the separation pay 
implemented in relation to the retirement? 
A It's based on a pro rata distribution of the 
disposable retirement pay. And disposable retirement 
pay is an important concept that we'll probably have to 
define, here. 
Q Okay, why don't you do that now? 
A Because it's really important in these 
retirement allocations. And that definition changed as 
of February, 1991, and for purposes of this case, a lot 
of the things that they talk about are not applicable. 
But the one thing that is really relevant to 
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this case is the federal and state taxes. 
February of 1991, federal and state taxes 
Because after 
are not 
considered part of the net disposable retainer pay, as 
they 
not 
were prior to 1991. 
Q 
A 
What impact does that have on this case? 
The impact it 
the plaintiff should 
gross amount and she pay 
what 
rate 
I 
has on this case 
receive eleven fo 
taxes on what she 
understand to be a lower rate than 
, or whether Uncle Sam gets 20 percent 
because of his tax rate, 
eleven 
uses 
net, 
now 
net < 
taxe 
Q 
and then she just 
fortieths of the after tax. 
Okay. And so 
now is that they do 
is whether or 
rtieths of the 
receives, at 
Mr. Marsh#s 
off the top 
gets her 
the implement that the military 
not make it a percentage of the 
they make it a percentage of the gross now. 
A 
is 
They actually allocate- - The 
they will allocate the, what they d 
disposable retirement pay, which does 
s. 
Q 
A 
Okay. 
And then they actually give to 
payee a form 1099-R, which shows that they 
duri ng 
Q 
A 
the year. 
Okay. 
And that's to avoid- - Because 
way it's done 
efine as the 
not include 
the alternate 
received that 
there was all 
COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPT 
41 
kind 
way. 
it's 
you' 
Mr. 
pro 
is of c 
Q 
• gross 
A 
Q 
omplications with trying to do it th 
Okay, so that impacts the issue of i 
or net. 
Correct. 
But as to the pro rata distribution 
e other 
whether 
that 
re describing, can you explain how that would affect 
Marsh, 
rata d 
A 
people on, 
diff 
reti 
the 
Reti 
Mr. 
erence 
rement 
house, 
rement 
if he's got $30,000 gross pay that', 
ivided between the retirement pay. 
The thing that I got clarification 
that bothered me, is because of the 
between the active duty side of the 
, and the reserve side. 
s being 
from these 
Now, once he's gone into the reserve side of 
he has to be paid under the Reserve 
Entitlement Act. Okay, which means 
Bigelow said, he doesn't start to get paid 
sixty. And it's based upon his total points ai 
of retirement. 
have 
duty 
360 
the i 
Now, where you have a problem is wh< 
nterface, where he had fifteen years 
* service. What they do is they'll convert 
points per year. And now, for his reserve 
receives one point for each period of inactive 
one point 
, as 
until age 
b the time 
are you 
of active 
that to 
duty, he 
duty, and 
for each day of active duty. And that's why I 
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said, in my experience in the last ten years, I've been 
receiving anywhere around ninety to 120 days of worth of 
points during the year. 
Okay. So the thing that's going to really 
make this lopsided on the payback is, they are going to 
withhold, assuming that he retires at fifteen years—or 
twenty years of service, I'm sorry—which is the 
minimum, when he gets to be age sixty, he will have an 
entitlement for whatever grade he is at the time. And I 
don't know if he's been promoted or not, but it's 
whatever the rank is at the time that he gets his 
retirement. 
They will then withhold fifteen twentieths of 
any payment he would otherwise be entitled to. So 
they're going to hold 75 percent of every payment until 
this $30,000 is paid back. Did I say that clearly? 
Q Uh-huh. 
A Okay. So the net effect of this is going to 
be, if he has fifteen years of active duty, that would 
work out to- - What's 15 times 2 and a half percent? 
That's going to be thirty, almost 40 percent of the base 
pay that was accrued during his active duty time. 
Now, for his remaining five years, assuming 
he takes a 20-year retirement, and he could go to thirty 
years, and if he gets to be a general he could go to 
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thirty-five years or something like that. Most of us 
don't make the general cut. But so what he's going to 
have is, he's going to have- - Something like 90 
percent of his total accrued payable points actually 
took place during the fifteen years that he was on 
active duty. So he's not going to have near as many 
points for that last part. 
The bottom line of that is going to be, most 
of what he's going to get is going to go towards 
repaying this $30,000 until it's paid off. So that the 
equity problem that you run into is, and the way the 
defense finance and accounting service will actually 
implement this, is after they take the 75 percent, which 
is considered an obligation owed to the federal 
government, which is deducted from the pay before it 
becomes net disposable, so that's going to come out 
every month. So what Mrs. Garner is going to get is 
going to be eleven fortieths of- -
Q 25 percent? 
A The peanuts that are left. It's not really 
even going to be 25 percent. Because of the difference 
between active duty years and reserve years. So she 
would get eleven fortieths of almost nothing until that 
$30,000 is repaid. 
After the $30,000 is repaid, then she would 
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get eleven fortieths of whatever the retirement pay is, 
which, < assuming he retires as a lieutenant 
would probably be $1,800 a month. I would 
It's going to depend on his rank and how ma 
has at the time that he retires. 
Q 
commander, it 
have to- -
ny years he 
Okay, so under the decree of divorce she's 
entitled to eleven fortieths, which is a li 
than 2 5 
pay 
the 
pay 
the 
$30 
A 
Q 
has 
mil. 
A 
percent of his gross retired pay. 
That's correct. 
But because of the fact that the 
to be paid back, she cannot receive 
itary. 
If she doesn't get it out of the 
ttle more 
severance 
that from 
severance 
, she won't ever get her share of it. Her share of 
retirement will be reduced by what her 
,000 
Q 
would have been. 
share of that 
Is that the interplay between the pension and 
retirement and the separation that we were 
about, ( or is there any other interplay that 
know about? 
you 
A 
the 
because 
to make 
No, that's primarily what it is. 
policy considerations that went int 
that's what we did at the air staff 
a lump sum retirement- -
The problem that the Air Force a 
talking 
we should 
I can tell 
o it in 1991, 
, and it was 
nd the Navy 
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have 
didn' 
than 
it. 
is, they 
t want to 
they had 
One is th 
Mr. Bigelow re 
or if you're p 
But then they 
that. 
The 
the voluntary 
years 
it#s 
thing 
your 
can come 
different 
rs--but ba 
way. 
Now 
somebody in th 
fifte en years, 
needed to get their force size down. They 
involuntarily terminate any more people 
to. So there's two primary ways they do 
e way of calling out officers that 
ferred to, which is the up-or-out program, 
assed over twice you're on the street. 
give you the severance pay to go with 
other thing, that got more publicity, is 
separation, where someone who has ten 
in, and they'll give him $20,000--and 
if you're a pilot and some other 
sically give you $20,000 and you're on 
, a lot of these people, especially 
e situation that he's in, where they have 
want to get into the retirement, or the 
reserve program, because of the fact all they have to do 
is serve five 
good 
peopl 
initi 
take 
where 
more years and they qualify for a pretty 
retirement. 
So 
e getting 
we have, we used to have a lot of those 
, trying to get into our programs. And 
ally, when they first came out, we couldn't even 
them. So 
we could 
this was a change where they made it to 
actually take them and they would pay 
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back the 
Q 
retirement. 
Okay. As a military officer in the field of 
expertise that you have, do you consider this separation 
pay under Utah law a marital asset? 
A 
Woodward 
Since Woodward, I believe it is. I think 
settled the issues of what's speculative on the 
receipt of the retirement pay and so on and so forth. 
In fact, 
involved 
Q 
Woodward1 
A 
actually 
possible 
counsel? 
this portion is, there's no speculation 
in this part. He's already got it. 
By the speculation, you're talking about 
s reference to vested versus unvested? 1 
And whether you'll stay long enough to 
get it and so on and so forth, yes. 
MS. WILLIAMS: I have no further questions. 
THE COURT: Cross? 
MR. BIGELOW: Yes, Your Honor, thank you. 
MS. WILLIAMS: Your Honor, would it be 
to take just a two-minute break? J 
THE COURT: Yes. Is that acceptable to you, 
MR. BIGELOW: Yes. 1 
THE COURT: We'll make it actually a 
10-minute break. We'll take a 10-minute break and pick 
up where we left off. Thank you. 
(Brief recess.) 
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THE 
MS. 
asked to admit 
COURT: Let's proceed with cross. 
WILLIAMS: Your Honor, I don't believe I 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 15, although I don't, 
since it is a U.S. Code cite, I don't need it to be used 
as an exhibit. 
15? 
into 
THE 
MR. 
THE 
COURT: Any objection to the receipt of 
BIGELOW: No, Your Honor. 
COURT: All right, 15 is received. 
(WHEREUPON Exhibit Number 15 was received 
evidence.; 
BY MR. 
the 
and 
this 
Q 
BIGELOW 
Mr. 
court, you 
) 
CROSS EXAMINATION 
• 1 
• 1 
Crist, just for clarification sake, for 
're here at the request of the plaintiff 
her attorney, correct? 1 
A 
Q 
Yes 
You 
» 1 
and I have not previously met to discuss 
matter, have we? 
A 
Q 
called 
this 
A 
ma 
Q 
No. 
To your knowledge, was I aware of you being 
as an expert before today? I 
I don't know. I haven't talked to you. On 
itter. 
You are being paid by the plaintiff in this 
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matter as an expert? 
A That's correct. 
Q Thank you. Mr. Crist, you stated, I believe, 
that you did review the decree of divorce regarding the 
award to the plaintiff of certain pension retirement 
benefits; is that correct? 
A Yes. 
Q And from your review of that decree of 
divorce, is there any reference made to severance or 
separation benefits? 
A I don't- - Not that I recall, but I'll check 
just to make sure. 
Q Paragraph 7 is, I believe, the applicable 
paragraph? 
A It says "eleven fortieths of all pension and 
retirement benefits that the defendant may receive upon 
his retirement from military service from the United 
States government." 
Q In the military, regarding the issues of 
severance or separation pay on the one hand, and 
retirement or pension pay on the other hand, is there a 
distinction between those two areas? 
A You mean are they handled separately, I 
guess? Yeah, there is a distinction between them. 
Q Is there- - When the military refers to 
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pension and retirement benefits, is it also referring to 
severance or separation pay? 
A It depends- - I'm not sure if I can answer 
this right. It depends on which side you're looking at 
it from. If you're looking at it from the retirement 
side, then it clearly fits in, because it's calculated 
in. 
If you're looking at it strictly from the 
severance pay side, then you can get severance pay and 
never be entitled to retirement if you don't complete- -
It's kind of like you were talking about, the 
speculative nature of the retirement thing. 
Q Is there any question in your mind in this 
instance as to whether Mr. Marsh, when he received the 
$30,000 distribution, whether that was a severance or 
separation pay, rather than a retirement or pension 
payment? 
A In his mind? 
Q In your mind. Is there any question- -
A In my mind. In my mind, it's clearly an 
advance on a retirement pay. 
Q Okay. Can you tell me, in the applicable 
code section, where it says that it is an advance on 
retirement? 
A I don't think it says- - I don't know of any 
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place where it actually says that. If you look at it 
as- -
Q So the term "advance on retirement," then, is 
your term, correct? 
A Well, it's calculated on the basis of number 
of years of service, that's correct. And that's my 
term, I guess. 
Q And again, let me go back, just to make 
certain I understand. In this particular case, do you 
believe that Mr. Marsh was paid severance or separation 
pay? 
A Yes. 
Q And when he received that distribution in 
1991, that was paid, intended to be paid to him by the 
military as a severance or separation pay, correct? 
A Yes. 
Q And the chapter of the Armed Forces Act that 
deals with severance or separation pay is which chapter, 
if you know? 
A It's the Title 10, 1174, section 1174. I'm 
not sure what the chapter is on that. 
Q Is it Chapter 36? Does that ring a bell to 
you? 
A I could probably- -
Q I'll withdraw that question, Your Honor. 
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1174 that you have referred to, Mr. Crist, specifically 
deals with the issue of how to handle severance or 
separation pay, does it not? 
A The section that I referred to- - You mean 
1174-H, that I referred to and read from? 
Q No, I'm talking about the entire section, 
1174. That's dealing with separation and severance pay, 
correct? 
A Upon involuntary discharge or release from 
active duty, right. 
Q Correct. It is not dealing with pension or 
retirement pay, correct? Except as stated within the 
body of that section. 
A Well, it does deal with retirement pay. 
That's what that section, or the section H deals with. 
Q That's right. Section H does address the 
issue of retirement pay, and it specifies, does it not, 
that at the time that a person who has received 
separation or severance pay who later qualifies for 
retirement pay, that then there is an adjustment to be 
made, correct? 
A Yes. That's what it-says. 
Q When Mr. Marsh was separated from the Navy in 
November of 1990, was he entitled to any kind of 
retirement or pension benefits at that time? 
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A 
not- -
I think it was November of 1991, if I'm 
THE COURT: That was the testimony. 
THE WITNESS: But at that time he had fifteen 
years accrual towards what's a between-year minimum 
that's re 
receive a 
could if 
different 
Q 
quired for retirement. But he could not 
retirement based on fifteen years. Well, he 
he took a medical, but that's totally 
. I 
(BY MR. BIGELOW) Point of clarification, and 
I misspoke the date. The date when he was involuntary 
separated 
A 
Q 
February 
answered 
was November of 1991. J 
Right. 
The day he received the disbursement was J 
of 1992. Simply to clarify that point. 
So back to my question, then, and I think you 
it, let me just make sure. Was he entitled to 
any disbursement of retirement or pension funds when he 
was involuntarily separated from the Navy in November of 
1991? 
A 
Q 
which he 
if he was 
years of 
He could not receive any in November of 1991. 
When would have been the earliest time at 
could receive retirement or pension benefits, 
age thirty-nine in November of 1991, with the 
service he had at that time? 
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A 
have been 
Q 
to receive 
A 
retirement 
extended a 
Q 
participat 
A 
Q 
It would be five more years. So 
forty-four. 
Would he have to had remained on 
that pension at age forty-four? 
he would 
active duty 
He would have had to receive active duty 
credit, and generally that has to 
ctive duty. 
And to your knowledge, did Mr. Ma 
e in that kind of active duty? 
I don't know anything about that. 
But that's the only way he could 
be on 
rsh 
have 
received it by age forty-four; is that correct? 
A 
what I sai 
he has to 
component 
Q 
That's correct, once he transfer-
d. Once he transfers to a reserve 
- That's 
component, 
take his retirement through the reserve 
retirement plan, which is the age 
Assuming Mr. Marsh did not engage 
sixty thing. 
in any kind 
of extended active duty, as you testified, but, instead, 
went into 
testimony 
retirement 
is that co 
A 
type. But 
the reserve component, then it wou 
that he could not then qualify for 
or pension benefits until he was 
rrect? 
Unless he qualified for a disabil 
Id be your 
any kind of 
age sixty; 
ity of some 
standard, plain-old retirement, requires age 
sixty. You can get a disability component earlier than 
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that. 
Q 
chapter in 
regarding 
A 
Q 
A 
Thank you. There is an entire separate 
the Armed Forces Act, Section 10 USCA, 
retirement payments, isn't there? 
Are you talking about Title 10? 
Title 10, excuse me. Yes. 
Yeah, there is a whole section that the 1 
Uniform Services Former Spouse's Protection Act is 
appended t 
Q 
which the 
Armed Fore 
A 
personnel 
would have 
o, if that's what you mean. J 
In fact, there's a separate fund set up from 
government pays retirement benefits under the 
es Retirement Act, is there not? j 
No, there's not- - It is paid out of current 
appropriations. It is not a fund, like you 
an IRA fund, that makes those payments. It's 
a line-item appropriation for the defense personnel 
budget. 
Q 
that—subs 
Are you familiar with Title 10, section 1408, 
ection H-8—that references that, "Retirement 
payments in accordance with this section shall be made 
out of funds in the Department of Defense Military 
Retirement 
title"? 
A 
Fund established by Section 1461 of this 
Section 1408, I think- - Isn't that the 
Uniform Services Former Spouse's Protection Act section? 
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Q 
A 
you're usi 
that are a 
personnel, 
Q 
separation 
A 
working on 
discussion 
That does deal with that. 
Right. Well, I guess it depends on how 
ng the term "fund." It is paid from funds 
ppropriated against the line item for 
retirement personnel payments. 
Are those funds the same funds from which 
or severance benefits are paid? 
I remember during the time that we were 
that at the air staff, there was some 
of that. j 
To be honest with you, I don't remember where 
it came down, if it came out of that same line item 
entry, or 
would say 
because I 
was made f 
out of- -
if it came out of a separate appropriation. I 
it probably did come out of those funds, 
don't know of a separate appropriation that 
or separation payments. So it's got to come 
In order for the government to spend it, it's 
got to come out of some appropriation. And that's the 
most likel 
Q 
you? 
A 
y one for it to come out of. 
But you're just speculating on that, aren't 
I don't know of any other one that it could 
possibly come out of. 
Q Okay. I'd like to go to the example that 
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you've stated in your testimony about, you believed a 
lieutenant commander, presently, if he were to retire, 
would receive in the neighborhood of $1,800 a month. 
Wasn't 
A 
project 
Q 
project 
working 
eleven 
receive 
A 
Q 
that your testimony? 
Based on the number of points that I would 
for him. That's really a rough projection. 
And I'm not going to hold you to an exact 
ion. I simply want to use it for purposes of 
through an example. Mrs. Garner is entitled to 
fortieths of any retirement pay Mr. Marsh is to 
, correct? 1 
Of the net disposable retirement pay, yes. 
Correct. And that eleven fortieths is, it's 
not exactly, but roughly 25 percent of the, what would 
be the 
A 
Q 
month, 
month? 
A 
Q 
stated 
disposable pay, correct? 
Just a little bit more than 25 percent, yes. 
Right. And can we say that of $1,800 a 
25 percent of that would be approximately $450 a 
Yes. 
And as I understand your testimony, you 
that, given the fact that Mr. Marsh will have to 
repay the $30,000 by having that deducted out of net 
disposable retired pay at the time he does retire, that 
roughly 75 percent of that total amount would be 
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withheld by the Navy, and roughly 25 p 
paid out; is that correct? 
A It won't be withheld by the 
withheld by the Defense Accounting and 
in Cleveland. 
Q 
what I 
A 
Q 
Okay. But other than that 
stated generally correct? 
Until the $30,000 is repaid 
Okay. And then it was your 
understand it, that the military would 
ercent would be 
Navy, it'll be 
Finance Service 
clarification, is 
, that's correct. 
testimony, as I 
then divide that 
remaining four, approximately $450 a month into a parcel 
that is twenty-nine fortieths to go to 
eleven 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
didn't 
eleven 
A 
Q 
fortieths to go to Ms. Garner. 
That's correct. 
Until the $30,000 has been 
That's correct. 
Mr. Marsh and 
repaid? 
And based upon that, you testified that you 
believe that she would be able 
fortieths of what she'd be enti 
That's correct. 
I need to ask you a few oth 
to receive her 
tied to, correct? 
er questions. If 
Scott Marsh had come to the end of a term of service of 
enlistment in the armed forces, excuse 
in November of 1991, and had not been 
separated, but simply his time was up 
me, in the Navy, 
involuntarily 
and he chose not 
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to re-en list, would he have been entitled to any kind of 
severance or separation benefit at that time? 
A 
officer. 
Q 
A 
They're 
Well, it was my understanding he was an 
He was. 
Officers don't have terms of enlistment. 
appointed for an indefinite term. So- - I 
don't think the question makes sense. 
Q 
then? 
A 
Q 
My example does not work for an officer, 
No, it wouldn't work for an officer. 
If he simply chose to submit his resignation, 
rather than be involuntary separated, involuntarily j 
separated, would he have been entitled to any sort of 
disbursement at that time? I 
A In November of 1991, he probably would have. 
MS. WILLIAMS: Your Honor, I'd object based 
on relevancy and- - J 
what Mr. 
the time 
issue of 
THE COURT: How is this relevant, counsel? 
MR. BIGELOW: I think we need to establish 
Marsh was and would have been entitled to at 
of the separation, trying to distinguish the 
whether it's retirement and pension benefits- -
THE COURT: At the time of what separation? 
Separation from the military? 
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MR. BIGELOW: From the military, correct, 
THE COURT: And your last question was- -
Well, ask your next question, let's see where we are. 
Q (BY MR. BIGELOW) I just want to know, if 
Mr. Marsh would have voluntarily resigned from the 
military at that time, versus having been involuntarily 
separated, would he have been entitled to any kind of 
retirement or pension benefits at that time? 
A Without knowing the specific plans that were 
available at the time, without looking at those plans, I 
can't tell you that. I know that there were VSI-type 
programs at the time for voluntary separation that did 
provide the same type payment. But whether he qualified 
under the terms of those plans, without knowing more 
specifics, I can't answer it in a general- -
Q If Mr. Marsh dies before he turns age sixty, 
would there be any of this retirement pay available to 
Mrs. Garner? 
A It depends. I'm not sure you want to get 
into this can of worms, but it depends on whether or not 
there has been an election under the Survivor's Benefit 
Program. If there's been an election under the 
Survivor's Benefit Program, then she would have a 
payment, whether or not he gets it. 
That has been changed recently in the last 
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two years as to how that's done. In the past, if the 
court ordered that to be done, then he would be ordered 
to elect that, or, if he had previously elected that 
option prior to the divorce, then it would continue in 
effect. 
Now, there's a way that she can apply, even 
if it hasn't been awarded by the court, she can apply to 
the Defense Finance and Accounting Service in Cleveland 
and obtain what's called SVP, survivor benefit 
protection on her portion of the retirement. 
What they do then is, the actuary will take 
the present value of what her share would be, and then 
they stretch it out for the amount of payments for her 
lifetime. So it actually reduces the amount- -
So if she was going to get, under your 
example, $450 a month, then with her difference in life 
expectancy, I would say it would reduce it to $375 a 
month. But that would then continue for her lifetime. 
Q Okay. In the event that Mr. Marsh lived to 
age sixty, took his retirement that would be available 
to him, but died prior to the $30,000 being recouped by 
the military, would basically the same result occur as 
what you've just described? 
A Well, under that scenario it would be 
different, because she would receive eleven fortieths of 
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the $450 until he died, and then from that time forward 
she would receive her portion under the SVP, if that's 
what you're asking. 
Q Okay, I understand that. So I think, to make 
sure we've had a meeting of the minds, here, is that she 
would- - If this election were made about 
surviving- -
A SVP? 
Q - -SVP. That if that was made, 
Mrs. Marsh would receive the eleven fortie 
whatever it should have been, or was to be 
died, whether he died before age sixty or 
sixty. Is that correct? 
A Clearly if he gets to age sixty 
this 
in essence 
ths payment of 
, if Mr. Marsh 
after age 
and he goes 
into pay status, there's no question she gets it that 
way. And to be honest with you, with this 
where she can apply for it herself, I don' 
That deals with what we refer t 
area. And that's what I'm in now. Where 
from active reserve service, but you haven 
for the age sixty payment plan yet. And I 
would have to go back and research that to 
was absolutely positive. 
But I think, as long as she's e 
survivor benefit, and he's actually got hi 
new election 
t know- -
o as the gray 
you've retired 
't qualified 
honestly 
make sure I 
lected the 
s twenty years 
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of creditable service, then whether or not he gets to 
age sixty to get his, she can still get hers under the 
SVP allocation. When he would otherwise be age sixty. 
Q If Mr. Marsh never reached the twenty years 
of service, would Mrs. Garner ever be entitled to 
receive eleven fortieths of any type of pension or 
retirement benefits from Mr. Marsh? 
A Not under that program, no. 
Q Or from the government? 
A No. 
Q I believe in your testimony you made the 
statement that if she doesn't get her eleven fortieths 
out of the retirement—I think you're referring to the 
full retirement benefit in my example, which would have 
been the $1,800 a month—you made the statement she will 
never get it. I just want to ask you about that 
statement. 
I think what you were stating is that—and 
you tell me if I#m wrong—is that the amount, eleven 
fortieths of the $450 a month she would be getting if 
the recoupment was going on, is a small enough amount 
that you were suggesting that it may take a long time, 
or forever, to recoup that amount. And there's no 
guarantee based upon whether she lives, or longevity, or 
whatever. 
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A 
be 75 p 
back to 
eleven 
that's 
No. No, the point was that there's going to 
ercent of that retirement pay that's going to go 
the government. So she's never going to get 
fortieths of that, what is it, $1,350 a month 
going back to the government. She would only get 
her eleven fortieths of the $450 that's left. But he's 
already 
paying 
Q 
got the $30,000 that the $1,350 a month is 
back. 
Okay. Now, using that as a base, if- - That 
could be simply remedied, couldn't it, by Mr. Marsh | 
simply 
month, 
permitting Ms. Garner to receive the full $450 a 
which would be roughly equivalent to what she was 
going to receive under the eleven fortieths of $1,800 a 
month. 
A 
Q 
A 
Spouses 
paid, a 
percent 
things. 
arreara 
No, he couldn't. J 
He couldn't do that? 
No, because under the Uniform Services Former 
Protection Act, there are limits on what can be 
nd for retirement benefits it's a maximum of 50 
unless there's an arrearage or some other I 
It can go up to 65 percent if there's an 
ge on alimony or child support at the time, but 
the basic limitation under FSPA is 50 percent. 
Q You're saying that's the most that could be 
garnished from Mr. Marsh, is this 50 percent or 60 
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percent? 
A That's the only amount that the Defense 
Finance Accounting Service will send her, period. 
Q I understand that. But Mr. Marsh, certainly 
there are ways that Mr. Marsh could, for example, 
receive a check and pay out of his own pocket the sum to 
Mrs. Marsh, correct? 
A Well, I guess, yes. 
Q There's no law preventing him from doing 
that, is there? 
A There's no law that prevents it, but it kind 
of undermines the whole purpose of the Former Spouses 
Protection Act. 
Q Well, I'll move on to another area. When the 
military makes a payment of moneys to Mr. Marsh, as it 
did in February of 1992, is it your opinion that the 
military knows what it's doing when it terms it as 
severance pay or separation pay, rather than retirement 
pay? 
A Well, the problem I have with that is the W-2 
that they provided showed it as retirement pay. 
Q Okay, on that W-2, if it was severance or 
separation pay rather than retirement, what- - Where 
should it have been marked on that particular W-2? 
A On this particular one, they don't have a 
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block for 
that I can 
much more 
Honor. 
Q 
Strike tha 
provided f 
VSI that I can tell. The print 
't- -
THE COURT: Let me interrupt. 
do you have with this witness? 
MR. BIGELOW: Just a couple of 
THE COURT: Okay. 
(BY MR. BIGELOW) To your knowl 
t. Do you recall looking at W-2 
or the military during the time 
W-2, for the year 1991, previously? 
A 
is so small 
Counsel, how 
minutes, Your 
edge- -
forms 
frame of this 
Most of what I've had to do with this is J 
people coming into the program that were wanting to make 
sure they 
retirement 
Q 
W-2s gener 
there was 
could get their money, or they could get their 
after they came in. 
So you don't recall whether the re's an, on 
ated by the military at this time, whether 
a box for severance pay, versus 
it as retirement or pension pay, do you? 
A 
Q 
of the mil 
separation 
I honestly don't, no. 
simply marking 
To your knowledge, was it a course of dealing 
itary to include a reference to 
pay on a W-2 form in the same b 
or retirement pay? 
A All I can go by is the one that 
severance or 
ox as pension 
's sitting in 
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front of 
yes. 
Q 
A 
Q 
me, and I would say I guess the answer would 
That they do do that? 
Yes. 
Because it#s clear in your mind that what 
Mr. Marsh got was a severance or separation pay, 
correct? 
A 
Q 
opinion, 
That's what they called it. 
One last thing. You stated that in your 
under Utah law, that this severance or 
separation pay Mr. Marsh received became a retirement 
benefit? 
A 
was paid 
Q 
A 
made in ' 
It was a retirement benefit at the time it 
. 
And what's your basis for saying that? 
be 
Well, if you used the analysis that the court 
the Woodward formula, this is a deferred 
compensation that was accrued during the period of time 
that the parties were married that is received by one 
party rather than the parties jointly. 
squarely 
that it ] 
I think it fits into those criteria about as 
as it can fit. I think the only difference is 
lias a name of severance pay that denotes that 
is an advance payment that avoids that speculative 
problem that you're talking about, that you mentioned 
it 
in 
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your openi] 
Q 
his estate 
A 
payments. 
Q 
until he h< 
sixty, cor: 
A 
ng statement. 
If Mr. Marsh died before he's sixty, would 
be required to pay the $30,000? 
No. That's only repaid out of retirement 
And his retirement payments are not vested 
as completed his twenty years and turned age 
rect? 
No, they're vested as you go along. The 
military is a defined benefit plan, an unfunded defined 
benefit pl< 
he reaches 
Q 
an. And he's totally vested in it. Whether 
the payment age is another question. 
If he doesn't reach the payment age, though, 
he would never, he or his estate would never be entitled 
to any ret 
A 
retirement 
Q 
either? 
A 
there is a 
irement benefits. 
His estate will never be entitled to any 
benefit, whether he gets to age sixty or not. 
So if he doesn't get to it, he won't get it 
If he doesn't get there he won't get it, but 
separate provision to take care of her. 
MR. BIGELOW: That's correct. Thank you. 
THE COURT: Anything by way of redirect? 
MS. WILLIAMS: No, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Sir, you may stand down. Thank 
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you for your assistance 
be excused at 
MS. 
MR. 
THE 
witnesses you 
seat. 
going 
Thank y 
THE 
to want 
quarter to 12: 
haven' 
break 
about 
t given 
this time 
WILLIAMS 
BIGELOW: 
COURT: 
know what 
ou again 
COURT: 
Any reason why Mr. 
7 
: No, Your Honor. 
No, Your Honor. 
Crist can't 
Mr. Crist, now you can tell 
it feels like to be 
for your help. 
Counsel, I'm assuming 
to make some brief argument. 
00. Why 
my court 
this morning, and 
1:15, 1: 30, and t 
problem with that? 
don't 
would 
would 
MS. 
know how 
WILLIAMS 
in the hot 
that you're 
It's now a 
don't we have our lunch break, I 
reporter or anyone el 
then come back and p 
ake what time you nee 
se much of a 
ick up at 
d. Any 
: It's the court's choice. I 
much time counsel has, but we 
need about a half 
THE 
MR. 
COURT: 
BIGELOW: 
be my preference 
THE 
you then, and 
COURT: 
hour, I would guess. 
That's what I would f 
I suspect that, as 
to do it at 1:30. 
Let's do it at 1:30. 
if you wish to leave anything 
probably 
igure. 
well, and it 
We'll see 
in the 
courtroom in the meantime, you can. I'll set aside 
thirty minutes at that 
(Noon recess 
juncture. Thank you 
.) 
counsel. 
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you're rea 
Mr. Marsh. 
please. 
called 
having 
as 
THE COURT: Let's proceed, 
Ldy. 
MS. WILLIAMS: Your Honor, 
THE COURT: Mr. Marsh, if 
SCOTT A. MARSH 
a witness by and on behalf 
been duly sworn, was examined 
follows: 
BY MS. 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
counsel, 
I would 
when 
call 
you'd come forward, 
of the PI aintiff, 
and testified as 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
WILLIAMS: 
Would you state your name, 
Scott Allan Marsh. 
And your address? 
10034 Jordan Crest Circle, 
Utah, 84095. 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
How old are you? 
Forty-five. 
Are you in the reserve? 
Yes, I am. 
please. 
South Jo 
And is that the Naval Reserve? 
That's correct. 
And how long have you been 
rdan, 
in the Naval 
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Reserve? 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
at this 
A 
for your 
rested, 
status o 
in? 
Honor, b 
Six years. 
Since 1991? 
Tha-
So ; 
junctu: 
Yes 
MS. 
THE 
MR. 
THE 
assis' 
MS. 
THE 
MR. 
THE 
t's correct. 
you have 
re? 
• 
WILLIAMS 
COURT: 
BIGELOW: 
COURT: 
twenty years of military service 
!: No further questions. 
Anything further? 
No, Your Honor. 1 
You may stand down. Thank you 
tance. Any other witnesses? 
WILLIAMS 
COURT: 
BIGELOW: 
COURT: 
both sides are 
Let 
f the < 
MS. 
THE 
MS. 
\: No, Your Honor, we would rest. 
All right. And you've rested? 
That's correct, Your Honor. 
All right. And both sides have 
entitled to make closings. 
me indicate my understanding of the J 
exhibits. 
WILLIAMS 
COURT: 
WILLIAMS 
Again, just 
ecause I think 
One, 2, 3 and 5 are in. Is 4 
• : No, I didn't- -
Ten, 13 and 15 are in. J 
•: Thank you, Your Honor. 1 
some of the background, Your J 
it is important, because of the 
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court's equitable nature, that this is a 15-year 
marriage where four children were born as issue. That 
during the marriage Mr. Marsh was the wage earner, 
Ms. Marsh, now Garner, was the homemaker, and she 
accrued no retirement benefit throughout the course of 
the 15-year marriage. 
They were married in 1974, divorced in August 
of 1989. That at the time of the divorce, Mr., or 
during the marriage and at the time of the divorce, 
Mr. Marsh had fourteen years of service in the military, 
and under the Uniform Spouse Protection Act, Uniform 
Services Former Spouses Protection Act, Public Law 
97-257, Ms. Garner is entitled to, we don't call it a 
QDRO, they will let you call it anything else, but she 
is allowed to an order that will be directed to the 
military that will tell the military that because she 
has ten years of marriage during which the member had 
ten years of service, that the military, then, under 
that act, will send that retirement portion directly to 
her. 
As the court's aware, under Woodward and 
numerous other cases, it was determined that, unlike the 
old law, that spouses were left out in the cold, it was 
determined that retirements were marital assets. It 
took the military a while to catch up. They've caught 
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up to the extent of the ten-year period. If it's under 
ten years then you're left to your own devices. 
Ms. Garner is awarded eleven fortieths of his 
retirement, and it's clear that in February of '91 he 
received a disbursement of $30,000 gross, $24,000 net. 
The reason that we've done both exhibits is 
because, whether you take the gross or the taxed amount, 
is a 20 percent tax bracket. Certainly there's been no 
evidence produced by Mr. Marsh that he actually ended up 
paying that full amount after his, by the time he filed 
his taxes. Who knows what the actual taxed amount was? 
And I believe that that's one of the reasons 
that Mr. Crist testified that there had been a recent 
change, so that the military doesn't divide up the net 
any more, they divide up the gross amount, so that the 
individuals pay taxes at whatever level they are in, 
whatever their tax bracket is. 
Exhibit 15, which is titled 10 USC 1174- -
THE COURT: So you're suggesting that 
Mrs. Marsh is entitled to eleven fortieths of the 
$30,000 gross. 
MS. WILLIAMS: Yes, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right, go ahead. 
MS. WILLIAMS: We are also requesting a 
reasonable interest, and I used 10 percent because for 
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years the courts have used 10 percent as a prejudgment 
interest, maybe just out of simplicity, because I've 
never found it anywhere. But Mr. Marsh has had the use 
and benefit of those funds since he received them in 
February of 1991. And, indeed, since 1992, Ms. Garner 
has been trying to get her portion, her share. 
The first order from December of 1992, after 
a hearing, ordered Mr. Marsh to provide more 
verification and information regarding that 
disbursement. It also specifically stated that J 
Ms. Garner had a right to assert her interest in that. 
Even though that order was outstanding, we still added 
into our petition of April '96 in paragraph 5 that the 
court needed to either consider it a pension plan for 
division, or that the court should consider it as a 
marital asset for purposes of division. 
Clearly his receipt of those funds is a 
substantial and material change of circumstances, since 
the entry of the decree. J 
The applicable code that really ties it to 
the retirement, Your Honor, is title 10 USC 1174 sub H, 
which very clearly says that the member has to pay the 
$30,000 — i n this case $30, 000—back upon retirement. 
And I don't think there's any dispute that it says that 
you do that. 
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Mr. Crist, fortunately, was able to explain 
to us in more detail what that meant, and how it's 
actually paid out. The net effect is that, since it's 
paid out at the rate of 75 percent of each month's 
disposable pay, that he would then get 25 percent of 
what he would normally get. 
What Mr. Crist also testified to, however, is 
that because he gets more points because he's retiring 
as a reservist, since he gets more points for those 
fifteen years of service, that the actual end result, if 
merely an allocation order, what would be a QDRO, is 
granted to her for eleven fortieths, she doesn't even 
get eleven fortieths of the 25 percent, because that's 
not the way it's calculated by the military in terms of 
reserves and active duty. 
has his 
It's unquestioned from the testimony that he 
twenty years in, that unless he dies, that at 
age sixty he is going to receive this, his pension. 
because 
new law 
called, 
Program, 
Defense 
The testimony from Mr. Crist also was that, 
of the need to protect spouses, that there is a 
that allows, under the current law, what is 
he called the SBP election, a Survivor's Benefit 
that would allow Ms. Garner to apply now to the 
Finance and Accounting in Cleveland for some 
rights to the retirement, even if he dies prior to 
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attaining the age of sixty years. 
The testimony from Mr. Crist is that the 
same, to his knowledge, that the same fund of money that 
pays out the severance from the military department is 
the same fund that pays out the retirement. He wasn't 
absolutely sure, but he did say he couldn't think of any 
other place where the moneys have been earmarked for 
that purpose. 
It was clear also from Mr. Crist's testimony 
that if the court does nothing, and if Mr. Marsh is 
permitted to retain the moneys he's received, then it 
completely eviscerates her retirement. It does not 
allow her to be made whole. There is absolutely no way 
that she can get the portion she was awarded in the 
decree of divorce. 
Now, apparently counsel's indicating, and 
questioned Mr. Crist, "Well, he can just pay it to her 
himself." 
And what Mr. Crist said is, "Well, yeah, but 
that completely destroys the purpose of the Uniform 
Services, Former Spouses Protection Act." Because the 
court is very much accustomed to people coming into 
court chasing after people who aren't paying their 
required bills and the requirements under the decree. 
And again, that's what he's asking, apparently, that she 
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do. 
deal. He' 
to pay it 
for maybe 
not requir 
He's, in a sense he would end up with a great 
s got a loan against his retirement, she has 
back, and he isn't in any way required, except 
at the age of sixty, if we can find him, he's 
ed to pay it back to her. 
He's got the current use and benefit. It was 
an asset that accrued over the course of the marriage, 
and it is 
court with 
of Kuzmiak 
as I read 
he's going 
quickly, y 
think. I 
At least I 
important that it be divided. 
Counsel will provide, or has provided the 
a California case, which is In Re: Marriage 
, and it's a 1986 case out of California that, 
it—and I'd like to discuss it now, because 
to bring it up. As I read it, if you read it 
ou don't really get what it's saying, I don't 
think you have to read it two or three times. 
was, maybe I'm slow. 
But the court, in its analysis, determines, 
and did determine, that the separation pay under 
California 
property. 
I think it 
based on p 
severance 
law was separate property, and not marital 
I am going to disagree with their reasoning. 
was clear from Mr. Crist's testimony it's 
rior years of service, that it's not like a 
package, where you're paying for the next six 
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months. But even if you agree to some degree with, or 
if you agree with their characterization of it, once 
Mr. Marsh has taken that, and once he's earned his right 
to retirement, then it's a different thing altogether. 
Because in this case, what the court said is 
that the government's withholding of the $30,000 from 
his retirement pay deprives wife of her community 
property interest in these funds. The $30,000 that 
should have been in the retirement. 
The election that he took, in the case of 
Kuzmiak, is inconsistent with the protective philosophy 
of the community property law. 
Now, I understand California's community 
property law, and Utah is a hybrid of equitable 
distribution. But I think that California has some of 
the same concepts, which is if you've earned it during 
the marriage, it's a marital asset. 
The court, on page 648, said that if they 
simply gave that $30,000 to him, it would deprive the 
wife of her interest in the funds. And the court said, 
"For these reasons we conclude the wife has a community 
property interest in husband's longevity pension, 
including the $30,000 separation pay the government will 
withhold from his retirement benefits." 
This holding recognizes the separate property 
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characteristic of the separation pay, in quotes, "Until 
husband's 
pension," 
actions in reenlisting and earning a longevity 
And it goes on to say, same sentence, "And 
also protects wife's rights to a community property 
asset." 
The court said afterwards that, "The proper 
division of husband's longevity retirement benefits 
remains wi 
may reach 
.thin the trial court's discretion; the parties 
a reasonable agreement concerning the division 
of the benefits." 
So what the court was saying in this case, 
Your Honor, is that if you don't include that $30,000, 
even if you call it a separate asset, that you're going 
to be dama 
appellate 
Lging, or injuring her rights to that asset. 
What perhaps the lower court and the 
court didn't have in the record on this case 
was the kind of testimony that the court's had from 
Mr. Crist 
divide up 
today, which is that if this court doesn't 
this asset now, that it creates a myriad of 
problems in the future. 
has before 
with what 
Mr. Marsh 
There is no way, given the scenario the court 
\ it, that the court can compensate Ms. Garner 
minimal moneys will be available when 
retires. There is no way to divide it up. 
The only way to pay her her interest is to pay her the 
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portion of the $30,000 that has already been received. 
I think that the distinguishing feature of 
this case from our case is likely that--and we don't 
have that before us—but likely that the lower court 
didn't have all the information, the appellate court 
didn't have the record before it, indicating that if you 
don't give it to her now, she's cut out when he retires. 
THE COURT: Let me turn to another question. 
This interest concept. Why is the 10 percent interest 
figure appropriate if I determine that interest is 
warranted? 
MS. WILLIAMS: Your Honor, we have asked for 
prejudgment interest, and prejudgment interest 
historically, in my practice, has been assessed at 10 
percent. Again, I really have never fully understood 
that. In fact, I've called, I've researched it, I've 
called the clerk's office, and it's just one of those 
magic numbers that's unexplainable. 
I have not gone back to try to figure out 
what judgment interest was from 1991 to the present. 
Certainly if the court believes judgment interest is 
appropriate, we would ask the court for judgment 
interest, which I think is 7.64 percent at this point. 
THE COURT: All right. 
MS. WILLIAMS: And lastly, Your Honor, as to 
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the issue of attorneys fees, again, Ms. Marsh, or 
Garner, has been chasing this issue for five years, now. 
It's been an ongoing issue. As was testified through 
proffer, at one point in the pretrial there was an 
admission by counsel that it was a pension. Certainly, 
based upon those kinds of representations, there is no 
reason that plaintiff would not continue pursuing it. 
Besides the fact that the W-2 seems to be 
clear, besides the fact that, given the testimony that 
we have, and all of the evidence, that it is an asset, a 
marital asset that should be divided. 
We have requested attorneys fees and costs 
relating to the expert. Our attorneys fees are $1,125, 
that's probably an understatement because there should 
be another hour of attorneys time added to that, for 
another $150, because of the longer trial than I 
anticipated. That would be $1,275. Also that it was 
anticipated that the fees related to Mr. Crist would be 
five to $800. We have not gotten a final bill from him, 
he has been paid $400 thus far. 
We would anticipate, given the length of the 
trial, again, that it would run- the $800 figure. We can 
certainly get a statement from him to confirm that. 
Ms. Marsh testified through proffer, she has 
no moneys with which to pay this. He, on the other 
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hand, has had the fund 
testified also 
court order to 
no action to d< 
for collection 
that Mr, 
pay her 
of money ever since '91. She 
. Marsh was ordered in the last 
attorneys fees, and he has taken 
D so, even though attempts have been made 
, and they have come to no avail at this 
point. Thank you. 
THE 
Counsel? 
MR. 
COURT: 
BIGELOW: 
Thank you, Ms 
Your Honor, 
provided to opposing counsel a, just 
stapled together of certain statutes 
present to the 
THE 
those, counsel 
MR. 
then. 
THE 
MR. 
court. 
COURT: 
. 
BIGELOW: 
COURT: 
BIGELOW: 
. Williams. 
I have previously 
some materials 1 
that I'd like to 
Yes, I'd be happy to consider 
I'd like to 
Thank you. 
Your Honor, 
submit that to you, 
I think if we start 
with a clear reading of the decree of divorce in this 
case, which, as I understand it, was 
agreement, and was not 
court for its decision, 
that's the one 
a stipulated 
one that was submitted to the 
paragraph 7 : 
we're talking about. 
Paragraph 7 refers to all 
Is very clear. And 
pension and 
retirement benefits that the defendant may receive upon 
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his retirement from military service. And I think, 
under every look at the testimony that's been presented 
today, including Mr. Crist's, there's absolutely no 
question that what we are talking about that Mr. Marsh 
received was not retirement or pension, but was 
separation, or severance pay. 
Now, if I might, Your Honor, the first page 
of the materials I provided to you refers to Title 10, 
section 627, indicating what Mr. Marsh had testified 
about regarding the effect of failure of selection for 
promotion, that when someone is not advanced, and as 
Mr. Marsh testified about happened to him, that's what 
resulted in his involuntary separation. 
I will indicate to the court that I had not 
pulled—and I just noticed it now--from this packet of 
information a letter that I had sought to admit as 
evidence, and the court sustained an objection to that, 
so I think it would be appropriate, the second page, to 
go ahead and delete from the court's packet of 
materials, and I apologize for not going through and 
pulling that out. 
THE COURT: That's all right. 
MR. BIGELOW: But at any rate, it's clear 
we're talking about a separation. The reason we get to 
section 1174, that is the one that was relied upon by 
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Mr. Crist and by counsel for Ms., by counsel, to argue 
this entire issue is referenced in the next section, 
section 642, indicating that an officer who's discharged 
under this chapter is entitled, if eligible therefor, to 
separation pay under section 1174 of this title. 
Now, there has been no evidence or argument 
to the contrary today but that Mr. Marsh was paid 
pursuant to this chapter of the, of Title 10, which 
refers to separation pay. Section 1174, which is the 
next, if you get to the next page, is specifically the 
section that deals with involuntary discharge, or 
release from active duty, and why that results in a 
separation or severance pay. 
Section 1174 subsection A indicates the 
entitlement that Mr. Marsh had to this severance pay, or 
excuse me, separation pay, that was provided by the Navy 
to him, the $30,000 sum. Again, this is specifically 
identified as separation pay. It is not retirement, or 
pension pay. J 
I would indicate to the court on the next 
page, which is numbered page 46 at the bottom, I hadn't 
highlighted, but the court had asked the question 
earlier, "How is the amount of separation pay 
calculated?" Well, there is a specific calculation 
criteria set forth in this section, subsection D. 
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It states amount of separation pay, the 
amount of separation pay which must be paid to a member 
under this section is, there's a calculation, 10 percent 
of the product of his years of active service and twelve 
times the monthly basic pay which he's entitled to at 
the time of his discharge, or, one half of the amount 
imputed under clause 1. 
I will confess, I don't know quite how the 
military comes down to a final number from that formula, 
but clearly there is a calculation based upon his last 
twelve months' pay, in part, which would go towards the 
issue, which is the stated, I think, congressional 
intent regarding this section, and that is to assist 
someone who has been involuntarily separated from the 
armed services to have the opportunity, by virtue of 
this separation pay, to work their way back into 
civilian life. 
And it is that very concept that I believe is 
the reason that the court in the Kuzmiak case that I 
have attached here next, it's the very reason that court 
came to the conclusion that this was a separation, 
severance pay, that was a separate asset and not a 
community asset, because of the nature of the intent to 
assist an involuntarily separated military member to get 
back into society. 
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I would indicate to the court that subsection 
H at the bottom of this page, page 46, is the subsection 
that we specifically dealt with, and it is absolutely 
clear, Your Honor, that separation pay and pension and 
retirement pay are different things under this act. And 
that the money that was paid to Mr. Marsh is separation 
pay. 
The only question about whether or not it's 
separation pay comes from the exhibit, I believe it is 
1, that is the W-2 form where the "pension" box is J 
marked, and I believe—I'm not quite sure what the 1 
testimony of Mr. Crist was—he had never seen a W-2 form 
with a different place to mark for separation pay than 
in the pension box, and that he was not aware of it 
being marked any place else on a W-2, and to the best of 
his knowledge, the retirement and separation benefits 
were reflected in the same box on the W-2 form. J 
What is clear in the Exhibits 10 and 13 J 
submitted by plaintiff, is that there is a specific J 
calculation or reflection of the $30,000 sum as 
separation pay. There is a specific notation indicating 
that $6,000 was withheld in terms of federal income tax, 
and that the net that came to Mr. Marsh as a result of 
that was $24,000. 
At any rate, going on, regarding subsection H 
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of section 1174, again, i 
is treated different than 
t's clear that separation pay 
retirement pay. And I 
recognize that the problem in this particular situation 
is that, in the event Mr. 
there will be required to 
that he got. 
There are a wh 
particular issue. One of 
has to live to age sixty. 
Marsh lives to be age sixty, 
be a repayment of the $30,000 
ole bunch of sides to that 
the sides is, first of all, he 
Secondly, or- - Or that 
$30,000 repayment will never happen. And according to 
Mr. Crist's testimony, assuming this appropriate 
designation is put in place of this Surviving Benefits 
Protection, she would receive the same thing she would 
be entitled to if the $30 
Mr. Marsh, minus whatever 
an adjustment, because it 
package that is adjusted 
$30,000, but as a result 
sixty. 
But there are 
,000 had not been paid to 
- - Well, there's going to be 
's a surviving spouse's benefit 
somehow, not as a result of the 
of Mr. Marsh dying before age 
other, I mean there are 1 
other- - Counsel wants to talk about the uncertainties 
of Ms. Marsh ever collect 
that's inherent in every 
expectation that that awa 
the future, depending on 
ing this money. Your Honor, 
award where there is an 
rd will not be paid until into 
whether--especially a lengthy 
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period of time in the future—depending on whether each 
side survives to that point in time. 
If, for example, if Mrs. Marsh, or Ms. Garner 
passed away before Mr. Marsh turned sixty, but this 
court had required Mr. Marsh to pay that money back, or 
pay that money to Ms. Marsh, conceivably she never would 
have received any of that money. And the factors that 
are thrown into this kind of pension retirement factor 
always create uncertainty about what's going to happen 
fifteen years into the future. Mr. Marsh is forty-five, 
we're looking at fifteen years into the future. 
If I might, Your Honor, go on. The Kuzmiak 
case, I know the court probably hasn't had, in fact I'm 
sure you haven't had a chance to read it in detail. I 
would indicate to the court that it is clear from that 
case, from this—and it is a California decision, and I 
will tell the court it's the only one I could find 
anywhere on the subject—but in this decision the court 
clearly found that this separation pay was different 
from retirement pay, and that it was a separate asset, 
and not to be counted as part of the community assets. 
The court then did go back and indicate that, 
at the time of the making of the decision about how to 
divide the assets, the court did say in the Kuzmiak 
case, that the wife presently had an interest in the 
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husband's 
648. 
non-mature longevity pension. That's on page 
And based upon that, the court took, stated 
with its two holdings that, one, the property was 
separate, 
husband's 
matter bac 
have a rep 
but two, the wife had an interest in the 
non-matured longevity pension. It sent the 
k to the lower court to be decided. We don't 
ort of a resolution from this particular case, 
and so I can't report to you how the lower court dealt 
with that. 
I would indicate, though, that the appellate 
court in California, it looks like the Second District 
Appellate 
particular 
California 
unfortunat 
this morni 
given one 
copy made, 
distribute 
whoever. 
the lower 
that at th 
Court in California that decided this 
' case, referenced the parties back to another 
case called In Re: Matter of Gilmore. And 
ely I just had time to grab one copy of that 
ng, I've got a copy of it here, and I haven't 
to counsel yet. Because I just got the one 
I'd be happy to make some more copies and 
it, or- -
THE COURT: What does it say? 
MR. BIGELOW: - -or make it available to 
But Your Honor, basically what it says is that 
court should divide the property in such a way 
te time that the pension benefits are 
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payable 
at that 
receivi 
--but it was referring to pension benefits--that 
point in time the divorced spouse who was 
ng a percentage, or pro rata portion, would be 
entitled at that time to receive their pension, and that 
the par 
worked 
ty who was actually receiving the retirement, had 
for the company that was going to be paying for 
the retirement, could not make decisions to delay 
receipt of that pension money by virtue of, instead of 
retiring at age sixty-two, the first time they could 
retire, choosing to wait until age seventy and then 
retiring, and for the interim eight-year period then the 
spouse would not receive any benefits. 
The California court said no, the spouse that 
could have received benefits at age sixty-two can't go 
put off 
spouse 
Dealing 
courts 
us here 
law is 
current 
, and you have to make those available to that 
at age sixty-two, or as soon as it was available. 
only with retirement benefits. 
And so that's as much direction as those 
came up with in terms of providing direction for 
But I would indicate that I don't think that 
any different than where we stand in terms of the 
understanding, here, of retirement plans, that 
they are customarily to be paid out at the time that the 
pension or retirement fund is available to be paid. 
I would indicate to the court, if you go on 
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in the packet of materials I've provided, that—and this 
is, gets into an area that Mr. 
with, apparently—section 1408 
10, and it gets into the issue 
a totally different chapter th 
were dealing with on severance 
Crist was not conversant 
, it's chapter 74 of Title 
of retirement pay. It's 
an the earlier chapter we 
or separation pay. 
And in this particular chapter, in section 
1408, it gets to a definition of this term, "disposable 
retired pay." On page, what is page 105, it talks about 
"disposable retirement pay, meaning the total monthly 
retired pay to which a member 
which one are owed to the U.S. 
or for recoupments." So that' 
that permits the, in essence, 
section, 1174-H, that permits 
But going on in thi 
section 1408 subparagraph H-8, 
109, it indicates that, "Payme 
this subsection shall be made 
Department of Defense Military 
established by section 1461 of 
And so there is, in 
Mr. Crist's recollection, a sp 
by the government for the purp 
retirement benefits. 
is entitled, less amounts 
for previous overpayments 
s where the law comes in 
coupled with the prior 
the recoupment. 
s section, and it is 
it's reflected on page 
nts in accordance with 
out of funds in the 
Retirement Fund 
this title." 
fact, contrary to 
ecific fund that's set up 
ose of paying out 
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And then the last page I have attached, the 
last two pages I've attached references, number one, 
what the, . In section 1462, what the assets of the fund 
are, and section 1463, who receives payments from the 
fund. And 
payable to 
the first subsection is A-l, "retired pay 
members on the retired lists of the Army, 
Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps." And I point that out 
to Your Honor to indicate that, not only are these types 
of pay, separation and pension, different in talk, 
they're dij 
statute. 
divorce in 
retirement 
negotiated 
1989. And 
separation 
it was not 
not from a 
that asset 
liferent in funding, they're different by I 
The controlling document, the decree of 
this case, only references pension and 
benefits. It was a document that was 
between the parties, who had counsel, back in 
presumably the issue of severance, or 
pay could have been dealt with at that time, 
» 1 
But under any circumstance—at least it was 
plain reading of the decree of divorce—but 
, that the asset that Ms. Garner is claiming 
Mr. Marsh's time in the military, that was in existence 
in 1989 at 
reading of 
cases, the 
the time of the decree of divorce, and from a 
all of these, the decree, the statutes, the 
case that I've supplied to the court, there's 
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no question, severance pay is a separate issue, and it 
was not brought up in the decree. 
To somehow, at this point, go back in time 
and open up the decree and permit an opening up of the 
decree to change paragraph 7 to include separation or 
severance pay, to me seems to be permitting a revision 
or review of that property distribution many, many 
years—way past any length—after the fact, and could 
not be permissible under our laws regarding going back 
and reviewing judgments. 
At any rate, Your Honor, the issues to me 
seem absolutely crystal clear in terms of the difference 
between the types of payments. Mr. Crist and 
Ms. Williams both have argued, or stated somehow, that 
Ms. Garner will never get her money if she doesn't get a 
judgment against Mr. Marsh for the eleven fortieths of 
the money that was, that came to him by separation pay. 
The other side of that coin is, Your Honor, 
in the event that Mr. Marsh lives to age sixty and 
starts to collect his retirement pay but Mrs. Garner 
does not live that long, or is nowhere to be found, she 
would have received a distribution of money, based upon 
what she's asking for right now, that legally she ought 
to be entitled to repay to the military. 
Because if he's going to have to repay the 
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portion of the 
some of it, th 
poi 
to 
of 
al 
it 
Mr 
tht 
if 
rtion, as we 
repay the e: 
THE 
$30,000 that he got, and 
en she's going to have to 
11. It would not be fair 
ntire amount- -
COURT: My understanding 
each of their shares. 
MR. 
ive, and Mr. 
would come 
THE 
MR. 
BIGELOW: At the time- -
Marsh is starting to see 
then she ge 
repay that 
to require 
is it comes 
If they're 
retirement, 
out of their both of their shares. 
COURT: And Mr. Marsh is what? 
BIGELOW: Forty-five. Excuse me. 
ts 
him 
out 
both 
yes, 
. Marsh retired and started to receive the retirement, 
sn it would < 
THE 
come out of both of their shares. 
COURT: Then they're both repaying. 
she receives nothing now, she's repaying somethi 
she never received. And that seems to, 
is 
to 
key to this 
MR. 
any of that 
spouse benefit 
Mr 
whole analysis. 
it seems to 
BIGELOW: Well, she may never be ent 
But 
ng 
me, 
itled 
money, either. If she does the surviving 
option that has been addressed by 
. Crist, then she would receive whatever the eleven 
fortieths of the total, not just eleven 
smaller amount 
sixty. 
If ] 
fortieths o 
If Mr. Marsh did not live until he 
Mr. Marsh lives to sixty, 
f the 
was 
and she does 
COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPT 
94 
also, well, she lives until then also, and he's 
collecting retirement, then it's true she, in essence, 
would, be only getting eleven fortieths of the 
disposable amount. If the court will remember my 
example of Mr. Crist, on an $1,800 a month payment, 
there would be $450 that, roughly, that would be paid 
out. And under the repayment process, only Mrs. Garner 
will only receive eleven fortieths of that $450, and 
Mr. Marsh the remaining portion. I think, frankly, I 
think that can be easily dealt with. But that's what 
would happen, based upon Mrs. Garner not getting any 
money right now. 
However, if she got money right now, and she 1 
was not available to repay her portion, then Mr. Marsh 
would be required to pay back all of the money. So in 
essence he's paying twice. He's paying, if he were 
required to pay some now, and then he lived to age sixty 
and she was not available, he would still have to repay 
the full amount, and then he would be paying it a second 
time to the military. The first time to her and the 
second time to the military, and that's not fair or 
equitable, either. 
At any rate, Your Honor, it seems to me that 
the way to deal with this matter is to let things be 
what they are stated, which is in the decree of divorce, 
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pension and retirement benefits when Mr. Marsh gets 
them. She gets her eleven fortieths, and Mr. Marsh 
would stipulate that until the $30,000 sum was paid 
back, this, court could order that Mrs. Marsh be entitled 
to receive his full amount, as well as her full amount 
from the $450 in the example I used. 
And if the court were to do that, what that 
would do is, until the $30,000 was repaid out of the 
portion that would come from the military to these two 
people, Mrs. Marsh, or Ms. Garner would receive within a 
few dollars everything she would have received if she 
received eleven fortieths of the full $1,800 a month. 
And that's a way to ensure that she gets paid. 
The plaintiff seems to make a big deal out of 
the fact that there's a question about whether Mr. Marsh 
will pay. You know, Mr. Marsh deserves credibility in 
this case, Your Honor. He has been in here, and he has 
paid a substantial sum of child support and alimony for 
a lot of years, now, and he was current, in terms of his 
mind, with Recovery Services up until the time of the 
last hearing. And then, since then, based upon the 
orders of this court, he's had to go back and is working 
out the payment of different amounts, but he's still 
making those payments. 
And Mr. Marsh does not deserve, in my view, 
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Your Honor, to be treated as though he is a credit risk 
in this particular case, based upon his track record. 
And, in fact, it doesn't really matter that much, 
because there is going to be money coming from the 
military as long as Ms. Garner's alive. 
So under any circumstance, Your Honor, I 
believe that we have to treat these things as they are. 
It's separate property, separate pay, it's separation 
pay. It's not pension, it's not retirement. The 
statutes clearly hold that. The only case that we can 
find holds that, that it is a sole and separate asset. 
And the very moneys that the plaintiff is asking for are 
paid from an account that is not a retirement or pension 
account with the U.S. Government. It's from a different 
account, not the retirement and pension account. 
Based upon that, Your Honor, I believe that 
Mr. Marsh's position that he did not have an obligation 
to pay eleven fortieths to the plaintiff was a 
well-founded, correct legal and factual position, that 
he has therefore not damaged Ms. Garner in any fashion 
by not paying that money to her. 
That for those reasons, not only should there 
be no judgment against him for monies, but there should 
certainly be no interest of any kind on any judgment, 
nor should there be any attorneys fees. And based upon 
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the status of the facts and nature of this payment, that 
is it's undisputed, it's separation pay, and not 
retirement pay, that Mr. Marsh ought to be entitled to 
his legal fees to which I've testified in reimbursing 
him. 
THE COURT: The court finds that the 
disbursement of $30,000 received by the defendant when 
he was involuntarily separated from the Navy as a result 
of being passed over for separation pay is either a 
marital asset, as a matter of equity is going to be 
divided equitably, or it is anticipatory retirement 
allocation. I think the expert witness referred to it 
as an advance on retirement pay. 
It seems to me that the expert in this case 
was an extremely credible expert, there were no 
objections to his qualifications or to the court finding 
him to be an expert, and therefore his testimony is 
given a lot of weight by this court as a person who has 
expertise in this area. His testimony is clear as a 
bell. Those, I believe, are his exact words. 
He said it's clearly an advance on retirement 
pay. He also said it was a retirement benefit accrued 
during marriage, and it fits squarely under Woodward V. 
Woodward in that connection, and this court so finds. 
This court finds that the W-2 form is 
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consistent with that, showing it as retirement pay. 
Therefore that money is to be split in the manner agreed 
to by the parties at the time of the decree, and that is 
the eleven fortieths allocation. 
This court is concerned about whether to 
allocate eleven fortieths of $30,000, or eleven 
fortieths of some other sum. I am not persuaded that 
anyone has established that the defendant actually 
received $24,000. But what appears to me is that he did 
receive less than $30,000 after taxes were taken out. 
To require that he then gives the plaintiff 
her full share of $30,000, when, in fact, he did not 
receive $30,000, seems inequitable. So what I'm going 
to do is suggest that she's entitled to the 
proportionate share that the parties agreed on of what 
he actually received, and I am finding that it is no 
less than $24,000, and no greater than $30,000, but in 
all likelihood, somewhere in between, depending on what 
his tax rate was at the time. 
If counsel cannot agree on that, proof needs 
to be furnished and an allocation made by Ms. Williams 
based upon that information. If information is not 
provided by the defendant to allow that figure to be 
determined, then it'll be based upon the $30,000. 
This court finds that, based upon the 
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credible testimony, this is a 
but as a matter of equity, it 
to be awarded in the manner in 
reasons the court has so indie 
As to the issue of 
retirement-type benefit, 
is also appropriate for it 
dicated. And for those 
ated. 
interest, this court finds 
that since the defendant has had the full benefit of 
this money since receiving the 
offers to plaintiff to let her 
this, or even to set aside a p 
of escrow account that can be 
same, and has made no 
share in any portion of 
ortion of it in some kind 
earning money, that he is 
responsible for paying some interest on this. I'm 
inclined, instead of making it 
interest rate sought by the pi 
lesser amount consistent with 
percent. Although it was not 
a 10 percent prejudgment 
aintiff, to make it the 
judgment interest of 7.64 
reduced to a judgment, it 
seems more appropriate to me to set it at the lower 
amount. 
It is also clear to 
plaintiff is eligible for what 
election, entitled to an order 
to send her her proportionate 
this court that the 
has been termed the SVP 
directed to the military 
share of the retirement 
income that comes due in the future consistent with the 
decree and with equity. 
It is clear to this 
disbursement of $30,000, that 
court, in looking at this 
in calculating it based 
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upon the y 
service, a 
vested, ha 
it would b 
ears of service, specifically fifteen years of 
nd the fact that the defendant is fully 
s his twenty years in at this juncture, that 
e inequitable and wrong not to give her her 
proportionate share of that sum. 
question, 
coming to 
that this 
often happ 
prevailing 
lose. 
issue that 
both sides 
As to the attorneys fees, that is a tougher 
because I believe that the defendant, in 
court on this matter, had a good faith belief 
was not a settled area. I do not believe, as 
ens, that he came to court taking a shot at 
, believing that in all likelihood he would 
On the contrary, I think this is a legal 
was a bit of a conundrum, if you will, for 
, and not one that is as well settled as some, 
and consequently I'm disinclined to award attorneys 
fees. Both sides are to pay their own. 
Mr. Marsh, 
attorneys 
But I will say this. There is no reason, 
why you have not paid the pre-existing 
fees that you were ordered to pay. There's no 
viable reason, and those need to be paid immediately. 
There's no 
time that 
with? 
reason for those not to be paid. 
Is there anything further at this point in 
I have failed to address that we need to deal 
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MS. WILLIAMS: No, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: I'm going to ask, Ms. Williams, 
that you prepare findings consistent with my ruling, but 
not limit it to the same, consistent with the expert 
witness7 testimony. 
I do find him to be a person with expertise 
in this area, and a person who is credible as a witness. 
And in spite of the fact that he was brought in by the 
plaintiff, he appeared to me to be a person who 
approached this as a disinterested individual with 
expertise in military retirement benefits who had no 
reason to testify for or against either party. And 
consequently I did give his testimony a great deal of 
weight. Is there anything further? 
MS. WILLIAMS: No, Your Honor. 
MR. BIGELOW: No, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: I appreciate the high quality of 
the argument today, and the research that went into it. 
It's always a pleasure to have both counsel in court. 
Best luck to the parties. We're in recess. 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MARION MARSH, VERIFIED PETITION FOR MODIFICATION 
OF DECREE OF DIVORCE AND MOTION FOR 
Plaintiff, RELIEF 
vs. 
SCOTT ALLAN MARSH, Civil No. 894901070 DA 
Judge Leslie A. Lewis 
Defendant. Comm. Michael S. Evans 
COMES NOW the Plaintiff, by and through counsel, Kellie F. 
Williams, and moves and petitions the above-entitled court to 
modify the parties' Decree of Divorce, and grant Plaintiff the 
relief requested and, in support of said petition and motion, 
states and alleges as follows: 
1. That a Decree of Divorce was entered in the above 
captioned matter on August 16, 1989. Within said Decree, Plaintiff 
was awarded the primary physical care, custody and control of the 
parties' four minor children. Defendant was ordered to pay child 
support to Plaintiff the sum of $300.00 per month, per child. That 
order of support was subsequently modified by an order dated 
November 25, 1992, which ordered the Defendant to pay child support 
at the rate of $680.00 per month for the four children. 
2. Since the entry of the Decree of Divorce, the 
circumstances and situation of the parties has changed 
substantially and materially and as follows: 
a. Two of the children have become emancipated and 
there remains two minor children who are in need of support. 
Defendant is currently paying child support to Plaintiff at the 
rate of $170.00 per child. 
b. Defendant's employment has changed and, to the 
knowledge and information of Plaintiff, Defendant is earning 
substantially greater income than at the time of the entry of the 
Decree. 
c. Plaintiff is informed and believes that the support 
that would be paid under the current Utah Uniform Child Support 
Guidelines would be 25% more than the Defendant is currently 
obligated to pay under the existing order. 
3. It is reasonable, necessary and proper that this court 
enter an order modifying the order of child support, so that the 
support is consistent with the Utah Uniform Child Support 
Guidelines, given the current incomes of the parties. Said support 
increase should be retroactive to the date of Plaintiff's filing of 
this Petition for Modification. Further, said support should be 
2 
payable on or before the 1st day of each month in which the support 
is due, and payable until each child attains the age of 18 years or 
graduates from high school in due course, with their class, 
whichever last occurs. 
4. That within the Decree of Divorce, Plaintiff was awarded 
11/40 of all pension and retirement benefits that Defendant would 
receive upon his retirement from military service with the United 
States Government (See, paragraph 7, Decree of Divorce). 
Subsequent to the entry of the Decree, the Defendant received a 
lump sum payment from the United States Navy, of $33,149.40, which 
payment was referred to, on Defendant's W-2, as "pension plan1', a 
copy of which check is attached hereto, designated as Exhibit "A" 
and incorporated herein by reference. After subsequent hearing, 
and by an order dated November 25, 1992, Defendant was to provide 
Plaintiff with the IRS publication relating to the Navy "severance 
payment". Plaintiff was given the right to assert issues related 
to the Navy's severance payment at a later date. The only 
verification that Plaintiff has received is a letter dated 
September 4, 1992, which letter was considered incomplete by the 
court, and a copy of which letter is attached hereto, designated as 
Exhibit "B" and incorporated herein by reference. 
5. Plaintiff is entitled to further verification from 
Defendant as to the nature of this payment and as to whether that 
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pay, which has been called "severance pay or involuntary separate 
pay" should be considered as "pension plan" for purposes of 
division between the parties. 
6. The Plaintiff is in need of attorney's fees and costs in 
bringing this matter before the court, it is reasonable, necessary 
and proper that the Defendant be ordered to pay to Plaintiff her 
reasonable attorney's fees and costs incurred. 
DATED this ^J>-^5ay Of -LJ^^^J^-r^-^ 1994. 
KELLIE F. WILLIAMS 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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STATE OF UTAH ) 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
MARION MARSH (GARNER), being first duly sworn upon oath, 
deposes and states as follows: That she is the Plaintiff in the 
above-captioned matter; that she has read the foregoing PETITION 
FOR MODIFICATION 0$ DECREE OF DIVORCE AND MOTION FOR RELIEF, 
including attachments, and that she understands the contents 
thereof, and that the same is true of her own personal knowledge, 
except as to those matters stated upon information and belief, and 
as to those matters, she believes the same to be true. 
ON THE m day of ^2&cuwx^ 1994, personally 
appeared before me, the undersigned notary, MARION MARSH (GARNER), 
the signer of the foregoing VERIFIED PETITION FOR MODIFICATION OF 
DECREE OF DIVORCE AND MOTION FOR RELIEF, who duly acknowledged to 
me that she signed the same voluntarily and for its stated purpose. 
i 
My Commission Exp ires: Q\\ 
Notary Public 
Residing in Salt Lake County 
r 
.** * * *83 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
W W ! (L. BfcCtfl LJftf 
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KELLIE F. WILLIAMS #3493 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
CORPORON & WILLIAMS, P.C. 
808 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: 801-328-1162 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, DIVISION I 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MARION MARSH, FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SCOTT ALLAN MARSH, Civil No. 894901070 DA 
Judge Leslie A. Lewis 
Defendant. Comm. Michael S. Evans 
THE ABOVE-CAPTIONED MATTER having come on regularly for trial 
before the above-entitled court on April 17, 1997, at the hour of 
9:30 a.m., the Honorable Leslie A. Lewis, Third District Court 
Judge, presiding, on Plaintiff's motions and petitions, and 
Plaintiff being present in person and being represented by counsel, 
Kellie F. Williams, and Defendant being present in person and being 
represented by counsel, Richard Bigelow, and the parties having 
testified and having presented exhibits to the court and Plaintiff 
having called Neil B. Crist as an expert witness, and the court 
having reviewed the file, the case law, and having considered the 
exhibits and testimony, and the court having also considered 
FILED D?5Tf!!CT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
JUN 9 t997 
Defendant's Objection to Commissioner's Recommendation, and based 
thereon, the court now makes and enters the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The parties were divorced by this court on August 16, 
1989, having been married for approximately 15 years. 
2. At the time of the divorce, there were four minor 
children. Plaintiff had been a homemaker, primarily, and Defendant 
had been the primary wage earner, having been engaged in the 
military for a period of 14 years of the marriage. 
3. Within the parties' Decree of Divorce, Plaintiff was 
awarded ll/40ths of all pension and retirement benefits which 
Plaintiff accrued through his service with the United States Navy. 
4. Subsequent to the parties' divorce, Defendant fell in 
arrears in child support and, pursuant to a court order dated 
November 25, 1992, Defendant was then in arrears in support of the 
sum of $7,637.00 through November 1992. 
5. During the period that Defendant was in arrears in his 
child support obligation, Plaintiff fell in arrears in the payment 
of the mortgage owed on the former marital residence, as a result 
of which the home was foreclosed. The deficiency owed due to the 
foreclosure, however, was waived and so Defendant has paid no 
monies out of pocket due to the foreclosure. Based upon the 
foregoing and the commissioner's previous findings, it is 
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EXHIBIT A 
reasonable that Defendant's objection to the commissioner's ruling 
on November 7, 1994 should be denied and overruled. 
6. Subsequent to the Decree of Divorce, Defendant separated 
from the military. The separation was involuntary and based upon 
the Defendant being passed over for promotion on two occasions. 
7. Defendant was paid the sum of $30,000.00, gross, on 
January 31, 1991, as a result of his separation from the U.S. Navy. 
Taxes of $6,000.00 were withheld so that the net actually then 
received by Defendant was $24,000.00 on January 31, 1991. 
8. Defendant received a 1991 W-2 Wage and Tax Statement from 
the Navy Finance Center which designated the disbursement "pension 
plan." 
9. Upon learning of the disbursement, Plaintiff made a claim 
by motion and petition and asked the court for her ll/40ths of the 
payment, based upon the fact that the disbursement was either part 
of Defendant's pension plan or should be considered a marital asset 
for purposes of division between the parties. 
10. Subsequent to his involuntary discharge, Defendant 
continued in the Naval Reserve and, at the time of trial in this 
matter, had over 20 years of service for purposes of a reserve 
retirement. 
11. The separation pay received by Defendant was computed 
based upon Defendant's years of active service, including the years 
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of service during the marriage of Plaintiff and Defendant. 
Defendant has qualified for a reserve retirement and upon 
Defendant's retirement, is he survives, Defendant will have 
deducted from each payment of his retirement pay 75% of the monthly 
benefit until the entire $30,000.00 disbursement was paid in full. 
(10 U.S.C. §1174(h).) Neil B. Crist was called as an expert witness 
and, given no objection by Defendant's counsel, was qualified by 
this court as an expert witness relating to separation and 
retirement pay for members of the Armed Forces. It was his 
testimony that the disbursement was in the nature of an advance on 
Defendant's retirement. Further, Mr. Crist testified that 
Defendant's military retirement would be calculated by adding 
points earned in both years of active military service and years of 
service in the reserve. Defendant would receive substantially 
greater points for the years of active service versus his years as 
a member of the Naval Reserve. Therefore, upon receipt of his 
reserve retirement, the majority of the monthly retirement or, 
approximately, 90%, which was Mr. Crist's best guess, would be 
attributable to the years of active service versus the reserve 
service years. Therefore, when the monthly retirement payments are 
reduced by 75%, and there is 25% remaining, Plaintiff would only be 
entitled to a portion of ll/40ths of that 25% payment. Upon 
Defendant's retirement, it would be impossible for Plaintiff to be 
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made whole and receive her ll/40ths of Defendant's retirement as 
awarded to her at the time of the Decree. Only after payment in 
fullf by offset, of the entire $30,000.00, would Plaintiff then be 
able to receive her ll/40ths of the retired pay. 
12. The court finds that the $30,000.00 disbursement made to 
Plaintiff when he separated from the Navy is either a marital asset 
or in anticipation of retirement and therefore "advance on 
retirement." The court finds the expert witness, Mr. Crist to be 
extremely credible and his testimony should be given a great deal 
of weight. Mr. Crist testified that the monies received were 
clearly an advance on Defendant's retirement benefits that had 
accrued and that the monies fit squarely under the holding of 
Woodward v. Woodward, 656 P.2d 431 (Utah 1982). 
13. Plaintiff should be entitled to ll/40ths of the amount 
actually received by Defendant, which sum shall be no less than the 
$24,000.00 net paid to him on January 31, 1991. Defendant shall 
provide Plaintiff, immediately, with his 1991 tax return so that 
Plaintiff can calculate Defendant's actual tax consequences of the 
$30,000.00 gross disbursement. Plaintiff shall then receive 
ll/40ths of that actual sum. However, if Defendant does not 
immediately provide that tax return to Plaintiff, then Plaintiff 
will be awarded ll/40ths of the full gross sum of $30,000.00. 
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14. Defendant has had the full benefit of the money since 
February 1991. It is reasonable, necessary and proper that 
Defendant be ordered to pay interest to Plaintiff at judgment 
interest rate of 7.64% on the amount that should have been paid to 
Defendant, commencing February 1, 1991 and until paid in full. 
15. The court finds that Plaintiff is eligible for an SVP 
election and is entitled to any necessary order to permit her make 
that SVP election with the military. 
16. The court finds that Defendant had a good faith belief 
that he was entitled to the funds that he had received. The 
disbursement received was one received in an area that is not 
settled. It is reasonable that each party bear their own 
attorney's fees and court costs incurred in bringing this matter 
before the court. 
BASED UPON the foregoing Findings of Fact, the court now makes 
and enters the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF IAW 
1. The court has jurisdiction over the parties to this 
action and over the subject matter of this action. 
2. The Defendant's Objection to Commissioner's 
Recommendation, dated November 7, 1994, should be denied and 
overruled. 
6 
3. Plaintiff should be entitled to an award of ll/40ths of 
the disbursement received by Defendant in 1991, together with 
interest thereon at 7.64%, from January 1, 1991 and pursuant to the 
foregoing Findings of Fact. 
4. Each party should pay their-own attorney's fees and court 
costs incurred in^this matter. 
DATED THIS i/l 'xday of 
APPROVED: 
LESttfE A. LEWIS 
Third District Court Judge 
RICHARD BIGELOW 
Attorney for Defendant 
DATED: 
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Bruce H. Shapiro (Bar No. 4761) 
BRUCE H. SHAPIRO, P.C. 
Attorneys for Defendant 
3760 S. Highland Drive, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
Telephone: 273-3314 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MARION MARSH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SCOTT ALLAN MARSH, 
Defendant. 
AFFIDAVIT OF DEFENDANT IN 
SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION FOR ORDER TO 
SHOW CAUSE 
Civil No. 894901070DA 
Judge Leslie Lewis 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss 
County of Salt Lake ) 
The undersigned, Scott Allan Marsh, being duly sworn under oath, states 
and represents to the court as follows: 
1. I am the Defendant in the above-entitled action. 
2. Pursuant to the Divorce Decree entered on august 16, 1989, Plaintiff 
was ordered to assume, pay, and hold me harmless on the mortgage obligation secured by 
real property located at 8966 South 3860 West, West Jordan, Utah. 
3. On or about November 1, 1991, I received information from the 
Veterans Administration that the mortgage was in arrears and that foreclosure proceedings 
had been instituted. 
4. Subsequent to November, 1991, I received information that the 
property had been foreclosed and that there was an arrearage amount due and owing of 
$13,028.11. Exhibit "A \ CSC Credit Services, Inc., deposition of Marion Marsh, p. 
49:13-15. 
5- I have since made demand upon the Plaintiff to pay off the arrearage 
amount, but to date she refuses to make arrangements for payment thereon. Deposition of 
Marion Marsh, p. 50:2-17. 
6. Because I was contractually obligated for the mortgage and the 
Plaintiff did not assume, pay, or hold me harmless on the mortgage obligation, I have been 
unable to obtain a loan through the Veterans Administration. 
7. I have been informed by the Veterans Administration that if I do not 
pay off the arrearage amount, I will not be able to ever qualify for a Veterans 
Administration loan and other GI benifits. 
8. The loan default has caused a cloud on my credit reporting. 
DATED this , P / day of September, 1994. 
SCOTT ALLAN MARSH 
ISO. 2 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this Si da^of Septe 
LES F. EHGLAH3 ! 
Sutherland h, c^..™ I 
375C Hwilcr.<! Pr.v- j 
Sail lakes f/fy Ut«i iy«. i* \ 
j \ f >v^_^'- y My Ccrr.,T.is3iC!i Expires l 't"oi'X i 
I *>*IZ*2** STATE OF UTAH • 
•42-)TARY^Bi:iC 
Residing in 
1994. 
Commission expires 
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fORWARDING AND ADDRESS 
CORRECTION REQUESTED 
COVEKNMENT S£RVIC£S OIVISION 
3 6 0 - 3 9 9 2 6 4 
SCOTT A MARSH 
1 8 0 5 MILLBROOK RD 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 8 4 1 0 6 
CSC Credit S e r v i c e s Inc . 
Collection Sorvicob Division 
7909 Parkwood Circla 
Sulto 250 
Houston, Toxas 77036 
7 I J / 9 9 5 - 3 6 3 0 
800/444-4965 
Re: DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS 
Name: SCOTT A MARSH 
Loan No: 54688591500SAMARSH21 
Principal Amount: 12469.58 
Interest Referred: 401.38 
Interest Accrued: 157.15 
Total Due: 13028.11 
AUG 25 1993 
Dear SCOTT A MARSH, 
Your delinquent loan balance owed to the DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS 
has been placed with our office for immediate collection. 
The serious delinquency of this loan necessitates that the total amount 
due be sent immediately. Failure to respond will leave us no alternative 
but to use all appropriate remedies we deem necessary to ensure 
collection of this loan. 
All funds should be made payable to the DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS 
and mailed in the enclosed envelope. Do not make your check payable to 
lour organization; do not send cash or postage stamps as payment. 
^11 inquiries concerning your loan should be made directly to our office 
at the address and telephone number above. 
Sincerely, 
REBECCA JOHNSON 
Office Manager 
<c: file 
PLEASE SEE REVERSE SIDE FOR IMPORTANT INFORMATION 
EXHIBIT "A 
THIS COMMUNICATION IS AN ATTEMPT TO COLLECT A 
DEBT AND ANY INFORMATION OBTAINED WILL BE USED 
FOR THAT PURPOSE. 
UNLESS YOU NOTIFY THIS OFFICE WITHIN THIRTY (30) 
DAYS AFTER RECEIVING THIS NOTICE THAT YOU DIS-
PUTE THE VALIDITY OF THE DEBT OR ANY PORTION 
THEREOF, THIS OFFICE WILL ASSUME THIS DEBT IS 
VALID. IF YOU NOTIFY THIS OFFICE IN WRITING 
WITHIN THIRTY DAYS FROM RECEIVING THIS NOTICE, 
THIS OFFICE WILL OBTAIN VERIFICATION OF THE 
DEBT OR OBTAIN A COPY OF A JUDGEMENT AND MAIL 
YOU A COPY OF SUCH JUDGEMENT OR VERIFICATION. 
IF YOU REQUEST THIS OFFICE IN WRITING WITHIN 
THIRTY DAYS AFTER RECEIVING THIS NOTICE, THIS 
OFFICE WILL PROVIDE YOU WITH THE NAME AND 
ADDRESS OF THE ORIGINAL CREDITOR, IF DIFFERENT 
FROM THE CURRENT CREDITOR. 
EXHIBIT "B " 
Most o f the times tha t h e ' s s l e o t the re , we have been 
watching T V or t a l k i n g and j u s t f a l l e n a s l e e o . as most 
couoles do 
Q How about when he s leeos in your bedroom? 
A What do you mean7 
Q You t e s t i f i e d e a r l i e r that he has s l e o t in your 
bedroom b e f o r e 
A r e s 
I n the l a s t s i x months? 
Yes 
Were you s l e e o m g in the bedroom, a lso? 
Yes . I have f a l l e n as leeo in the bedroom, too . 
Okay. But you c a n ' t r e c a l l hou many t imes 
14 t h a t ' s occurred? 
[15 A. No. I t ' s not been — i t ' s been ve ry feu t imes . 
16 but I t does haooen on occasion when I know h e ' s too 
t i red to drive. I f a l l asleeo: he's fa l len asleeo. 
18 Sometimes I f a l l as leeo t a l k i n g to him. and he ends up 
19 f a l l i n g a s l e e o . too . Sometimes he gets uo and l e a v e s . 
Q. Where I s your T .V . located? 
A. I n my bedroom. 
Q. Okay. Have you ever s l e o t in h i s bedroom i n the 
l a s t s i x months I n h i s home? 
A. Uh-huh. 
Q. Has he been In the bedroom? 
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PAGE 46 
Huh-uh. 
Okay. Have you ever traveled to Washington D.C. 
Mr. Garner, or to the State of Washington? 
Huh-uh. 
Have you ever told any of your children not to 
ft*. Jlarsh that you're engaged because he w i l l get 
Yes. I told my daughter that. 
When did you t e l l her that? 
When [ told her that ue were getting married, 
two weeks or a month ago No. i t hasn't been a 
I t ' s only been a few weeks. 
With the exceotion of Sryana, are any of the 
children In counseling? 
Yes 
Who? 
Ana 
What's she in counseling for? 
Sexual problems that she had when she was at 
s house 
Are you currently in counseling? 
I see the counselor too. res 
Is rt Gcr^er currently m course I irg? 
5
1 
2
1 
( 
He s t a r t e d going w i t h us yes 
SHAPIRO Ckay I 'm going to take a snor t b reak . 1 
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and I ' l l be back in a minute 
(Whereuoon a discussion was held off the record ) 
rR SHAPIRO Let 's go back on the record I ' l l rind 
the rest of my notes We re almost done 
Q When did you begin discussing marriage olans 
with r r Garner? 
A In March of '91 
0 /larch of '91? 
A Uh-huh. 
Q. Have the kids ever sDent any summers at IV . 
Garner's home? 
A. Christooher. 
0 Christooher has? What summers? 
A. Summer of '93 
0. Have the kids ever soent Christmas over at ft*. 
Garner's home? 
A. No. 
Q Thanksgivings? 
A. Yes. 
0. Which Thanksgiving? 
A. *92. 
Q. Has Ana ever SDent any time at Mr. Garner's 
relatives? 
A. Yes. 
Q. When? 
INTERMOUNTAIN COURT REPORTERS 263-1396 
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I A. Summer o f ' 9 3 . 
! Q. How long; f u l l summer? 
\ A. No. i t was about two months. 
i Q. Two months? 
A. Uh-huh. 
Q. Why? 
A. Because she wanted to go down and s t a y w i t h 
them. She had made r e a l good f r i e n d s - w i t h h i s 
s i s t e r - i n - l a w and wanted to go s t a y w i t h her because 
they t o l d her she cou ld work down there 
0 So she stayed w i t h the s i s t e r - i n - l a w ? 
A Uh-huh 
Q T e l l me about the home you l i v e d in a t 8966 
South 3860 West. Old i t go i n t o f o r e c l o s u r e ? 
A Yes. 
Q Whose name was on the promissory note? 
A S c o t t ' s and mine 
Q Okay Were you ordered to assume. Day. and hold 
Scott harmless on the mortgage? 
A 1 was ordered to pay the mortgage, yes 
Q Okay Are you aware of a d e f i c i e n c y 7 
A No 
Q Okay I'm going to hand / c u u h a t ' s been marked 
as E x h i b l t No 3 
Have you ever r e c e i v e d any n o t i c e s l i k e t h i s ? 
INTERMCUNTAIN COURT REPORTERS 2 6 3 - 1 3 9 6 
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DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIHS 
Regional Office 
125 South State Street 
POBox 11500 
Salt Lake City UT 84147 
November 4, 199<± A 
Marion Marsh Garner 41-41-2-0137885 
8966 S 3860 W 
West Jordan, UT 
Dear Ms. Garner: 
Per our telephone conversation yesterday, the records on the above subject loan, 
which you were a co-obligor, indicate the foreclosure sale was held on March 10, 
1992. There was a debt of $12,469.58 established against the veteran. 
Scott Marsh requested a waiver of this debt and it was granted on December 13, 
1993. He does not have to pay this debt unless he wants his VA entitlement 
restored for future use. 
If you have any further questions please contact me at 801-524-3411 ext. 2617. 
Sincerely yours, 
GREEN 
iz.ii Service Representative 
360-399264 
SCOTT A MARSH 
1805 MILLBROOK 
SALT LAKE CITY 
RD 
UT 84106 
S««llo 2 3 0 
Houston. Toxas 7 7 0 3 G 
7 1 3 / 9 9 5 - 3 6 3 0 
800/444-4965 
Re: DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS 
Name: SCOTT A MARSH 
Loan No: 54688591500SAMARSH21 
Principal Amount: 12469,58 
Interest Referred: 401.38 
Interest Accrued: 157.15 
Total Due: 13028.11 
AUG 25 1993 
Dear SCOTT A MARSH, 
Your delinquent loan balance owed to the DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS 
has been placed with our office for immediate collection. 
The serious delinquency of this loan necessitates that the total amount 
due be sent immediately. Failure to respond will leave us no alternative 
but to use all appropriate remedies we deem necessary to ensure 
collection of this loan. 
All funds should be made payable to the DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS 
and mailed in the enclosed envelope. Do not make your check payable to 
our organization; do not send cash or postage stamps as payment. 
All inquiries concerning your loan should be made directly to our office 
at the address and telephone number above. 
Sincerely, 
REBECCA JOHNSON 
Office Manager 
cc: file 
PLEASE SEE REVERSE SIDE FOR IMPORTANT INFORMATION 
EXHIBIT " 
% 
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TERRY R. SPENCER, Ph.D. #6635 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
CORPORON & WILLIAMS, P.C. 
310 South Main Street 
Suite 1400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: 801-328-1162 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MARION MARSH, PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE TO 
DEFENDANT'S ORDER TO 
Plaintiff, SHOW CAUSE 
vs . 
Civil No. 894901070 DA 
SCOTT ALLAN MARSH, 
Judge: Leslie Lewis 
Defendant. Comm.: Michael S. Evans 
PLAINTIFF, by and through counsel, Terry R. Spencer, hereby 
responds to Defendant's Order to Show Cause as follows, based on 
the affidavit of Plaintiff filed herewith: 
1. The parties are formerly husband and wife and were 
divorced pursuant to a Decree of Divorce entered on or about August 
16, 1989, by Judge Raymond S. Uno of the above-entitled court. 
2. That the parties are the parents of four children, two of 
which are still minors. 
3. Pursuant to the Decree of Divorce, Plaintiff was awarded 
the physical custody of the parties' minor children, and Defendant 
sx 
was ordered to pay $300.00 per month per child for child support 
for a total of $1,200.00 per month, plus $468.00 per month in 
alimony. Plaintiff was also awarded the marital home located at 
8966 South 3860 West, West Jordan, Utah, subject to paying and 
holding Defendant harmless on the mortgage thereon. A copy of the 
Decree of Divorce is attached to Plaintiff's Affidavit as Exhibit 
"A" . 
4. Defendant failed and refused to pay the ordered child 
support and alimony ordered by the court in the Decree of Divorce, 
and by November 1992, the date the Decree of Divorce was last 
modified, Defendant was in arrears for family support in the amount 
of $7,63 7.00. A copy of the Order modifying the Decree of Divorce, 
which identifies Defendant's arrearage amount, is attached to 
Plaintiff's Affidavit as Exhibit "B". 
5. Because of Defendant's willful failure to pay the child 
support and alimony ordered by this court, Plaintiff was unable to 
maintain the mortgage on the real property located at 8966 South 
3860 West, West Jordan, Utah. 
6. The subject real property was foreclosed on March 10, 
1992, with an outstanding debt of $12,469.58 after the sale of the 
house to cover loan arrearages, sale costs and attorney's fees. 
2 
See the Letter from the Veterans Administration, dated November 4, 
1994, and attached to Plaintiff's Affidavit as Exhibit "C". 
7. As a result of a request by Defendant, the outstanding 
debt on this property was waived by the Veterans Administration was 
v/aived as of December 13, 1993, and there is nothing now due and 
owing to the Veterans Administration. See the Letter from the 
Veterans Administration, dated November 4, 1994, and attached to 
Plaintiff's Affidavit as Exhibit "C". 
8. Because: (1) there is now no debt due and owing to the 
Veterans Administration, (2) if any amount had been due and owing, 
tjhat amount would have been a direct result of Defendant's failure 
to pay family support as required by the Decree of Divorce, and (3) 
Defendant knew, at the time this Order to Show cause was filed, 
that no money was due and owing to the Veterans Administration; 
Defendant has brought this matter before the court with unclean 
h&nds and in bad faith, and therefore, Defendant should be required 
to pay Plaintiff's attorney's fees pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
Section 78-27-56 and/or Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
3 
DATED this 4th day of November, 1994. 
CORPORON & WILLIAMS 
TERRY p. SPENCER, Ph.D 
Attorn'ey for Plaintiff 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MARSH, MARION 
VS 
MARSH, SCOTT ALLAN 
PLAINTIFF 
DEFENDANT 
MINUTE ENTRY 
CASE NUMBER 894901070 DA 
DATE 11/07/94 
HONORABLE MICHAEL S. EVANS 
COURT REPORTER TAPE-1-1500 
COURT CLERK CPW 
TYPE OF HEARING: MOTION HEARING 
PRESENT: PLAINTIFF DEFENDANT 
P. ATTY. SPENCER, TERRY 
D. ATTY. SHAPIRO, BRUCE H 
COMM. RECOMMENDS: 
1. DEFT'S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT FOR DEFICIENCY AMOUNT REGARDING 
THE HOME IS DENIED FOR REASONS NOTED ON THE RECORD. 
2. FOR REASONS NOTED ON THE RECORD, COMMISSIONER WILL NOT RECOM-
MEND ISSUE OF PLTF'S CONTEMPT BE CERTIFIED FOR FURTHER 
HEARING. 
3. EACH PARTY BEAR THEIR OWN FEES AND COSTS FOR TODAY'S HEARING. 
MR. SHAPIRO PREPARE ORDER 
TabK 
Exhibit 
K 
RlShWrd Nr Bigelow (Bar No. 3991) 
Attorney for Defendant 
700 Kearns Building 
136 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 364-6450 
W OCT | 7 AM 8-- 5 5 
r;
 Pun- CLEhh 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, DIVISION I 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MARION MARSH, 
Plaintiff, ) 
vs. 
SCOTT ALLAN MARSH, 
Defendant. 
I AFFIDAVIT OF SCOTT A. MARSH 
i Civil No. 894901070 DA 
i Judge Leslie A. Lewis 
STATE OF UTAH ) ):ss 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
COMES NOW Defendant Scott Allan Marsh and hereby affirms as follows: 
1. I have personal knowledge of the facts contained herein. 
2. I am the defendant in the above entitled matter. 
3. I live in and am jointly purchasing a home in Salt Lake County with my wife, 
Leslie Marsh, located at 10034 S. Jordan Crest Circle, South Jordan, Utah 84065. 
4. My wife, three of her five children from a previous marriage, her mother and I 
all reside in that home. 
5. My wife did not receive support from her previous husband for several years 
(although earlier this year she began to receive support from him) and so each month I 
was required to spend monies from my paycheck to assist in providing support to the 
children who reside with me. 
6. My wife and I have each been employed in Salt Lake County for more than the 
last five years, her children go to school in Salt Lake County. My minor daughter does live 
and attend school in Weber County. 
7. I have been current in the payment of my support obligations to Plaintiff since 
1992 except when the Court has made a decision to order retroactive support, and then 
I have quickly paid off any arrearages the Court determined were owed. 
8. My employment is stable. 
9. I do not have the lump sum amount owed Plaintiff from the most recent Court 
Order. 
10. I have filed a Declaration of Homestead regarding my property pursuant to Utah 
Code Annotate Section 78-23-3 et. seq. 
DATED this day of 0Cfi?0&t- , 1997. 
Respectfully submitted, 
^ ^ 
Scott Allan Marsh 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this ( d a y of October, 1997 n 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
ULJLJCQ. - ) 
Nrt^Pubnc""'"^ My Commission expires: Kji/O/rfty 
TRACI K. ROSS 
2:534 Newtopta Circle i 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84121 J 
M>' Commission Expires • 
October 10, 1999 I 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF SCOTT A. 
MARSH was mailed, postage prepaid, on this /SHr^dav of O^ts , 1997 to: 
Kellie F. Williams 
CORPORON & WILLIAMS 
808 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
^JJ<J- \yy_ 
MARSH.AFF 
